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This thesis seeks to describe, critically analyse and evaluate the welfare reforms of the 
Fourth (1990-99) and Fifth (2008-2014) National Governments. I develop a 
theoretical framework for these tasks, drawing from the social democratic and neo-
Marxist traditions of the political economy of welfare. In particular, the theories of 
Gosta Esping-Andersen and Frank Castles are used. Esping-Andersen developed a set 
of criteria for categorising welfare states, leading to the identification of three regime 
types: liberal, social democratic and conservative. Castles argues New Zealand was 
part of a separate category, which he characterised as the Wage Earners Welfare State 
(WEWS). The WEWS linked social security to participation in paid work, and 
ensured full employment for working-aged males. These theories are complemented 
by the insights from the neo-Marxist tradition, which provides a more critical 
analysis of the role the welfare state plays in maintaining capitalism. This framework 
is supplemented by an analysis of the new paternalist school of thought originating in 
the United States. New paternalism strongly influenced the welfare reforms of the 
Fourth National Government, and provides a basis for critically analysing the 
similarities and differences of the two National Governments.  
The thesis then outlines the focusing on the Fourth and Fifth National Government’s 
respectively. Each of the Fourth National Government’s three terms is described and 
analysed. This Government’s welfare reforms initially focused on improving the 
financial incentives facing beneficiaries, but by the end of National’s reign the 
emphasis had shifted to implementing obligations, backed with the threat of 
sanctions. I argue this reflected a move away from a neoliberalism dominated by 
classical liberalism, to a neoliberalism more heavily influenced by conservatism and 
new paternalism. The Fifth National Government has reintroduced and expanded the 
obligation and sanction-based approach, reflecting the influence of a neoliberalism 
influenced by conservative principles.  
Overall, I argue that a neoliberal welfare regime emerged under the Fourth National 
Government, which has been entrenched by the Fifth National Government. This 
critical investigation has generated four key findings. First, it is demonstrated that 
new paternalism heavily influenced the reforms of the Fourth National Government 
and the Fifth National Government continued to implement paternalist reforms. 
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Second, New Zealand has clearly moved towards what Esping-Andersen identified as 
the liberal welfare regime, which excludes and stigmatises beneficiaries. Third, I draw 
on the argument that the WEWS has been “hollowed out” by welfare reforms. I 
demonstrate that the WEWS now represents a Trojan horse, which maintains the 
valorisation of work and protection for working families, but brings with it increased 
inequality, poverty, and stigmatisation and exclusion of beneficiaries. Finally, 
underlying these welfare reforms is a changed relationship between the state and the 
reserve army of labour. The state is now driven by two goals: to decrease the cost of 
the reserve army to the state through reduced welfare spending and to assist the 
growth of low quality work by encouraging beneficiaries into jobs characterised by 
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On April the 1st, 1991, benefit rates were slashed by the National Government as part 
of its neoliberal redesign of the welfare state. The result of these cuts was a 40% rise 
in poverty.1 In 1999, a Labour-led Government was elected, and despite stating their 
goal to reduce poverty amongst beneficiaries, did not increase benefit rates to pre-
1991 levels.2 In 2004, the Labour Government introduced the Working for Families 
package, which was in part designed to eradicate poverty. The package targeted 
families with at least one partner in fulltime work. Beneficiaries would not receive the 
package, as they were not in full time work. Thus, even by the predictions of 
government research, the package would reduce child poverty by only 30%. The 
children of beneficiaries would remain as part of the 70% in poverty.3 Currently, 
approximately 16% of the total population live below the poverty line, a total of 
690,000 people. Childhood poverty remains, with 22%, or 230,000 children, living in 
poverty.4 In families reliant on a benefit for their income, child poverty is between 75-
80%, compared to 11% for families with at least one parent in full-time employment, 
as Labour’s WFF package did reduce poverty amongst working families. In total, 62% 
of children in poverty come from homes that rely on a benefit, with the remaining 
38% coming from families with employment.5 Clearly, New Zealand’s welfare state 
fails to prevent poverty amongst the wider population, and particularly for those who 
rely on a benefit for their main source of income. This outcome has been driven in 
part by the policy decisions made by consecutive governments. This thesis examines 
some of these decisions, particularly those made when the National Party has been in 
Government. 
                                                   
1  Brian Easton, “Poverty and Families: Priority or Piety?,” (Paper to “Issues for 
Families” workshop, October 1993, Working Paper 93/62 Economic and Social Trust 
on New Zealand), 11. 
2 Helen Clark and Steve Maharey, Pathways to Opportunity: From Social Welfare to 
Social Development (Wellington: Government Printer, 2001), 2. 
3 Brian Roper, Prosperity for All? Economic, Social and Political Change in New 
Zealand Since 1935 (Southbank: Thomson Dunmore Press, 2005), 233. 
4  Bryan Perry, Household Incomes in New Zealand: Trends in Indicators of 
Inequality and Hardship 1982 to 2013: Summary Report (Wellington: Ministry of 
Social Development, 2014), 23. 




This thesis seeks to describe, critically analyse and evaluate the welfare reforms of the 
Fourth (1990-99) and Fifth (2008-2014) National Governments. I limit my analysis 
of the Fifth National Government to all policies implement until their re-election for a 
third term in September 2014. The thesis proceeds in four parts. First, I seek to 
develop a theoretical framework, which provides the tools for analysing and 
evaluating the welfare reforms. Second, I aim to describe the Fourth and Fifth 
National Government’s welfare reforms. This involves describing the key policy 
reforms of the governments, as well as identifying the theoretical underpinnings of 
these policies. Third, I critically analyse the key similarities and differences between 
the two governments. More specifically, I aim to identify whether the two National 
Governments have been guided by a shared theoretical outlook on welfare, and 
whether this has manifested in the advocacy of similar policy reforms. Finally, I will 
use the concepts developed in the theoretical framework to evaluate whether 
National’s reforms represent a fundamental change in the way New Zealand delivers 
social security. Thus, I seek to describe the welfare reforms, critically analyse the 
similarities and differences between the two Governments, and evaluate the 
importance of these reforms by applying a theoretical perspective which I have 
developed. In writing this thesis I hope to provide an insight into how social security 
has evolved under National, and to contribute to the analysis of the Fifth National 
Government’s reforms. It is important to note here that I am not seeking to identify 
the causes of welfare reform. There is a substantial amount of literature on this topic, 
and such a task has been well done in the New Zealand context.6 Identifying the 
causes of the reforms would require expanding my research aims to encompass the 
wider history and political economy of welfare reform. Such a task is not possible 
given the length of a Master’s thesis.  
Terminology 
The literature on welfare reform is characterised by a range of approaches, reflecting 
differing definitions of what the welfare state encompasses. The welfare state can be 
defined to include: social welfare (e.g. unemployment, sickness benefits etc.); 
                                                   
6 See Peter Starke, Radical Welfare State Retrenchment: A Comparative Analysis 




housing; health; education; accident compensation; and economic regulations.7 Thus, 
it is important to identify what aspects of the welfare state will be analysed in this 
thesis. My approach is guided by the work of Mike O’Brien and Frank Castles. In his 
2008 book Poverty, Policy and the State, O’Brien sought to provide a comprehensive 
discussion and examination of the broad shape of social security reform. Social 
security refers to the “provision of some form of secure basis of income for members 
of society,” which is provided on the basis of shared citizenship.8 This includes the 
major benefit categories, such as the unemployment, sickness and domestic purposes 
benefit, as well as family benefits. Castles argues New Zealand’s social security, or a 
minimum income for members of society, has historically been delivered through a 
system of economic regulation, which he calls the Wage Earners’ Welfare State 
(WEWS). This argument is explored in-depth in chapter one. Thus, O’Brien’s 
definition of social security provision is supplemented by an emphasis on the 
economic regulations which support it. When I discuss social security, I refer to both 
welfare benefits and the economic regulation which supports it, whereas welfare 
refers only to the provision of welfare benefits (unemployment, DPB etc.). This 
definition excludes health, education, and superannuation. Following from O’Brien’s 
approach, superannuation is not considered for two reasons. Firstly, such an analysis 
would require too much space, which would reduce the quality of the rest of his work. 
Secondly, the elderly are far less likely to be in poverty.9  
Chapter Summary 
With respect to the overall structure of the thesis, chapters one and two outline the 
theoretical framework for this thesis. Chapters three and four present the two case 
studies; chapter three describes the Fourth National Government’s welfare reforms 
and chapter four the Fifth National Government, who have adopted an approach 
which is kindred in many respects with the welfare reforms of the 1990s. Chapter five 
brings the previous four chapters together, and critically analyses and evaluates the 
National Government’s welfare reforms. 
                                                   
7 Chris Rudd, “The Welfare State,” in The Political Economy of New Zealand, ed. 
Brian Roper and Chris Rudd (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1997), 237. 
8  Mike O’Brien, Poverty Policy and the State: Social Security Reform in New 
Zealand (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2008), 11. 




The first chapter develops the theoretical framework for describing and evaluating 
the impact of welfare reforms. This framework is developed through a review of the 
political economy of welfare. The chapter begins with a description of the “regimes 
debate” between Gosta Esping-Andersen and Frank Castles. Esping-Andersen began 
this debate with his typology of welfare regimes. He argues welfare states could be 
categorised into three “regimes”: liberal; social democratic; and conservative. He 
characterises New Zealand as a liberal regime, which seeks to ensure the primacy of 
the market by encouraging beneficiaries to participate in paid employment, and 
consequently leads to the stigmatisation of those outside the labour market. Frank 
Castles shows several deficiencies with this categorisation. He argues Australia and 
New Zealand were characterised by a WEWS, which provided social security through 
ensuring full employment and high wage work. Then, the three dominant traditions 
in political economy are described: neoliberalism; social democracy; and neo-
Marxism. Each tradition provides a different characterisation of the relationship 
between the welfare state and capitalism. Neoliberals view the welfare state as a 
costly burden on the economy; social democrats view welfare as ameliorating 
inequality and extending social citizenship; and neo-Marxists view it as a crucial 
institution in ensuring the profitability and legitimacy of capitalism. Finally, I outline 
my own position in relation to these traditions. I predominantly draw from the social 
democratic theories of Esping-Andersen and Castles. I supplement their theories with 
the more critical insights derived from neo-Marxism, particularly regarding the role 
welfare and unemployment plays in maintaining capitalism. 
The second chapter contributes to the theoretical framework by providing a basis to 
critically analyse the similarities and differences between the welfare reforms of the 
two National Governments. This is found in the work of Conservative thinkers from 
the US in the 1970s and 80s, from whom emerged a school of thought known as new 
paternalism. These conservatives argue the then current generation of adults were 
behaving fundamentally differently from previous generations, which was driven by a 
breakdown of morality. This led to the rise of an underclass, who were united by their 
behavioural deficiencies. Out of this wider concern for society came a specific analysis 
and critique of welfare. They argue beneficiaries were unable to help themselves 
because of their behavioural deficiencies. Thus, welfare agencies must actively 
intervene in order to inculcate morally appropriate behaviours. This intervention 




mould their children’s behaviour, hence the name new paternalism.  This eliminates 
the behavioural deficiencies which caused people to require welfare, allowing 
beneficiaries to exit welfare and poverty. From this discussion, the key elements of 
new paternalism are identified.  
The third chapter outlines the welfare reforms of the Fourth National Government. It 
begins with a brief description of the economic history of New Zealand dating back to 
1945. It outlines New Zealand’s history of economic growth and full employment, and 
then the lengthy crisis which engulfed the country from the mid-1970s. This provides 
context for the reforms National implemented. Each of National’s three terms is 
considered chronologically. The major reforms in each term are described, and the 
key themes identified. Broadly, the three terms are characterised by a shift in 
thinking by the Government. I argue the reforms of the early 1990s were driven by 
neoclassical economic theories. This meant an emphasis on reducing public debt and 
decreasing benefit rates. By the end of the 1990s, National was strongly influenced by 
the new paternalist school of thought. I characterise this shift as a change from a 
neoliberalism dominated by classical liberalism, to one more heavily influenced by 
conservatism.  
The fourth chapter describes the welfare reforms of the Fifth National Government. It 
begins with a brief description of the welfare reforms of the Fifth Labour Government 
(1999-2008) and the economic conditions facing National upon its return to 
Government. Then, as with previous chapter, the welfare reforms are described, and 
their key themes identified. Overall, National’s goal was to reduce welfare 
dependency by encouraging people into work. This encouragement took the form of a 
“punitive, obligation-based, sanction-reinforced process.”10 Sole parents, people with 
health issues, and youth were targeted by reforms, with each group facing an array of 
new obligations. National also utilised a particular form of rhetoric to justify their 
reforms, which sought to avoid the controversy created by its 1990s reforms. This 
chapter does not contain the same level of analysis as the previous chapter, as that 
task is left until chapter five. 
The final chapter critically analyses and evaluates the welfare reforms of the two 
National Governments. I critically analyse the similarities and differences between 
                                                   
10 Mike O’Brien, “Work-First and Active Labour Markets,” in New Zealand New 




the two Governments by comparing the reforms of the two National Governments in 
light of the new paternalist ideology set out in chapter two. I show that there are 
significant similarities between the two governments with respect to new 
paternalism. Then, I begin the evaluation of the reforms by applying Esping-
Andersen’s concepts to the reforms; this analysis shows a clear movement towards a 
liberal welfare regime. A similar analysis is done using Castles’ concepts. This shows 
the WEWS was effectively destroyed by the Fourth National Government. Labour 
made some attempt to reform the WEWS in the 2000s, and the Fifth National 
Government have largely kept the reforms. However, I argue these reforms represent 
a Trojan horse; it keeps the façade of the WEWS, but brings with it increased 
inequality, poverty, and the stigmatisation and exclusion of beneficiaries. Then, I 
utilise the insights of neo-Marxism to develop two related arguments, that underlying 
the welfare reforms was a changing relationship between the state and the reserve 
army of labour, and further that welfare reforms now serve to strengthen the 
incentive to work through increasing poverty, in order to encourage participation in 
low quality work. Finally, I bring these four key findings together, and show that the 
Fourth National Government was a more radical reformer of welfare. The Fifth 
National Government is less radical, but has continued to move New Zealand to the 
political right, guided by neoliberalism. Given the popularity of these reforms, I 
conclude the Fifth National Government is entrenching the neoliberal features of 
New Zealand’s welfare and social security provision. 
Wider Significance of Analysing Welfare Reform 
I hope this work will contribute to wider academic debates in three areas. Firstly, the 
analysis of the Fifth National Government’s welfare policies has been relatively 
limited. Mike O’Brien, Susan St John, Louise Humpage and Peter Starke have 
published articles or chapters on welfare reform.11 A larger volume was published by 
                                                   
11 Mike O’Brien, “Lone Parents Working for Welfare in New Zealand,” Local Economy 
27 (5-6, 2012): 577-592, Mike O’Brien and Tapio Salonen, “Child Poverty and Child 
Rights Meet Active Citizenship: A New Zealand and Sweden Case Study,” Childhood 
18 (2, 2011): 211-226, Mike O’Brien, “Welfare Reform in Aotearoa/New Zealand From 
Citizen to Managed Worker,” Social Policy and Administration 47 (6, December 
2013): 729–748, Susan St John contributed to Shaun Wilson et al., “Wage-Earners’ 
Welfare after Economic Reform: Refurbishing, Retrenching or Hollowing Out Social 
Protection in Australia and New Zealand?,” Social Policy and Administration 47 (no. 




the Child Poverty Action Group, and some interest arose after the establishment of 
the Welfare Working Group in 2010.12 However, these pieces have addressed welfare 
reform in a piecemeal fashion, focusing only on small elements of the reforms. 
Further, there have been no attempts to analyse the similarities or differences 
between the two National Governments, though Mike O’Brien has begun such an 
analysis.13 Thus, this thesis adds to the emerging literature on contemporary welfare 
reform. It provides both a comprehensive summary of reforms and a comparison 
with the previous Government. 
Secondly, it was noted by Shaun Wilson et al. that little work has been done on 
analysing the evolution of New Zealand’s social security since the 1990s.14 Those 
reforms led to a substantial increase in poverty, and made welfare the subject of both 
public and academic interest. A wide array of research was created which focused on 
the political economy of New Zealand, the welfare regimes debate, and the lived 
experiences of poverty.15 However, since the 1990s the evolution of welfare has been 
largely left unanalysed.16 In the fifth chapter, I build on what work has been done 
since 1999, and I argue the WEWS has been hollowed out into a Trojan horse. 
Finally, there has been both academic and public discourse over whether the Fifth 
National government can be classified as neoliberal. This debate was begun by an 
article by Brian Roper, which analyses the Fifth National Government, published in 
2011. Overall, he concludes “this Government is committed to retaining and 
                                                                                                                                                               
Welfare Reform?,” in The New Electoral Politics in New Zealand: The Significance of 
the 2011 Election, ed. Jack Vowles (Wellington: Institute for Governance and Policy 
Studies, 2014), 77-8, and Peter Starke, “Antipodean Social Policy Responses to 
Economic Crises,” Social Policy and Administration 47 (no. 6, December 2013): 
647–667. 
12 Claire Dale et al., eds., Left Further Behind: How Policies Fail the Poorest Children 
in New Zealand (Wellington: Child Poverty Action Group, 2011), Jonathan Boston, 
ed., Policy Quarterly Special Issue: The Welfare Working Group’s Report 7 (Issue 2, 
May 2011). 
13  Mike O’Brien, “Welfare Reform in Aotearoa/New Zealand From Citizen to 
Managed Worker.” 
14 Shaun Wilson et al., “Wage-Earners’ Welfare after Economic Reform: Refurbishing, 
Retrenching or Hollowing Out Social Protection in Australia and New Zealand?,” 625. 
15 For example, see Brian Roper and Chris Rudd, eds., The Political Economy of New 
Zealand (Auckland: Oxford University Press), Frank Castles, ed., Families of Nations 
(Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993), and Mike O’Brien, Poverty Policy and the State: 
Social Security Reform in New Zealand, chapter 5. 
16  A notable exception is Peter Starke, Radical Welfare State: A Comparative 




extending the neoliberal policy regime.”17 This spawned two notable responses. The 
first came from Kate Nicholls, who argues the Fifth National Government’s reforms 
represent “typical centre-right responses to economic hard times,” and that 
“neoliberalism does not necessarily provide the best “lens” though which to 
understand the nuances of government policy since the late 1990s.”18 In the second 
response, Grant Duncan argues “the analysis and critique of neoliberalism is 
increasingly of historical interest only.” 19  Whilst many of the neoliberal reforms 
remain, this “does not necessarily mean that neo-liberalism continues to dominate.”20 
Duncan argues neoliberalism’s influence is waning, and is dying a “‘strange non-
death.”21 Thus, according to these authors, neoliberalism’s period of dominance has 
passed, and we should look for new analytical tools to analyse the Fifth National 
Government.  
This debate has been mirrored in the public sphere. On a popular blog, author Danyl 
McLauchlan argues National “aren’t neoliberal.” Instead, they are guided by “Right-
wing intellectual thought … [which] is focused on the primacy and infallibility of 
‘business’ and the wisdom and needs of the private sector.”22 In the comments, 
prominent right-wing political commentator Matthew Hooton enthusiastically agrees 
with McLauchlan’s thesis.23 Hooton has restated this thesis several times, arguing the 
Fifth National Government has made a decisive break from neoliberalism. 24  In 
another blog, economist Brian Easton puts forward a supporting thesis. He states “I 
don’t think we have a ‘neoliberal’ government. Recall the short shift Key gave to Don 
                                                   
17 Brian Roper, “The Fifth (Key) National Government’s Neoliberal Policy Agenda: 
Description, Analysis and Critical Evaluation,” New Zealand Sociology 26 (Issue 1, 
2011): 37. 
18 Italics in original, Kate Nicholls, “Beyond Neoliberalism: A Response to Brian 
Roper,” New Zealand Sociology 26 (Issue 2, 2011):  83, 78. 
19  Grant Duncan, “After Neo-Liberalism, What Could Be Worse?,” New Zealand 
Sociology 29 (Issue 1, 2014): 15. 
20 Ibid, 23. 
21 Ibid, 22. 
22 Danyl McLauchlan, “On Neoliberalism,” The Dim-Post, January 30, 2015, accessed 
February 25, 2015, https://dimpost.wordpress.com/2015/01/30/on-neoliberalism/, 
Danyl McLauchlan, “Vague Trotteresque Musings of the Day,” The Dim Post, January 
20, 2015, accessed February 25, 2015, 
https://dimpost.wordpress.com/2015/01/20/vague-trotteresque-musings-of-the-
day/. 
23 Danyl McLauchlan, “Vague Trotteresque Musings of the Day.” 
24 “Politics with Mike Williams and Matthew Hooton,” Nine To Noon, Radio New 




Brash (who is definitely a neoliberal). In fact this government is … a business-
oriented one.” 25  This means, as McLauchlan also pointed out, business use 
government to actively pursue their own interests, to which the Government 
responds favourably to. 26  Overall, the debate on whether New Zealand is still 
dominated by neoliberalism is nascent, but one of crucial importance, as it questions 
how best to analyse the Fifth National Government, and is becoming an important 
topic in the public sphere. 
                                                   
25 Brian Easton, “How Shallow is Intellectual Life in New Zealand?,” Pundit, January 






THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WELFARE 
The first chapter seeks to develop a theoretical framework to evaluate the two case 
studies. The first part of this framework is developed through a review of the political 
economy of welfare. This field seeks to identify the key features of the welfare state, 
and place it in the wider context of politics and the economy. The first two sections of 
this chapter outline the regimes debate between Gosta Esping-Andersen and Frank 
Castles. The regimes debate concerns how to categorise different national welfare 
states. Section 1.1 outlines Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare states, which 
identifies three welfare regime types: liberal; social democratic; and conservative. 
Section 1.2 describes Castles’ critique of this work, as his work provides a more 
accurate conceptualisation of New Zealand’s welfare state prior to the neoliberal 
reforms of the 1980s and 90s. Then, the three major traditions within the political 
economy of welfare are considered: neoliberalism; social democracy; and neo-
Marxism. Each tradition provides a different characterisation of the relationship 
between the welfare state and capitalism. Finally, section 1.6 outlines my own 
theoretical framework. It draws predominantly from the theories of Esping-Andersen 
and Castles, and is supplemented by the critical insights of neo-Marxism.  
1.1. Welfare State Regimes 
One of the key developments in modern political economy is the “regimes debate.” An 
analysis of this debate provides a basis for examining the broad changes of New 
Zealand’s social security, as it identifies the key elements of different kinds of welfare 
regimes, a concept which includes both social welfare and economic regulations. This 
debate was started, and continues to be dominated by, Gosta Esping-Andersen’s 
seminal text The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism.1 His key insight is that welfare 
states cluster around three types, or ‘regimes’. 2  His analysis begins with a 
reconceptualisation of the welfare state, premised on Thomas Marshall’s classic 
                                                   
1 Christopher Pierson, Beyond the Welfare State? The New Political Economy of 
Welfare (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 171. 
2  Gosta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1990), 2, 19-20. 
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statement on the welfare state and citizenship.3 Marshall argues citizenship evolves 
through three stages. The first is civil citizenship, which relates to the rights necessary 
for individual freedom. Second is political citizenship, which allows for mass 
participation in political institutions. The final stage is social citizenship, which 
includes “the whole range [of rights], from the right to a modicum of economic 
welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live 
the life of a civilised being according to the standard prevailing in the society.”4 Social 
rights are realised through extensive education, health, housing and income 
maintenance policies. 5  According to Marshall, the evolution of social citizenship 
would ameliorate differences based on class.6 All citizens would be equal with respect 
to the rights endowed by citizenship, and would thus guarantee equality of status, 
which Marshall viewed as superior to equality of income.7 
From this basis Esping-Andersen reconceptualises the welfare state. His account is 
based on two principles. The first is the concept of decommodification, which “refers 
to the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable 
standard of living independently of market participation.” 8  Welfare policies are 
highly decommodifying if they are “rendered as a matter of right” of citizenship, 
which achieves Marshall’s concept of social citizenship. 9  Alternatively, welfare 
policies can be commodifying if they “compel all but the most desperate to participate 
in the market.”10 He argues this occurs when benefits levels are set near the poverty 
line, and welfare is associated with social stigma. Such policies are discussed in 
greater detail later in the chapter. 
The second principle is social stratification. Esping-Andersen notes the welfare state 
is often naively seen as a system which promotes equality. Instead, he argues welfare 
                                                   
3 Ibid, 21 
4 Christopher Pierson, Beyond the Welfare State?, 29. 
5  Hartley Dean, Welfare, Law and Citizenship (Hertfordshire: Prentice 
Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1996), 4. 
6 Thomas H. Marshall, “Citizenship and Social Class,” in The Welfare State Reader 
2nd Edition, ed. Christopher Pierson and Francis Castles (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2006), 32.  
7 Hartley Dean, Welfare, Law and Citizenship, 5.  
8 Gosta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, 35. 
9 Ibid, 21-2.   
10 Ibid, 22. 
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should be seen as system of social stratification in itself. 11 Highly commodifying 
regimes can produce social stigma for welfare recipients, creating divisions between 
those reliant on state welfare, and those who rely on the market. Conversely, 
universal programs can foster social solidarity, furthering the cause of equality.12 This 
relates to Marshall’s conception of citizenship; if welfare states attribute rights based 
on citizenship, a sense of equality can be fostered which acts as a counter to the 
inequality produced by the market. 
Esping-Andersen operationalises these two concepts into new ‘indexes’, which are 
used to measure decommodification and stratification. He includes three measures 
for the decommodification index. Firstly, he measures how easy it is to access a 
benefit, including: whether it guarantees a standard of living regardless of previous 
employment or financial contribution; whether the benefit is time-limited; and if it 
includes a needs-test. Secondly, he includes the level of income replacement, which 
measures the level of benefit income as a percentage of previous market income. 
Finally, he measures how extensive the range of benefits is. A limited range would 
only apply to old age, sickness and unemployment, and a wide range would include a 
social wage for all citizens.13 For the stratification index, he measures the level of 
means-testing, the extent of market provision in welfare and the extent of 
universalism. Regimes with greater universalism, fewer means-tests and less market-
based welfare foster a sense of solidarity, and lower stigma.14  
According to Esping-Andersen’s data, welfare states cluster around three regime 
types. The first is the liberal regime, which is predominantly found in Anglo-Saxon 
countries, including New Zealand, which measure low in decommodification, and 
rely extensively on means-tests and market-based welfare.15 The second are the social 
democratic countries, found in Scandinavia, which measure high on 
decommodification and universalism. 16  The final regime type is described as 
Conservative, and is found predominantly in Continental Europe. The conservative 
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12 Ibid, 24. 
13 Ibid, 47. 
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regime type will not be considered here, as it is not relevant to a discussion on New 
Zealand’s welfare state. 17  The liberal and social democratic regime will now be 
described in greater depth. 
The Liberal Welfare Regime 
The liberal regime is characterised by the “logic of the market.”18 The goal is to 
minimise the state, and promote market solutions to welfare.19 This logic is seen in 
the liberal approach to decommodification. The market is viewed as “emancipatory, 
[and] the best possible shell for self-reliance and industriousness.”20 Thus the goal of 
welfare is to ensure the participation in the market by all those who are capable to do 
so. There are, however, clear instances where people are unable to work; the old, the 
sick and so on.21 Esping-Andersen identifies two responses from liberals. Firstly, they 
adopt the principle of less eligibility. According to this principle, benefits should be 
set at a level below what is provided by the market. This ensures incentives to work 
are maintained, as individuals can gain more money via work than from welfare. 
Secondly, the concept of public insurance, based on previous contributions to 
insurance funds, as well as private insurance, is accepted. 22  In terms of 
decommodification, welfare should have the lowest possible effect. Welfare only 
provides an income for those completely unable to participate in paid employment, 
and does not interfere in the workings of the market. Thus welfare supported the 
process of commodification. 
                                                   
17 The conservative welfare state is characterised by a set of policies which seek to 
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The logic of the market is also seen in the stratification principle. The stratification 
outcomes produced by the market are seen as inherently justified, as they reflect 
“effort, motivation, adeptness, and self-reliance.”23 According to Liberals, welfare 
should seek to reinforce the individualism fostered by the market. Further, liberal 
ideals stress the importance of formal equality and universalism.24  However, as 
welfare should not interfere with the market, benefits cannot be provided to all 
citizens, as it would reduce the work incentive. So, the equality becomes one of need. 
Only after proving an individual is in genuine need will welfare be provided. Thus, 
formal equality is guaranteed as everyone is eligible for welfare. However, Esping-
Andersen argues this creates a duality. Those who are poor are forced to rely on state 
benefits, whereas those who are better off rely on the market for their well-being.25 
This dualism stigmatises the poor for being “market failures,” and is worsened when 
benefits are associated with “punitive” conditions.26 So, in practice, liberal welfare 
states show several key characteristics; they are generally means-tested, with few 
modest universal transfers, are associated with social stigma, which leads to low 
levels of decommodification, and a dualism between the poor and everyone else.27  
The Social Democratic Welfare Regime 
The second regime Esping-Andersen identifies is the social democratic welfare 
regime. This regime is typified by a commitment to “a welfare state that would 
promote an equality of the highest standard.”28  Decommodification is central to 
achieving this equality. This is, Esping-Andersen argues, because of social 
democracy’s socialist roots. He identified the goal of destroying the “commodity-logic 
of labour” as the core of socialist movements.29 The radical socialists view revolution 
as the best path to this goal. Moderates, however, accept decommodification through 
the welfare state as an acceptable reformist path to socialism. Thus, reformists seek 
to provide the populace with a social wage outside of the market, effectively achieving 
an acceptable level of decommodification, and the first step towards a socialist 
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economy.30 Thus, whereas liberal welfare regimes seek to limit the role of welfare, 
social democracies extend it. 
A similar logic is seen in the stratification principles of social democracy. Social 
democrats seek to build a basis for solidarity in society.31 This solidarity is built on 
shared citizenship, which is based on the principle of universalism: programs would 
be provided to everybody, not just those defined as in need’32 This equality was 
threatened by the emergence of the middle-class, who expected a higher quality of 
public service, including health and education. The social democratic response was to 
implement earnings-related benefits, which provide high benefits levels for those who 
earn more through the market. Though this creates inequality between individuals, it 
is justified as it ensures continued support for welfare, and prevents market provision 
of social services.33 Overall, the social democratic welfare regime is characterised by: 
universal and generous programs; high replacement rates; generous eligibility 
criteria; leading to a high level of decommodification and an attempt to build 
solidarity through the welfare state. It also entails a strong commitment to full 
employment, including measures to encourage female employment, in order to fund 
a generous welfare state.34  
1.2. The Fourth World of Welfare - Critiquing the Three Worlds 
Esping-Andersen’s work on welfare regimes was ground-breaking, and has been 
immensely influential in the political economy of welfare. Indeed, much of the work 
in the field during the 1990s and 2000s “can be seen as a ‘settling of accounts’ with 
Esping-Andersen.”35 Given the immense popularity of his work, it is little wonder it 
has come under sustained criticism. The critiques are wide-ranging, including 
arguments to add more regimes, criticisms that he implicitly relies on a male-
breadwinner model of welfare, and is too narrowly focussed on income 
maintenance.36 Only the argument for including additional regimes will be analysed 
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here, for two reasons. Firstly, despite these critiques, Esping-Andersen’s typology 
remains popular and in wide usage.37 Secondly, the first critique is based on an 
analysis of New Zealand’s social security, giving it direct relevance to this thesis. 
The most important critique relating to New Zealand is put forward in the works of 
Frank Castles.38 Castles’ work analyses the welfare state prior to the radical neoliberal 
reforms of the 1980s and 90s. He shows several deficiencies in Esping-Andersen’s 
work, arguing the welfare states of the Antipodean (Australia and New Zealand) 
countries were fundamentally different from their European counterparts. He argues 
European democratic socialist parties aimed to “procure state action to alter the 
reward structure of capitalism by the provision of income transfers, public 
consumption items and fiscal benefits.” 39  So, welfare measures were aimed at 
supplementing the resources provided by the market. Thus welfare states in Europe 
had to include substantial redistribution of income in order to ameliorate the 
inequality produced by the market, with the more generous countries utilising 
extensive universalism in their welfare policies. New Zealand and Australia had low 
levels of total expenditure, and made extensive use of means testing in their 
benefits.40 This led Esping-Andersen to place these countries in the liberal category.41 
                                                                                                                                                               
158, and for Esping-Andersen’s reply, see Gosta Esping-Andersen, Social 
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Model of Australian Social Protection,” Australian Journal of Social Issues 29 (no. 2, 
May 1994): 120-145, and Frank Castles and Ian Shirley, “Labour and Social Policy: 
Gravediggers or Refurbishers of the Welfare State,” in The Great Experiment: 
Labour Parties and Public Policy Transformation in Australia and New Zealand, ed. 
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This, according to Castles, was a mistake, stemming from the uniqueness of the 
Antipodean approach to welfare. These countries provided “social protection by other 
means” through what he called a “wage earners’ welfare state (WEWS).”42 Instead of 
seeking to ameliorate inequality after its distribution by the market, the Antipodean 
countries sought to reduce these inequalities through regulating wages.43 
Regulating wages was achieved through two means. Firstly, both countries had 
extensive systems of compulsory arbitration, where the wages of some occupations 
were set by a special employment court. The Court of Arbitration set wages at a level 
which enabled the “average” employee to participate in their community. The notion 
of an average employee was based on the expectation that men would be the sole 
breadwinner, and would earn enough to support a family. 44 Thus, many occupations 
had wages which were set according to social criteria, not by market demands. The 
second means was a commitment to full employment. Employment could only act as 
an effective social protection if it covered all those who sought it. Thus, governments 
implemented a series of policies which ensured unemployment would be virtually 
eliminated, including: immigration controls; tariffs and subsidies; and a general 
commitment to Keynesian economic principles (discussed further later in the 
chapter). This system of regulated wages was supported by remarkably high levels of 
home ownership, which ensured security for individuals in their old age. Further, 
progressive taxation helped to curb inequality. This led to internationally-low levels 
of inequality in both countries.45 
Overall, New Zealand “experienced a relatively high level of social protection 
throughout the mid-twentieth century, especially compared to European countries.”46 
The emphasis on work meant that security was not guaranteed by welfare or 
citizenship, but by status as a wage earner.47 This strategy was largely successful, as 
remarkably low levels of unemployment enabled virtually all adult males to be 
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employed.48 This had a significant impact on the role of the welfare state. As security 
was guaranteed through the (managed) market, welfare played a residual role as it 
supported only those who fell outside the labour market.49 Given the high wages and 
employment, the relative lack of generosity of welfare was less important than in 
other countries.50 However, because of the residual nature of welfare, there were 
“some remarkably large holes in the welfare-safety net.”51 In particular, sole parents, 
large families, and those who fell outside the labour market were more likely to be in 
poverty.52  
In a chapter co-authored with Deborah Mitchell, Castles launches a direct critique of 
Esping-Andersen. At the heart of their critique is a simple proposition; Esping-
Andersen fails to take into account the distributional effects of liberal welfare states, 
which leads him to miscategorise all Anglo-Saxon countries together. When this is 
taken into account, Castles and Mitchell argue there are not three worlds of welfare, 
but four: conservative; social democratic; liberal; and a new ‘radical" world. The 
liberal world includes the US, Canada, Switzerland and Japan. The ‘radical’ world 
includes New Zealand, Australia, Ireland and the United Kingdom. The authors point 
to three measures to support their new categorisation. The first is benefit equality, 
which measures the extent to which benefits increase income equality. The data 
mostly supports Esping-Andersen’s characterisation of social-democratic and 
conservative welfare regimes. However, it shows a clear separation within the ‘liberal’ 
world, with the ‘radical’ countries falling into a separate category.53 This is because 
the targeting of benefits in the Antipodes does not have the negative outcomes 
Esping-Andersen claimed. In fact, targeting increases equality by ensuring 
expenditure was spent only on the poorest.54 This point is reinforced by the second 
measure, which is the extent to which welfare expenditure and tax mitigate the 
inequalities created by the market. The impact of tax is not measured by Esping-
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Andersen.55 Again, the data shows a clear differentiation within the liberal world, 
with the radical countries exhibiting higher levels of equality than liberal countries.56 
Finally, they note the extent to which liberal countries (prior to 1984) utilise public 
sector employment to reduce total levels of unemployment.57  
Overall, the ‘radical’ countries are characterised by the commodification of labour, as 
they tie social security to work. However, the state extensively manages the market, 
and ensures wages are set predominantly to social, rather than market, demands. 
Further, wage regulation, combined with heavy benefit targeting and progressive 
taxation, entails a high degree of redistribution, which is a characteristic of social 
democratic, not liberal, regimes.58 This has a significant effect on stratification; as the 
equalisation of wages promotes a kind of equality usually associated with social 
democratic regimes. So, the unique combination of commodification and residual 
welfare, along with high redistribution and low stratification, constitutes a fourth 
‘radical’ world of welfare.59  
Esping-Andersen was initially supportive of including the wage-earners welfare state 
in his own categorisations. However, he later retracted his support, as neoliberal 
reforms fundamentally changed the Antipodean welfare states. 60  Indeed, Castles 
himself argues neoliberal reforms had destroyed the uniqueness of Australia’s welfare 
state.61 These arguments will be addressed in the chapter five.  
Political Economy of Welfare States: Schools of Thought 
The regimes debate provides a series of important insights into the nature of welfare 
states. More insights can be gained by analysing the three major schools of thought 
within the political economy of welfare. The first school of thought which will be 
addressed is neoliberalism. Understanding neoliberalism is crucial, as it came to 
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dominate liberal welfare states during the 1980s and 1990s.62 This was particularly 
true in New Zealand, where neoliberalism arguably dominated policy making more 
than any other democratic country.63 Secondly, the social democratic viewpoint will 
be addressed. This tradition has been the dominant viewpoint in the field.64 Finally, 
the neo-Marxist tradition is addressed, as it provides a critical account of both 
neoliberal and social democratic theories.  
1.3. Neoliberalism 
In order to understand neoliberalism, it must first be defined; as it has been argued 
that the concept is often undefined, creating confusion over its meaning.65 Two key 
ideological strands can be identified within neoliberalism: classical liberalism and 
conservatism. Classical liberals are defined by two key beliefs. The first is an absolute 
commitment to the importance of freedom, defined in the negative sense as an 
absence of restraints.66 Thus classical liberals advocate: individual property rights; 
the rule of law; sanctity of contracts; and that individual freedom of conscience and 
action are prerequisites for a good society.67 The second is the revival of neoclassical 
economic theories. The market is considered the most efficient and equitable 
guarantor of economic growth.68 Thus, neoliberal economic policy seeks to maximise 
the role of the market, and minimise state intervention. Several economic schools are 
associated with the neoclassical revival: the Chicago and Austrian Schools; 
monetarism; public choice; and supply-side economics.69 Conservatism is concerned 
with “the conditions that are required for the establishment and maintenance of 
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social order.”70 Unlike classical liberals, conservatives are less concerned with the 
maintenance of freedom, and are willing to violate freedom in order to maintain 
social order and a just society.71 Despite these differences, these groups are united by 
a common belief in the importance of free market capitalism, and opposition to social 
democratic and socialist policies. 72  Thus neoliberalism in the real world is 
characterised by a variety of different practices, united by an emphasis on free market 
economics. Depending on which school of thought within neoliberalism is dominant 
(e.g. supply-side economics, public choice, new paternalism), neoliberalism can 
include a range of different policies and appeal to different values to justify these 
policies. Indeed, it is the combination of classical liberalism and conservativism 
which makes neoliberalism unique.73 
Neoclassical Economics 
Having defined neoliberalism, the next task is to outline the neoliberal political 
economy of welfare. As stated in the definition, neoclassical economics forms the 
basis of neoliberalism. As such, the description of neoliberalism must start there. At 
its core, neoclassical economics is based on the idea of an ‘economic man’.74  Two key 
assumptions are posited about this individual. Firstly, they are considered to be 
rational. Rationality is defined narrowly as meaning having a set of desires or 
preferences, and pursuing an efficient way of achieving them.75 Secondly, humans are 
considered to be self-interested. This is defined as attempting to seek advantage, in 
order to fulfil your own welfare by achieving your preferences.76 This does not mean 
humans are always selfish, as it is defined widely enough to include altruism.77  
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Neoclassical economists argue the key to understanding how the market economy 
works is through the price system.78 The price system performs two functions: it 
transmits information; and it creates incentives to act on the information. 79 Put 
simply, prices create incentives for economic actors; if prices are high, it encourages 
individuals to enter the market, thereby decreasing the price of goods through 
competition. 80  As entrepreneurs seek to increase their own profit, they are 
incentivised to keep costs as low as possible. Thus they will seek out the most efficient 
production techniques available.81 The market also responds to the demands of the 
people; as greater demand means greater potential profit, entrepreneurs will produce 
goods which others desire.82 Thus, market incentives produce a system which is both 
efficient and responsive to the needs of individuals, thereby producing benefits for 
the entire community. This is best summed up by Adam Smith, an intellectual 
forerunner of neoclassical economics: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, 
the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own 
interest.”83 
Neoclassical economists argue the process of market incentives produces market 
equilibrium; where sellers are willing to sell a set amount of product, which is the 
same amount that buyers are willing to purchase at equilibrium price.84 When this 
analysis is expanded to the entire economy, neoclassical economists argue there 
exists a general equilibrium, which is the aggregate of all individual market 
equilibriums.85 The key point to note about general equilibrium is that it is always 
tending towards, or achieves, full utilisation of resources, including labour, as a result 
of market pressures. 86  So, markets will reflect the desire of the people, work 
efficiently and utilise all resources, which leads to economic growth. All that is 
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required for this to happen is to allow the forces created by the market to run 
effectively. The role of government is strictly limited to supporting the market, 
through ensuring “private property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets, 
and free trade.”87 Thus, the state sets up a legal and political framework for markets 
to prosper within; after which the state does not need to intervene further.88 
Neoliberal Political Economy of Welfare 
The neoliberal analysis of welfare is categorised by a distinct split between the liberal 
and conservative traditions. Amongst conservatives, the new paternalist ideology 
became the dominant view of the welfare state. As this is covered in chapter two, only 
the liberal understanding of welfare will be described here. The liberal political 
economy of welfare is a critique of welfare’s effects on society. A generous welfare 
state is considered to be politically and economically undesirable and unsustainable. 
The political critique is drawn from three ideas. The first is a conception of 
democracy taken from the work of Joseph Schumpeter, who argues democracy is 
defined by the competition for votes by elites to gain power. Because politicians 
desire power, they therefore desire votes above all else.89 The second idea is that 
voters will behave rationally and self-interestedly, and is drawn from neoclassical 
economics.90 Finally, voters are considered to have limited information when voting 
for their representatives.91  
From these three premises, neoliberal Samuel Brittan contended that liberal 
democracies were under serious threat in the 1970s. He argues the costs of being fully 
informed on political issues are high, and the ‘benefit’ is extremely low; as it is 
unlikely a single vote will influence the outcome of an election. Thus, by applying an 
economic analysis to voting, it is clear that “it is irrational to be too rational,” as the 
cost of being informed is too high. 92  Politicians take advantage of this lack of 
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knowledge by making increasingly grandiose and unrealistic promises.93 The welfare 
state is emblematic of the problem; politicians can promise increased spending in 
welfare, despite its growth providing a clear threat to the health of capitalism.94 Given 
the cost of being politically informed on this issue is high, and the benefit of increased 
spending satisfies peoples immediate self-interest, there is no incentive to stop this 
process. Brittan concluded this would lead to economic catastrophe, which 
threatened to undermine liberal democracies.95 
Continuing on from the economic analysis of democracy, neoliberals argue the 
welfare state creates perverse economic incentives. The impact of this is seen on two 
levels; for welfare beneficiaries, and for the economy as a whole. For beneficiaries, 
welfare payments are designed to prevent poverty. But by doing so, it also creates an 
alternative to work. Beneficiaries are then able to reject low quality and low wage 
work (e.g. cleaning), as they can maintain a living on a welfare benefit. This is a 
rational response from beneficiaries if welfare rates are high. The ‘disutility’ of 
working an unpleasant job needs to be lower than the benefits of working (increased 
income). If welfare payments are high, there is little benefit to be gained, meaning it 
is rational to abstain from work. In the long-term, this has a negative effect on the 
beneficiary. They spend more time out of the work force, which atrophies their work 
ethic. Further, these low-paying jobs often lead to better paying work, which lifts the 
beneficiary out of poverty without assistance.96 Thus welfare creates a “poverty trap,” 
where it is rational to remain on a low income (welfare), increasing the likelihood 
that beneficiaries will remain in poverty.97 Welfare, then, actually hurts the most 
vulnerable in society by keeping them in a state of near poverty.  
High spending on welfare also increases total government expenditure, requiring 
increased taxation to cover the costs. The effect of this is threefold. Firstly, if tax rates 
are high, individuals reduce their work effort, particularly if taxation is highly 
progressive. The argument is the same as for beneficiaries; if high income earners 
face low benefits from increased work, they will rationally choose not to work 
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harder.98 Secondly, entrepreneurial behaviour is discouraged. Starting a business is a 
significant financial risk, and will only be undertaken if the potential pay-off is large 
enough. High taxation reduces this pay-off, which disincentivises risk-taking 
behaviour.99 Finally, talented individuals are likely to immigrate to countries with 
lower taxes, depriving countries of their most talented people.100 
Further issues arise due to the government provision of welfare. Government 
provision falls prey to two key problems: fiscal inefficiency and poor targeting due to 
special interests. The first issue derives from the assumption of human self-
interestedness. Milton Friedman argues that individuals will achieve the best value 
for money when spending their own money on themselves. The incentives are clear; 
the money spent (costs) directly affects you, and the benefits are enjoyed by you. 
Government spending is the opposite. Politicians and civil servants spend other 
people’s money (taxes), and the benefits go to other people (e.g. welfare 
beneficiaries). The only incentive for government officials to spend efficiently is 
“human kindness,” and not “the much stronger and more dependable spur of self-
interest.” 101  Friedman concludes these incentives explain “the wastefulness and 
ineffectiveness of … spending” on welfare.102 A further issue draws on the critique of 
representative democracy discussed earlier. Writing in the New Zealand context, 
James Cox argues most welfare provision is directed to those on middle-to-high 
incomes, especially in areas such as education and health.103 Politicians use welfare as 
a tool to gain more votes. The poorest in society are the least likely to vote, so there is 
no political gain by targeting them. Thus politicians will push initiatives which favour 
the better off, rather than the most vulnerable.104  
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1.4. Social Democracy: Keynesian Economic Theory 
Historically, social democracy has been associated with Keynesian economic 
theory.105 This theory was considered economic orthodoxy throughout the middle of 
the twentieth century, but has since declined in popularity after the rise of 
neoclassical economics. 106  At its most basic level, Keynesianism represents a 
fundamental challenge to classical and neoclassical economic theories. They, as 
previously discussed, argue the market creates incentives which produce economic 
growth and high levels of employment. Keynesians reject this view. Instead, they 
argue markets are capable of producing long-lasting recessions, and under-utilise 
economic resources, particularly labour, leading to low growth and high 
unemployment.107  
The key to this critique is the concept of aggregate demand.108 Put simply, Keynesians 
argue markets do not produce sufficient levels of demand to ensure high levels of 
growth and employment.109 If sufficient levels of demand are created, the market can 
produce economic prosperity. This can be achieved through the active intervention of 
the state in the economy.110 This intervention is achieved through a wide variety of 
mechanisms. The primary instrument available to the state is fiscal policy. In times of 
recession, it can increase state spending in order to increase aggregate demand, 
thereby increasing economic growth. In times of high growth, the state reduces its 
spending, decreasing economic growth.111 This prevents the boom-and-bust cycle of 
free-market capitalism, ensuring consistent growth and full employment.112 The state 
can also intervene in a wide array of other areas to ensure economic growth, 
including: building infrastructure; restricting foreign imports; subsidising local 
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industry; restricting foreign investment; and maintaining high levels of funding for 
the welfare state.113 
Social Democratic Political Economy 
The literature on social democratic political economy of welfare is expansive. Indeed, 
it is considered to be the dominant viewpoint within the field.114 Given the breadth of 
literature which could be discussed, this section will only focus on two elements of 
social democratic political economy: its theory of state; and the broad principles 
underlying social democratic welfare states.  
The social democratic theory of state is drawn from the power resources theory 
(PRT). PRT is, at its core, a theory of power within society. There are three key 
institutional sectors within society: the market; democratic politics; and the family.115 
Within the economic sphere, capitalists are dominant, as they (by definition) own the 
means of production, giving them control over the economic process. The democratic 
sphere, however, is driven by a different logic. This sphere can be dominated by sheer 
numbers via elections. Here, labour movements, due to their superior size, can gain 
influence to implement social reform. 116  Crucial to this theory is the role of 
representative democracy. Parliamentary democracy is considered an “effective 
institution for the translation of mobilised power into desired policies and 
reforms.” 117  Thus, progress is achieved through democracy via gradual reform, 
coalition building and compromise.118 
The importance of the political sphere is complimented by the work of Karl Polanyi. 
Polanyi argues the logic of free market capitalism “assures the destruction of both 
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society and the natural environment.” 119  Capitalism turns everything, including 
labour, into a commodity. Labour then becomes subject to the “‘artificial” and volatile 
market forces.”120 However, labour is not truly a commodity; it represents people and 
their livelihoods. The negative outcomes of market forces are visible to all; 
destitution, poverty and so on.121 Thus, as capitalism spreads, a countermovement is 
created which seeks to protect society from the negative effects of markets.122 Politics, 
as a realm where this conflict is visibly seen, then becomes fundamentally important. 
Once the working class is in power, social democrats seek to reform capitalism in 
order to improve the conditions of the working class. The introduction of Keynesian 
economic controls represents a fundamental advancement of the social democratic 
position. Economic controls represent “a system of control over economic life.”123 By 
having political controls over the economy, the working class can control the 
economic sphere without the use of central planning or implementing socialism.124 
This constitutes a form of socialisation of the economy, where the non-capitalist class 
can exert its influence, and ensure its own prosperity. In 1956, British MP Tony 
Crosland wrote the classic statement of social democratic thought, arguing the rise of 
Keynesianism and the welfare state had shifted power so far towards the working 
class that Britain was on the cusp of realising a democratic form of socialism.125 
Social democrats view the state as an effective institution for translating working 
class demands into political reality, allowing them effective control over the economy. 
This, however, begs the question of what principles would be used to guide social 
democratic reforms. For this, we return to the work of Esping-Andersen, who is 
located within the social democratic tradition. 126  Thus his concepts provide an 
accurate summation of social democratic principles, which emphasise 
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decommodification and low levels of stratification, based on shared citizenship. It is 
worth expanding on the notion of citizenship, as it is a foundational piece of social 
democratic thought. David Harris, a social democratic author, identified two 
elements of citizenship theory. Firstly, there is a rejection of the primacy of the 
market. Citizenship theorists accept the Keynesian critique of markets, agreeing there 
are numerous forms of market failure which necessitate state intervention. In 
particular, the market’s inability to produce public goods, such as education and 
health care, is of primary concern.127 More widely, citizenship theorists argue “left 
unsupplemented, markets lead to radical insecurity and generate systematic 
inequality which in turn underwrites morally unacceptable relations of dominance 
and subservience between groups and individuals in society.”128 This inequality stems 
from the unequal relations of power created by capitalism; workers are forced to sell 
their labour in order to survive, whereas capitalists are free to choose whether to 
accept the offer of labour from workers.129  
The solution to this “radical insecurity” lies in a conception of citizenship and 
community. Every citizen is entitled to “what it is to be a full member of a 
community.”130 That is, they are entitled to the resources which enable individuals to 
participate in society with their fellow citizens. The implication of this conception is 
that resources should be allocated not just to avoid absolute poverty and destitution, 
but on a relative basis; individuals must be guaranteed access “to a community way of 
life,” which requires more resources than the bare minimum.131 This means the state 
must provide the social rights to which Marshall referred, including education, 
health, housing and social welfare policies. These rights would be delivered through 
the welfare state, which should provide “an extensive, elaborate and generous 
structure of social policies.” 132  Overall, David Harris put the argument most 
succinctly : 
A developed and extensive welfare state is an integral element of a morally 
acceptable society. It is an essential means of promoting social community. It is 
an essential means of promoting social justice, enhancing individual self-
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development and fostering a sense of community. Without it market societies 
permit, indeed encourage, the exclusion of individuals.133 
1.5. Critique of Social Democracy and Neoliberalism: Neo-Marxism  
Marxian political economy belongs to the heterodox tradition of economic thought.134 
Marxists have been consistent critics of Keynesianism, its close-ally social democracy, 
and neoliberalism.135 Marxist accounts of the welfare state have grown since the 
1970s, and there have been a remarkable variety of theories developed.136 As with 
neoliberalism and social democracy, the basic views of Marxist economics will first be 
described.  
Fundamentally, Marxists view capitalism as inherently exploitative and crisis prone. 
To understand why, one must begin with a description of the concept of class, which 
is at the core of all Marxist theories.137 The class structure of society is created by the 
mode of production, which is the “economic foundation of society.”138 Modern society 
is defined by the capitalist mode of production. Marx argues capitalism creates two 
distinct classes; the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The bourgeoisie are the owners of 
the means of production; and the proletariat are those who must sell their labour 
capacity for income.139  
The driving force of economic growth is the necessity for business to accumulate 
profit.140 To do so, businesses simply need to take in more profit than they expend in 
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costs.141 Put simply, this requires capitalists to receive more benefits from workers 
than they cost to employ. The difference between costs and profit is called surplus 
value.142 Because the bourgeoisie own the means of production, and therefore control 
the output of production, they can appropriate the surplus value for themselves. This 
surplus value becomes profit, which is the income of the bourgeoisie.143 
Marxists reject the neoclassical view that free markets tend towards equilibrium, 
where economic resources are fully utilised. Instead, they argue there is no 
equilibrium; rather capitalism goes through regular boom-and-bust cycles.144 Unlike 
Keynesians, they do not believe these cycles can be managed, as the crises are part of 
the “laws of motion” of capitalism.145 These recessions are caused by a decrease in the 
rate of profit.146 In order to return to economic growth, capitalists must increase their 
profitability.  This usually includes decreasing the power of the working class in order 
to increase surplus value.147 However, Marxists argue there is a general tendency for 
the rate of profit to decline over time. Thus, crises will become more prevalent and 
extreme; attacks on the proletariat will increase, contributing to the long-term 
unsustainability of capitalism.148 
The Marxist Political Economy of Welfare 
The first task of the neo-Marxist analysis of welfare is to place the welfare state in the 
wider context of capitalism and the state. Neo-Marxist Ian Gough’s theory of the state 
provides an excellent starting point for understanding how this is done. A 
fundamental feature of capitalism is the separation of the political sphere from the 
economic.149 The economic sphere is dominated by exploitation and unequal power 
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relations. 150 The political sphere is marked by political freedom, equality of rights 
and nominal equality of power. Importantly, the political sphere has centralised the 
means of coercion: the courts; the army; police etc.151 This allows the state a degree of 
autonomy from the economic sphere. Importantly, this gives it the ability to make 
decisions that are not in the interests of the bourgeois. However, Gough argues the 
state still acts in the interest of capital. The most important reason is that the state 
must submit to the logic of capitalism.152 The logic of capitalism is profitability; in 
order for the economy to prosper, the state must ensure a conducive environment for 
the extraction of surplus value, and therefore of class exploitation.  
A contemporary of Gough, James O’Connor, provides a theoretical framework which 
encapsulates Gough’s views. O’Connor argues the state has two key functions: 
accumulation and legitimation.153 The accumulation function was just mentioned, 
and requires surplus extraction. The second function is legitimation. The legitimation 
function requires the state to win the mass loyalty of the population to both the state 
and the capitalist system, thereby “integrat[ing] all elements of the population into a 
coherent system.”154 The separation of state and economy is crucial to achieving this 
purpose. The autonomy of the state allows it to assume “the name of a universal 
principle,” whilst actually acting in the interests of the bourgeois class, and against 
the interests of the majority.155 The state ensures the consent of the proletariat for its 
own exploitation. 
O’Connor then identifies two types of state expenditure relating to these two 
functions: social capital and social expenses. Social capital increases the rate of profit, 
as it provides services which either increases the productivity of labour (e.g. 
education), or reduces the costs of reproducing labour (e.g. early childhood education 
or healthcare). Social expenses are projects which maintain social harmony, without 
increasing the rate of profit.156 The welfare state plays a crucial role in achieving both 
legitimisation and accumulation. Welfare helps to shield people from the worst 
outcomes of capitalism, including poverty, and unequal access to health and 
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education.157 This type of spending is predominantly a social expense, though it does 
ensure the unemployed are ready for employment, and may be classed as social 
capital. Welfare can also be a more direct form of social capital. For example, welfare 
for families (e.g. direct payments, early childhood education) ensures parents return 
to the workforce (increasing productivity), and reduces the costs of childrearing, 
making it a form of social capital. 
The welfare state, then, is an institution which assists the process of accumulation, 
and ensures public support for the system. Thus the welfare state represents a 
“contradictory unity.”158 Provision of education, health and social welfare prevents 
absolute poverty within society, shielding people from the harshest elements of 
capitalism. However, these same institutions are seen as repressive mechanisms. The 
education system assists in the creation of inequality, the provision of family welfare 
entrenches gender inequality and unemployment benefits coerce individuals into 
work. Ian Gough concludes the welfare state “simultaneously embodies tendencies to 
enhance social welfare, to develop the powers of individuals … and tendencies to 
repress and control people, to adapt them to the requirements of the capitalist 
economy.”159 Gough argues the welfare state is a result of working-class activism and 
labour strength, but it “paradoxically … aids the long-term accumulation of capital 
and strengthens capitalist social relations.”160  
Welfare also plays an important role in maintaining what Marx calls the “reserve 
army of labour.”161 The reserve army is the pool of unemployed and underemployed 
workers in society. When the economy grows, these workers are pulled into the 
economy. However, if the economy nears full employment, wages will increase 
rapidly, which decreases surplus value. This leads to a slowing, and possible 
reversing, of economic growth due to a lack of profitability. Workers are then pushed 
back into the reserve army, increasing profitability and economic growth.162 The 
reserve army plays a crucial role in the extraction of surplus value. They ensure 
workers cannot claim all of the surplus value, as employers can replace them with 
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lower paid workers. 163  The reserve army also ensures greater productivity, as 
employers can pressure employees to work harder out of fear of losing their job.164 
Providing welfare for the reserve army is, then, beneficial to capitalism. It allows the 
unemployed to be prepared to work by coercing them into changing their behaviour 
to make them suitable for employment and mandating they take up job offers.165 So, 
welfare is more than just a social expense to ensure social harmony. It is a form of 
social capital, which increases capital accumulation by keeping wages low, and 
workers productive.  
Another neo-Marxist perspective is offered by the regulation approach. The core of 
this approach is an historical analysis of how capitalist societies ensure capital 
accumulation. The focus of the regulation school is not just economic; it seeks to 
examine how accumulation is regulated by “a range of economic and extra-economic 
mechanisms in seeking to explain the ‘regularities’ of economic behaviour.”166 As with 
other Marxist schools, a key question is how capitalism is maintained in spite of the 
“inevitably generated antagonisms and crises.”167 The answer to this question is found 
through the concept of modes of regulation, which is defined as “a set of mediations 
which ensure that the distortions created by the accumulation of capital are kept 
within limits which are compatible with social cohesion.”168 Regulationists seek to 
describe how institutions, societal norms and patterns of conduct support and protect 
capital accumulation. These factors are not constant; and, driven by crises, evolve 
over time.169  
The welfare state is one of the mechanisms which support capital accumulation. As 
with other neo-Marxist theories, the welfare state is seen as having two key goals: to 
help create a productive work force; and to lessen the negative side-effects of 
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economic crises, helping to maintain the legitimacy of capital accumulation.170 The 
key insight of the regulation school is that the regime of accumulation must work in 
concert with social policies in order to function properly. This insight is developed 
through an analysis of the Keynesian Welfare State. Regulationists argue capital 
accumulation during this period was predicated on mass production of goods; thus, 
profitability was ensured through mass consumption of these goods.171 Social policy 
was designed to manipulate the demand-side of the economy in order to ensure high 
levels of consumption. This was achieved through full employment, which ensured 
the vast majority of people could economically participate in consumption. To ensure 
full employment, the state instituted a range of economic controls in order to achieve 
sufficiently high levels of demand.172  
However, the 1970s and 80s saw the breakdown of this form of accumulation through 
a series of economic crises.173 These crises led to a transition between accumulation 
regimes - from one which required mass consumption, to one which requires 
flexibility and the liberalisation of the economy.174 Under conditions of flexibility, full 
employment can no longer be achieved. Instead, social policy has to focus on 
ensuring a constant supply of labour. This was achieved by introducing stronger 
disincentives for remaining on a benefit, and ensuring beneficiaries were prepared to 
work. 175  The key point from this analysis is that social policy assists capital 
accumulation; and, as the demands of capital accumulation changes, so does social 
policy. 
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1.6. Theorising Neoliberal Welfare Reform 
It is now possible to articulate my own theoretical framework in relation to this 
literature. My framework draws from the social democratic and neo-Marxist 
traditions. As outlined in the introduction to this thesis, the framework will be used 
to inform the description, analysis and evaluation of the welfare reforms of the two 
National Governments. Importantly, these tasks must be done within a set word 
limit. As such, it is necessary to maintain a tight empirical focus in order to maintain 
the quality of the thesis. Given these requirements, the theories of Esping-Andersen 
and Castles stand out as the most useful. Their work will help guide the descriptive 
and evaluative elements of the thesis. The key strength of their work is that they 
identify the main features of different welfare regimes, which is useful for the 
comparative analysis of welfare states. Each thinker outlines the key elements of 
welfare regimes, and identifies a set of empirical measures for identifying each 
regime. This will help guide the descriptive element of the thesis, as it identifies what 
reforms are most relevant to social security. Further, it provides analytical tools for 
evaluating the impact and importance of the welfare reforms. For example, if it is 
shown that National’s reforms have dismantled the WEWS, then these reforms 
represent a fundamental change to the nature of New Zealand’s social security 
provision. A final strength is derived from Esping-Andersen’s focus on how the 
welfare state impacts on social stratification within society. This directs our attention 
to how welfare can foster a sense of solidarity, or can be used to create social stigma 
and feelings of exclusion amongst beneficiaries. Such a focus requires acknowledging 
the lived experiences of beneficiaries, as their experiences will test Esping-Andersen’s 
contention that liberal welfare regimes exclude beneficiaries from society. 
A more critical perspective is gained by incorporating several insights from the neo-
Marxist perspective. In particular, neo-Marxist interpretations of the role the welfare 
state plays are capitalist economies is valuable. The key advance made by Castles is 
that he includes labour market and economic regulations in his conception of New 
Zealand’s social security. Neo-Marxists go a step further than Castles and argue the 
welfare state plays an important role in maintaining capitalism. It does this by 
mitigating and legitimising the negative outcomes of capitalism, helps to maintain 
downwards pressure on wages, and ensuring the reserve army of labour are prepared 
for work. By incorporating these insights, our attention turns not just to the lived 
experiences of beneficiaries; but to the wider role welfare plays in capitalism. The key 
The Political Economy of Welfare 
37 
 
weakness of the neo-Marxist approach is its wider empirical focus. A neo-Marxist 
analysis involves a close examination of the accumulation process, and if one adopts a 
regulationist approach, how accumulation changes over time. Given the need for a 
tight empirical focus, such an analysis is not possible. As such, the main insight to be 
incorporated is the role of the reserve army of labour. The reserve army concept 
directs our focus to the labour market, and the relationship between the unemployed, 
welfare and the economy. This complements the focus of Castles’ concept of the 
WEWS, and provides a more critical insight than Castles’ work. Thus, the theoretical 
framework which I adopt predominately relies on the typology of welfare states 
outlined by Esping-Andersen and Castles. This provides a heuristic guide for the 
description of the two National Governments, and the analytical tools required for 
evaluating the reforms. This will be complemented by the more critical perspective of 
neo-Marxism, though it will not include such a detailed analysis of accumulation. 
1.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has developed a theoretical framework that is drawn from the political 
economy of welfare. Sections 1.1 and 1.2 outlined the regimes debate between Gosta 
Esping-Andersen and Frank Castles. Esping-Andersen outlines a typology of welfare 
regimes, defined by his concepts of decommodification and stratification. Liberal 
welfare states, which he argues includes New Zealand, are defined by low levels of 
decommodification and the entrenchment of the stratification produced by the 
market. Social democratic countries, conversely, have high levels of 
decommodification and seek to foster solidarity within society. Castles rejects this 
view, arguing Australia and New Zealand represent a separate welfare regime, which 
he describes as the wage earners’ welfare state, which historically ensured widespread 
social protection and equality through a managed market and targeted benefits. 
Sections 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 provide an overview the three major traditions of political 
economy: neoliberalism; social democracy; and neo-Marxism. Each tradition 
provides a different characterisation of the relationship between the welfare state and 
capitalism. Neoliberals view the welfare state as a costly burden on the economy; 
social democrats view welfare as ameliorating inequality and extending social 
citizenship; and neo-Marxists view it as a crucial institution in ensuring the 
profitability and legitimacy of capitalism. Finally, I outlined my own theoretical 
framework which will be used throughout this thesis. It draws predominantly from 
the theories of Esping-Andersen and Castles, as they provide a tight empirical focus, 
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and the analytical tools to evaluate the two National Governments. Their theories are 
supplemented by the more critical insights derived from neo-Marxism, particularly 




THE INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF 
PATERNALISM 
This second chapter further develops the theoretical framework, begun in chapter 
one, by providing a conceptual basis for the critical analysis of the similarities and 
differences between the two Governments. This requires an analysis of the neo-
conservative critique of welfare in order to identify the intellectual underpinnings of 
neoliberal welfare reform. As will be shown in the following chapters, this school of 
thought would significantly influence New Zealand’s reforms. The neo-conservative 
critique originated in the United States and became known as ‘new paternalism’. In 
order to properly understand paternalism, the context in which it arose must be 
described. Thus, section 2.1 describes the historical backdrop to the emergence of 
new paternalism. It is shown that paternalism draws on the older conservative ideas 
of the distinction between the deserving and underserving poor, and the related 
concept of a culture of poverty. Then, the broader conservative critique of American 
society in the 1970s and 1980s is described. They saw a breakdown of basic social 
order, which led to the rise of an “underclass.” Section 2.2 outlines how conservatives 
applied this analysis to welfare, which provides a set of problems which welfare 
reform must target. Section 2.3 outlines the policy platform which is advocated in 
order to solve these problems, and to help dismantle the underclass. Finally, section 
2.4 identifies the key elements of paternalism, which provides criteria to judge New 
Zealand’s reforms against, in order to assess the similarities between new 
paternalism and the reforms. 
2.1. Situating Paternalism 
Before addressing the modern theory of paternalism, its historical antecedents must 
be identified. Paternalism grew from one of the most enduring concepts in welfare; 
the dichotomy between the “deserving” and “undeserving” poor.1 The deserving poor 
are those who have fallen on hard times due to forces outside of their control. For 
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example, they have lost their job because their employer’s business shut down. They 
have behaved responsibly, and are deemed to be deserving of welfare. The 
undeserving poor are those who have a low-income because they are unwilling to 
work hard enough to earn more, or refuse to work at all. In this case, whether the 
person should receive any form of welfare is contested.2 This distinction is based on 
behaviour, and the moral culpability of a person who is poor; thus moving the focus 
of welfare to the actions of the individual.3 As I shall later describe, the focus on 
behaviour is fundamental to the paternalist argument. 
Closely related to this position is the theory of a “culture of poverty.”4 This theory 
gained prominence in the late 1950s with the publication of Five Families: Mexican 
Case Studies in the Culture of Poverty.5 Author Oscar Lewis argues “one can speak of 
the culture of the poor, for it has its own modalities and distinctive social and 
psychological consequences for its members.”6 This culture is “a  way  of  life  handed  
on  from  generation  to  generation  along family  lines.”7 It is a specifically Western 
and capitalist phenomenon, and is borne from the reaction of families to the “feelings  
of  hopelessness  and  despair  that  arise  from  the realization  by  the  members  of  
the  marginal  communities  in  these  societies  of  the improbability of their 
achieving  success  in  terms  of  the  prevailing values and  goals.”8 Lewis identifies 
several features of this culture: it is marked by fear, suspicion and hostility to the 
dominant institutions of society; they are less likely to marry; have a strong feeling of 
fatalism, helplessness, dependency and inferiority; and whilst there is a nominal 
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adherence to mainstream or middle-class morality, these values are not acted out in 
practice.9 
The Breakdown of American Society 
The 25 years following the end of World War II are known as America’s “Postwar 
Golden Age.”10 Dean Baker succinctly describes the economic context 
The years from the end of World War II up to [1973] … had been a period of a 
largely unbroken prosperity. The economy had grown rapidly through most of 
the period, with low rates of both unemployment and inflation. The periods of 
recession were relatively short and mild … Also, the economic gains from this 
period were evenly shared, with workers at all points along the wage 
distribution enjoying the gains.11 
Underpinning this growth was the rise of Keynesianism as economic orthodoxy 
across the Western World.12 As described in chapter one, Keynesianism provides the 
justification for state intervention in the economy. Though rejecting the more left-
wing elements of Keynesianism, successive post-war United States Governments 
accepted the fundamental proposition that Governments could avoid or ameliorate 
recessions through manipulating aggregate demand.13 
The 1970s brought the end to the Postwar Golden Age. A wide range of problems 
beset the US: two “Oil Shocks” rapidly increased oil prices; economic growth slowed, 
economic recessions were deeper and lasted longer; real wages decreased; 
expenditure on the welfare state increased; and tax avoidance became more 
prevalent, leading to high budget deficits for Government.14 The coincidence of low 
economic growth, high inflation and high unemployment became known as 
stagflation. The existence of stagflation provided a fundamental challenge to 
mainstream Keynesian economic theory, as Keynesian economic modelling did not 
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predict such a scenario.15 Indeed, it is argued stagflation “constituted definite proof of 
fundamental flaws in Keynesian theory.”16 Not only was the Postwar Golden Age 
breaking down; so was the concomitant consensus on Keynesian economic 
management.  
It was in this environment that neoliberal and neo-Marxist theories began to flourish 
as alternative explanations of the collapse of the postwar boom were sought.17 These 
theories sought to identify the key structural problems afflicting advanced capitalist 
societies and, as described in chapter one, came to a variety of conclusions. 
Neoliberals contend the social democratic Keynesian policy regime had caused the 
economic slowdown by impeding the natural functioning of the market, which 
undermined growth. In contrast, neo-Marxists argue that declining profitability had 
led to a contraction of investment resulting in economic stagnation and rising 
unemployment.  
Conservatives take a fundamentally different approach to the problem. Rather than 
emphasising economic and political problems, US conservatives argue their society 
was experiencing a breakdown of basic morality and societal order. The evidence for 
this was seen in four areas: family structure; crime; education; and employment. 
Conservative analysis begins with the family, which is considered to be the 
fundamental building block of society.18 The connection between societal breakdown 
and families became a controversial topic in the 1960s, with the release of a 
government report called The Negro Family. Writing in the midst of the civil rights 
movement in the mid-1960s, author Daniel Moynihan argued that regardless of the 
success of the movement, African Americans would not be equal in “ability to win out 
in the competitions of American life.”19 The primary obstacle to equality was the 
trends in family structure amongst African Americans. In 1965, approximately 25% of 
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all African American marriages had been dissolved, a number which had been 
increasing since the 1950s. Nearly 25% of African American children were born to 
unwed mothers, up from 16% in 1940. For whites, only 3 to 8% of marriages had 
dissolved, and only 3% of babies were born out of wedlock.20 This argument was 
again brought to national attention in the 1980s by influential conservative 
commentator Charles Murray. He found that by 1980, only 54% of African American 
families consisted of both a husband and a wife, compared to 85%, of whites.21 The 
proportion of African American babies born to sole-parent households had increased 
to 48%, compared to only 11% for whites. This gap is mostly explained by the 
substantial income differences between African Americans and whites, as low-income 
families break-up at a higher rate.22 Murray emphasises the point that these statistics 
pointed to a fundamental change in the behaviour of low-income people. Individuals 
who became adults in the late 1970s and 1980s were far more likely to become 
divorced and raise a child out of wedlock than those of previous eras.23  
The second area of analysis was the increase in crime rates. Beginning in the 1960s, 
crime rates rose steeply. From 1960 to 1980, the total number of serious crimes 
reported in the US increased from approximately 3,384,000 to 13,295,000.24 The 
increase in violent crimes was particularly alarming. Between 1963 and 1980, the 
incidence of murder increased by 122%, forcible rape by 287% and aggravated assault 
by 215%. Equally concerning was the increase in property crime, with burglary up 
189%, larceny 159% and car theft 128%.25 There was also increasing concern about 
illicit drug usage, particular because crack cocaine suddenly became widespread in 
the mid-1980s.26 The use of illicit drugs was most severe amongst those who had: 
poor relations with their parents; psychological disturbances; have performed poorly 
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at school, live in communities where drug-use is widespread, and are in poverty.27As 
with the breakdown of the family, African Americans were disproportionately 
represented in the statistics, being both more likely to commit and to be the victim of 
crime.28 Conservatives saw the increase in crime as further evidence the current 
generation of adults were behaving differently from past generations; never before 
had people committed crime at such a high level.29 
The state of the education system was another area of concern. Public disquiet over 
the quality of education had grown throughout the 1970s, with the Department of 
Education responding with a national commission. The commission stated: “each 
generation of Americans has outstripped its parents in education, in literacy, and in 
economic attainment. For the first time in the history of our country, the educational 
skills of one generation will not surpass, will not equal, will not even approach, those 
of their parents.”30 The commission compiled an impressive range of statistics to 
support its case. SAT (a test taken by school leavers) scores had consistently declined 
between 1960 and 1983, demonstrating a general fall in overall achievement in 
education.31 This trend occurred across mathematics, English, science and physical 
education. The percentage of students achieving high scores on SAT tests had 
declined dramatically. Of particular concern were the outcomes of the least 
successful. Approximately 13% of all 17 year olds were functionally illiterate. There 
was a 73% increase in remedial mathematics classes to bridge numerical illiteracy, 
constituting 25% of all mathematics classes.32 African Americans fared particularly 
poorly in education. Only 3.5% of white students scored less than 300 on their SAT 
(considered a low score), compared to 25% of African Americans. 33  Finally, the 
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national commission estimated up to 40% of African Americans were functionally 
illiterate.34 
Trends in unemployment were a particular concerning area for conservatives.  
Unemployment rates between 1960 and 1974 never rose higher than 6.7%, and 
dropped as low as 3.5%. In 1974, there was a sudden rise to 8.5%, which slowly 
decreased until 1980, when it again rose to a high of 9.7% in 1982.35 Rise and falls in 
the unemployment rate are not, however, unusual. Conservatives contend, however, 
this form of unemployment was not due to structural factors and the onset of 
economic stagnation, but rather was voluntary in nature. The economy was 
producing enough jobs, but the unemployed did not want to take them. Conservatives 
argue proof of this trend could be seen across a variety of statistical measures. It 
appeared most prominently in the measure of male participation in the labour force 
(LFPR). To be included in the LFPR, individuals either had to be in work, or be 
actively looking for work. In 1948, participation rates for African American and white 
males were virtually identical at approximately 87%. This rate remained stable until 
the 1960s, when the overall LFPR began to decline, and a gap between African 
American and white participation began to appear. By 1980, 70.5% of African 
Americans participated in the labour force, compared to 78.6% of white males.36 The 
downward trend in the LFPR demonstrated people had simply stopped looking for 
jobs. This change represents a “large-scale voluntary withdrawal from … the labour 
market by able bodied males” which had never been seen in US history.37 The gap in 
the LFPR was most severe amongst youths (aged 16-24), whereas older generations 
saw no gap arise between ethnic groups. This age difference was used to strengthen 
the conservative argument that younger generations were behaving differently; they 
were less likely to have jobs, and less likely to be even looking for work. 
The LFPR leaves an important question unanswered: did people stop looking for 
work because there were no jobs to be found? Lawrence Mead argues jobs were 
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available, and therefore most unemployment was voluntary. Between 1970 and 1987, 
47% of the jobless had been made redundant or were fired, 13% had left their jobs 
voluntarily, and 40% were people entering or re-entering the workforce. This means 
less than half of the unemployed had left their jobs involuntarily. Further evidence is 
found in a government survey of the unemployed conducted in 1976. It found the 
average unemployed person would only return to work if the job offered a 7% 
increase on their previous wage; 35% were willing to work for less money; and 30% of 
the jobless were willing to work a job more than 20 miles away. For Mead, this 
showed the unemployed were only willing to work in employment they found 
desirable, with a decent wage and with little travel. He also argued it was clear there 
were jobs available. Amongst the disadvantaged (women, teens, non-whites) long-
periods out of work were rare, with most cycling in and out of different jobs.38 This 
was confirmed by administrators of federal training programmes, who found clients 
had far more difficulty keeping their jobs rather than finding them. Jobs existed for 
disadvantaged individuals, but they were unable to keep them due to a sense of 
entitlement (believing they deserved a better job), or behavioural deficits (not 
showing up to work).39 Further, many menial jobs were taken by illegal immigrants, 
who were more willing to work low-wage and low-skill jobs.40 
Mead saw this as evidence the jobless had become “jobshopping” for suitable 
employment, rather than “jobseeking,” and accepting any job they could find. This 
explains why the slight majority of jobless had not lost their previous job; they either 
left voluntarily or were not actively looking for work. 41  Unlike the Keynesian, 
neoliberal and neo-Marxist analyses, which attribute unemployment to the onset of 
economic stagnation, driven by economic and political structural problems, 
conservatives argue the individual was at the centre of the problem. Unemployment 
was not caused by government intervention in the economy, or the needs of capital 
accumulation, but because individuals simply were not taking the jobs which were 
available. 
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The New Problem: The Rise of the Underclass 
Conservatives saw American society heading in a new direction, with the breakdown 
of the family, increasing crime, decreasing educational attainment, and increasing 
voluntary unemployment being its most egregious outcomes. These trends pointed to 
a new social problem; the rise of an ‘underclass’. The concept of the underclass gained 
widespread exposure after the publication of Ken Auletta’s book Underclass in 
1982.42 Auletta defined the underclass as: 
(a) the passive poor, usually long-term welfare recipients; (b) the hostile street 
criminals who terrorise most cities, and who are often school dropouts and 
drug addicts; (c) the hustlers, who, like street criminals, may not be poor and 
who earn their livelihood in an underground economy, but rarely commit 
violent crimes; (d) the traumatised drunks, drifters, homeless shopping-bag 
ladies and released mental patients.43 
The underclass was the culmination of the interaction of various individual social 
problems. Coming from a broken family is linked to increased drug usage and poor 
educational outcomes, which are linked to greater crime rates, and so on, which 
creates a cycle that was exceptionally difficult to prevent.44 The underclass is usually 
poor, stemming from their tenuous relationship with the labour market, leading to 
dependence on welfare for financial security.45 Hustlers and criminals, however, are 
not always poor. What unites these groups are their behavioural deficiencies; they are 
likely to be unemployed, lack respect for law and order, are unable to maintain 
marriages, and seem incapable of managing their own lives.46 Here, the culture of 
poverty thesis re-emerges in a modern context. Being part of the underclass means 
being part of a certain culture, which inculcates behaviours which are incompatible 
with mainstream society, a culture which is passed from one generation of broken 
families to the next.  
The exact size of the underclass was difficult to precisely measure, as the categories 
created by Auletta are difficult to operationalize. Aluetta himself does not provide an 
exact number, though his statistics suggest around 9 million people were in the 
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underclass, compared to 29.3 million who were in poverty. 47  This finding is 
reinforced by a study by conservative scholars Mary Bane and David Ellwood. They 
found a “hardcore” of long-term poverty amongst the poor. Over a single year, the 
majority of people who were in poverty were there for only a short period. But at a 
single point in time, approximately 60% of those in poverty would be in the midst of a 
spell of poverty which would last eight years or more.48 This meant the majority of 
beneficiaries used welfare to quickly exit poverty. However, because of the existence 
of a hardcore of poverty, the majority of welfare funds were spent on this group.49 
They found the spells of poverty that lasted longest were associated with family 
events; either a break-up of a family which led to solo-motherhood, or the birth of a 
child to a sole-mother.50 Thus, because poverty is associated with family break-up, 
which is more predominant amongst African Americans, the long-term impoverished 
are dominated by a particular demographic; they are predominantly non-white, live 
in female-headed households (i.e. sole-mothers), and 70% are under 18.51 
2.2. The Challenge for Welfare 
The rise of the underclass, and their associated problems, creates a fundamental 
challenge for the way governments should assist the poor. Conservative critiques 
were levelled at all public institutions: from education, to law and order, and most 
prominently, welfare.52 The welfare system was of particular importance because of a 
growing concern of welfare “dependency.” The existence of welfare was said to 
contribute to the rise of the underclass. Charles Murray, for example, argues the 
availability of a benefit for sole-mothers accelerated the break-down of the family, 
and increases voluntary unemployment, thereby increasing the size of the underclass. 
This creates a cycle where the people who most need help are put on welfare, which 
reinforces their poverty, creating the hardcore of poverty Bane and Ellwood had 
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identified.53 The underclass are unable to help themselves, and become dependent on 
welfare. Welfare reforms, then, are crucially important to reducing the underclass, 
because so many of the underclass were dependent on welfare.  
The challenge the underclass posed to welfare originated from the newness of their 
problems. Already we have seen that family breakdown, crime, educational failure, 
and unemployment were more severe amongst the younger generations than 
previous ones, representing a fundamental change in behaviour. Mead outlined the 
challenge most articulately. He argues the existence of the underclass creates a 
paradigm shift from progressive to “dependency” welfare politics.54 The key change 
between these paradigms is the assumption of competence. Under progressive 
politics, it is assumed welfare beneficiaries behave in accordance with the “axioms of 
individually self-interested rationality.” 55  That is, left to their own devices, 
beneficiaries behave in a way conducive to bettering their own lives. Thus, 
progressive welfare policies are designed to eliminate the barriers the poor face in 
achieving their goals. According to Mead, progressive policies succeeded in this 
regard; the poor no longer face any major external barriers to success.56 However, 
poverty, unemployment, criminality and educational failure remain. Mead argues this 
is because the poor are not competent; rather, they suffer from behavioural deficits 
which make it unlikely they will escape poverty.57 Thus, the problem lies not with the 
structure of society, but with the individual.  
In Mead’s edited volume The New Paternalism, other scholars furthered the case for 
rejecting the competence assumption. George Vaillant found in his study of 456 
under-educated white males, the best predictor of being in poverty was the existence 
of mental illness. Of the 52 who were officially in poverty, only 3 (7%) did not have 
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psychiatric illnesses (including alcoholism, schizophrenia, mental retardation, etc.).58 
Further, he found those who are in poverty are unable to find work because of their 
behavioural deficits (depression, undersocialisation etc.), not because of structural 
deficits (economic conditions, bigotry etc.)59 Psychologist Miles Shore found poverty 
is causally related to major mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia, anxiety disorders, 
severe depression and substance abuse, as well as several others.60 In another study, 
he found behavioural disorders are clearly segregated by income; 27% of those below 
the poverty line suffer from a disorder, compared to 20.4% for low-income earners, 
16.1% for middle-incomes, and 14.2% for high incomes. 61  A key psychological 
outcome of poverty is a sense of pessimism, defined as “respond[ing] to adversity by 
giving up and adopting a helpless stance.”62 Pessimists are unable to exercise “choice 
and control and creat[e] opportunities for successful outcomes of individual 
actions.”63 This leads to those in poverty adopting a sense of hopelessness, and an 
inability to improve their own position. Beneficiaries become dependent on the state 
for their own survival, which leads to a state of pessimism, which makes it more 
difficult to leave welfare.64 
Mead rejects the assumption of competence for the most vulnerable in society. 
Instead, he assumes incompetence. This rejection has immense implications for 
welfare. It means the long-term poor cannot, without additional help, get out of 
poverty themselves. This means the orthodox approach of policy makers, which was 
to change economic incentives to induce individuals to change their behaviour, is 
incapable of helping the poor.65 This rejects the then dominant centre-left approach 
to welfare reform. More controversially, it also rejects the then emerging classical 
liberal approach to welfare, which is based on economic incentives. According to this 
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view, severely cutting welfare programs creates powerful incentives for the poor to 
better their lives. According to Mead this would further immiserate the poor, who 
lack the ability to be independent.66 So, successful welfare reforms must move away 
from economic incentives, and focus on the behaviour of the poor. According to 
James Wilson, a supporter of Mead, the behavioural problems of the poor must be 
understood as a lack of basic “character.” If the dependent are to participate in 
mainstream society, welfare policy must instil this “character.” 67 
2.3. Paternalistic Welfare Reform 
Mead’s proposed approach to instilling character is to base welfare on “paternalism.” 
Paternalism is “the close supervision of the dependent,” aiming to “reduce poverty 
and other social problems by directive and supervisory means.”68 To unpack this 
definition, three issues will be addressed. Firstly, the justification for paternalism will 
be described. Secondly, the broad principles that guide paternalistic welfare reform 
will be outlined. Finally, examples will be provided of how these principles are 
applied in practice. Paternalists justify their welfare reforms by an appeal to a ‘social 
contract’. 69  Society asserts the right to tell welfare recipients how to live, as it 
provides the assistance. These demands form certain obligations that the poor must 
fulfil in order to qualify for welfare. By fulfilling these obligations, the beneficiary 
becomes “deserving” of welfare. These obligations are also justified by appealing to 
the desires of the beneficiary. Mead states welfare recipients have the same values 
regarding work as the rest of the population, and they deeply desire employment.70 
But, because they lack basic competence, they are unable to achieve what they desire. 
Enforcing obligations, as will be discussed later, helps beneficiaries achieve their own 
goals, and become free from dependency. Thus, these obligations help beneficiaries 
achieve freedom, despite initially restricting it.71 
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The question, then, must be: how will close supervision help the poor achieve their 
desire for work? Broadly, paternalistic welfare reform must follow two key principles 
in order to be effective. Firstly, it must emphasise the values the poor lack, most 
importantly a strong work ethic and obedience to the law.72 Secondly, it must create 
structure around the lives of beneficiaries in order to allow them to function. These 
two principles demand a system of individualised welfare delivery. This requires 
“case managers,” who can provide individual attention to beneficiaries, be at the 
heart of welfare reform.73  
Case managers can implement these principles in five key ways. Firstly, the primacy 
of work must be emphasised. Case managers must constantly reinforce the 
temporariness of welfare, and that getting work must be a beneficiary’s main 
priority.74 Secondly, the welfare office must mimic as much as possible the working 
environment. This demands welfare policies focus on the obligations of beneficiaries, 
not on providing entitlements without any kind of work.75 Focussing on obligations 
helps build structure for the beneficiary; they know they must achieve certain 
outcomes, and have a case manager to assist them. Thirdly, these obligations must be 
“directive.”76 That is, beneficiaries must be required to fulfil their obligations. This 
allows case managers to “force” structure on beneficiaries, who may be reluctant to 
accept responsibility. 77  Fourthly, payment must be related to work. This means 
introducing the threat of sanctions for non-compliance. Fifthly, welfare programs 
must assume that everyone can work at some level, and try to fit each beneficiary 
with suitable employment.78 Overall, the goal is to recreate the relationship between a 
parent and its child through public policy. Case managers perform the role of a parent 
by setting goals, and instilling the motivation and discipline required to achieve those 
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goals. This helps instil the necessary values into the beneficiary to become self-
reliant.79 
Paternalistic Welfare: A Practical Policy Programme 
The principles of paternalism proved to be immensely influential in the United 
States. The state of Wisconsin was the leader of paternalistic welfare reform in the 
1980s and 90s, and followed these principles closely. 80  The welfare reforms in 
Wisconsin began with a build-up of the welfare bureaucracy, increasing its funding 
and staff.81 For welfare recipients, the new set of reforms was noticeable immediately. 
A policy of “diversion” was introduced, where an employee would meet the potential 
beneficiary as they entered the welfare office. The employee attempted to “persuade 
them to get a job immediately or seek help from relatives instead” of going on a 
benefit, and “tell them the obligations they will face if they go on aid.” 82 If the 
potential beneficiary did apply for welfare, mandatory stand down periods were 
implemented, during which the beneficiary received no money, and would be 
obligated to look for work. 55% of all people who entered welfare offices were 
successfully diverted by 1995. 83  Diversion ensures all beneficiaries know their 
obligations, and only the genuinely “deserving” received welfare, as those who found 
jobs or were supported by relatives were driven off welfare rolls. 
Those who were not diverted were directed to case managers. Case managers provide 
“help and hassle” for the client.84 Help is provided in a myriad of ways. This includes 
traditional welfare policies to eliminate barriers to employment, such as organising 
child care, transportation, training on how to budget, basic hygiene etc.85 The key 
change in helping clients comes through the close attention of the case manager. This 
begins at the initial meeting, where the case manager works with clients to establish 
career goals. This is crucially important, as effective case management empowers 
individuals to achieve their own goals. The next step is to plan a path to that goal; the 
case manager can provide further assistance through setting up job interviews, or 
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recommending training courses.86  Here, the case manager acts as a coach; they 
provide honest advice on the likelihood of the beneficiary’s plan, and can advise 
against their proposed plan, for example recommending against entering a course 
that would be too difficult.87 Crucial to this coaching is emphasising the importance 
of getting a job. Paternalists argue it is easier to find a job whilst participating in the 
job market, thus making it easier to get a better job.88 More importantly, however, is 
its effect on self-respect and self-confidence. One of the barriers to employment is the 
lack of self-confidence amongst beneficiaries (or their pessimistic outlook). The first 
step into the labour force helps alleviate this problem, opening up more opportunities 
in the labour force. By providing the structure of goal-setting and planning, as well as 
giving encouragement, the case manager facilitates the building of self-confidence, an 
optimistic outlook, and helps break the cycle of dependency.89  
Case managers must also “hassle” clients to be effective. This is predominantly 
achieved by making the obligations of the clients compulsory.90 Obligations can range 
from attending meetings with case managers, or completing training courses or job 
interviews. If beneficiaries do not show up, a case manager should “pursue them to 
find out what the problem is.”91 This allows the case manager to assess whether there 
was a legitimate reason for not turning up. It also allows them a chance to help solve 
any issues that may be arising in their client’s lives.92 If there is no legitimate excuse, 
then sanctions can be imposed on beneficiaries to ensure future compliance. The 
threat does not need to be severe; in one Wisconsin welfare office, only 2–12% of 
recipients were sanctioned, with the threat of sanctions ensuring far more complied 
with their case manager’s demands.93 This system of monitoring means the best case 
managers “know what most of their clients are doing every day.”94 Hassling also 
demands a certain tone be adopted by case managers; though they need to be 
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encouraging, they must also be able to “get in the face” of clients if necessary to force 
them to address the “real issues” that keep them on aid.”95 It is the implementation of 
the “hassle” technique that makes paternalism unique in welfare. The “help and 
hassle” technique mimics the relationship between parent and child, by providing 
both encouragement and discipline. This role is particularly poignant given the likely 
background of long-term beneficiaries; Mead points out “many of them never had 
anybody come after them before. They often grew up in neglectful families where 
parents paid them little regard of any kind.”96 Because of their own lack of structure, 
beneficiaries in Wisconsin “responded favourably to oversight,” because it “honor[ed] 
them with the assumption that their behaviour matters.”97 So, paternalism works by 
setting, and enforcing, a structure on the lives of beneficiaries. 
The case manager is at the heart of paternalistic welfare reform. Only they can 
provide the individualised attention that can produce a paternalistic relationship, 
which helps eliminate welfare dependency. However, case managers have a limited 
range of influence, as they only affect their individual clients. Politicians, on the other 
hand, have a far wider audience. Mead states “people learn social mores initially from 
their families, but public institutions have a lot to do with whether they are taken 
seriously … Whether values are treated as obligatory ultimately depends for many – 
perhaps most – citizens on the presence of enforcement.”98  
Paternalism must, then, be a statement of public morality to be effective; it must 
reinforce the societal view that work is mandatory, the value of family, and being 
dependent on welfare is undesirable. Policy must reflect this statement of ethics; the 
requirement to work, to take care of your family, and a focus on obligations must be 
clearly evident. Thus paternalist policies include seemingly harsh requirements for 
beneficiaries. These have included: enforced maximum time limits for receiving 
welfare; strict work requirements, including requiring sole mothers to work up to 35 
hours per week; the ability to deny unwed mothers and children welfare entitlements; 
a focus on getting beneficiaries into work, not education; and stricter child support 
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laws.99 In practice, a variety of waivers and special benefits have been created for 
those who cannot meet the requirements. 100  However, the public value of these 
policies is greater, as it reinforces the value of work. Strict rules assist case managers 
and beneficiaries. For case managers, it assists them to establish high expectations 
for beneficiaries. For beneficiaries it ensures a clear set of rules, decreasing the 
arbitrariness of the system.101  
2.4. Identifying the Key Elements of New Paternalism 
In the following chapters, the influence of new paternalism on New Zealand’s welfare 
reform will be identified and assessed. It is necessary, then, to identify the key 
elements of the new paternalist argument. This will provide the analytical tools to 
assess the similarities and differences between the two National governments with 
regards to new paternalism. Broadly, three key elements can be identified. 
Conservatives argue the US was experiencing a breakdown of society; the then 
current generation got divorced more, had more children out of wedlock, did worse at 
school, committed more crime, and were voluntarily choosing to be unemployed. This 
led to the rise of an underclass, which is united by its behavioural deficiencies. 
Conservatives argue the existence of an underclass challenges the way governments 
should assist the poor. Previously, welfare reforms assumed beneficiaries were 
competent; that is, they would act in a way conducive to bettering their own lives. 
According to Mead, the rise of the underclass proved this to be untrue. These 
arguments form the first key element of paternalism; beneficiaries are assumed to be 
incompetent, which is linked to a dysfunctional culture (the underclass). The second 
key element is the practical policy programme of paternalism. This is based on 
extensive case management, utilising the “help and hassle” technique. This technique 
mimics the relationship between parent and child, with the case manager acting as a 
parent, and the beneficiary the child. Finally, welfare reform must be backed by 
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statements of morality which relate to the deficits of the underclass. This can be 
achieved through two means. Firstly, politicians can reinforce morality through their 
public statements. Secondly, policy itself can reinforce the societal view that work is 
mandatory, the value of family, and being dependent on welfare is undesirable.  
2.5. Conclusion 
Paternalism grew from wider conservative concerns about American society in the 
1970s and 1980s. They saw the foundation of society, the family, breaking down, with 
high divorce rates and sole-parenthood rising rapidly. Crime rates were increasing, 
educational achievement was decreasing for the first time in their history, and most 
unemployment seemed to be voluntary in nature. These problems led to the rise of an 
underclass, reviving old conservative fears of a culture of poverty. Various reforms 
were proposed across all state institutions to help solve this growing problem. In 
welfare, a paternalistic policy programme was advocated. Conservatives, most 
prominently Lawrence Mead, argue the underclass is unable better their own lives, as 
their behavioural problems are too severe. Welfare reform was targeted as the ideal 
institution to help solve these problems. By recreating the relationship between 
parent and child through case managers, welfare could instil “character” into 
beneficiaries, which would allow them to participate in mainstream society. The “help 
and hassle” technique would be the foundation of this relationship; advice and 
support was given, but with strict discipline and a clear focus on obligations. This 
would provide a structure for beneficiaries which would allow them to prosper, and 
become free from a life of welfare dependency.  
 
58 
 CHAPTER THREE 
THE FOURTH NATIONAL 
GOVERNMENT’S WELFARE  REFORMS 
The first two chapters developed a theoretical framework for the description, analysis 
and evaluation of the two National Governments. Having completed this task, I can 
now move on to the first of the case studies, and describe the welfare reforms of the 
Fourth National Government. Conservatives in the United States launched a holistic 
attack on contemporary society, and a school of thought known as new paternalism 
emerged as a critique of welfare. The work of these conservatives was highly 
influential in the welfare reforms of the Fourth National Government from 1990 to 
1999. To begin the discussion of these reforms, the economic and political history 
prior to National’s election will be briefly described. This context is crucially 
important to understand why National reformed welfare. Then, the welfare reforms 
of the National Government will be described. This will proceed chronologically, and 
will be broken down into National’s three electoral terms. Next, the influence of 
paternalism will be outlined, concluding it had a significant effect on the reforms. 
Finally, the broad trend of National’s welfare reforms is identified, showing a clear 
shift from the liberal to conservative tradition within neoliberalism. 
3.1. New Zealand’s Long Boom and Economic Crisis: 1945-84 
The broad trends of New Zealand’s post-World War II economic history will be 
described in order to provide the backdrop and context of the National Government’s 
welfare reforms. For 30 years following the end of World War II, New Zealand 
experienced a remarkable level of economic prosperity and political stability.1 The 
economy relied significantly on New Zealand’s role as “Britain’s little farm,” with the 
vast majority of exports coming from the agricultural sector.2 Keynesianism provided 
the intellectual paradigm Governments used to manage and regulate the economy, 
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with New Zealand amongst the most regulated economies the in world.3 New Zealand 
experienced strong economic growth during 1945-1975, with real GDP growth 
averaging 3.56% annually.4  This growth rate was below average for the OECD. 5 
Perhaps New Zealand’s most prominent economic success of this period was the 
record low levels of unemployment. In total numbers, approximately 56 people were 
unemployed in 1956; 463 in 1966; and 5,356 in 1975.6 Between 1945 and 1971, the 
unemployment rate was never higher than 1.3%.7 Unlike GDP, New Zealand’s rate of 
employment was higher than the OECD average, though by 1973 employment had 
fallen below the average.8  
New Zealand’s post-war economic boom was to end in the 1970s. GDP growth 
suddenly plummeted as a variety of internal and external economic conditions 
worsened. 9  Several external shocks hit the economy during the decade, which 
severely damaged New Zealand’s exporting position. The two oil shocks in the 1970s 
increased the costs of importing goods, and decreased the competitiveness of New 
Zealand’s exports. This was particularly severe given New Zealand’s geographic 
isolation from major markets.10 This was exacerbated in 1973 when Britain entered 
the European Economic Community, which restricted New Zealand’s ability to export 
agricultural goods to Britain. 11  This, along with several other factors, led to a 
deteriorating balance of payments position; that is, more money was leaving New 
Zealand shores (through the purchase of imports, investing overseas etc.) than was 
coming in from overseas (through purchasing exports, foreign investment in New 
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Zealand etc.).12 This led to a worsening debt position for both the public and private 
sector.13 High levels of unemployment emerged, with unemployment increasing from 
2.1 to 7.9% from 1976 to 1986. In gross numbers, only 5,356 people were unemployed 
in 1976; increasing to 64,912 in 1984. The 1976 number was high by New Zealand 
standards. For the first time since the great depression New Zealand was 
experiencing mass unemployment. Inflation also became a major problem. These 
trends were a microcosm of the wider Western world, as the global economy suffered 
from similarly high rates of unemployment and inflation, combined with low growth 
rates.14  
3.2. Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State 
The economic crisis had dire ramifications for the state as public debt increased 
rapidly. The increase was driven in part by the state’s reliance on Keynesian economic 
thought to guide its management of the economy. As discussed in chapter one, 
Keynesians argue the state should intervene in the economy to produce a level of 
aggregate demand which is conducive to full employment and steady economy 
growth. In order to maintain demand in an economic downturn, Keynesians advocate 
the state increase its debt to boost demand, thereby returning the economy to 
economic growth.15 This interventionist approach was accepted by Robert Muldoon’s 
National Government, elected in 1975. 16  The effect of Muldoon’s policies was a 
massive increase in debt. Upon taking office in 1975, public debt stood at 
$4,200,000. By the time the Labour Party was elected in 1984, debt stood at 
$21,879,000, averaging an increase of 20.7% in debt every year Muldoon was in 
office.17  
The welfare state accounted for an increasing proportion of total government 
spending. In 1972 welfare accounted for 17.9% of total expenditure; by 1980 it had 
                                                   
12 Paul Dalziel and Ralph Lattimore, The New Zealand Macroeconomy: A Briefing on 
the Reforms 3rd Ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 17. 
13 35 
14  Andrew Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics of 
Thatcherism (Hampshire: MacMillan Education Ltd, 1988), 7. 
15 Brian Roper, Prosperity For All?, 131. 
16 Patrick Massey, New Zealand: Market Liberalization, 40-2. 
17  See Appendix A, data sourced from David Thorns and Charles Sedgwick, 
Understanding Aotearoa/New Zealand, 104. 




increased to 25.4%. 18  This increase was caused by two factors. Firstly, two new 
benefits were created which became increasingly expensive to maintain. The first was 
the Domestic Purposes Benefit (DPB), introduced in 1973 to provide a better safety 
net for sole-parents.19 In 1975, total expenditure on the DPB was $30,156,000. By 
1984, that number had risen to $380,836,00020 The second new benefit was the 
generous superannuation scheme. It was initially implemented by the Third Labour 
Government (1972-75), before being redesigned and expanded by National in 1977.21 
In 1970, prior to superannuation’s implementation, New Zealand spent 
$155,822,000 on old-age pensions. By 1984, expenditure had risen to 
$2,526,031,000. 22  The second reason for the rise in welfare spending was the 
increased expenditure on existing benefits. The increase in unemployment saw 
expenditure for the unemployment, sickness and invalid benefits rise from 
$34,707,000 in 1975, to $464,471,000 in 1984.23 Whilst the state was experiencing a 
fiscal crisis, welfare spending was substantially increasing, contributing to the rapidly 
increasing public debt. This situation was exacerbated by businesses beginning to 
aggressively pursue ways to avoid taxation, decreasing state revenue at the same time 
expenditure was increasing.24 
3.3. Fourth Labour Government: Radical Neoliberal Reforms 
In 1984, a David Lange led Labour Government was elected. Over the next six years, 
the Labour Government would implement a series of radical economic reforms which 
fundamentally changed New Zealand’s economy. There is a consensus across the 
political spectrum this period amounted to a fundamental shift from Keynesian to 
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neoliberal economic, social and employment relations policy.25 The scope and speed 
of the reforms was remarkable; over six years the Labour Government transformed 
how the state managed the economy, demolishing the Keynesian economic controls 
with an economic policy based on a “model of pure neo-liberal economic theory.”26   
Broadly, the Government pursued a policy agenda driven by neoliberal theory. 
Labour sought to reduce inflation to improve the clarity of price signals; 27 reduce the 
fiscal deficit;28 remove state intervention in the economy;29 liberalise foreign trade;30 
reform the public sector;31 the corporatisation and privatisation of state assets;32 and 
substantially reduce the progressive nature of the tax system.33 Overall, the key goal 
was to allow “greater freedom to market forces” in order to create economic growth.34  
3.4. Fourth National Government: Completing the reforms 
In 1990, the National Party was elected to government in a landslide victory. Upon 
entering office National “moved very rapidly to finish implementing Labour’s 
neoliberal program.”35 In particular, new Finance minister Ruth Richardson stated 
there were three areas National would reform: the on-going indebtedness of the state; 
the labour market; and the welfare state.36 Each of these areas will now be addressed 
in turn. 
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The Continuing Fiscal Crisis of the State 
The Fourth Labour Government adopted the goal of reducing the fiscal deficit as part 
of its wider neoliberal reforms.37 By 1990 it had succeeded in doing so.38 However, 
Government expenditure had continued to rise throughout Labour’s reign; from 
35.9% of total GDP in 1984/5 to 39.2% in 1989/90.39 The close of the 1980s saw 
growing concern about “government overspending,” and in particular expenditure on 
social policy.40 To reduce expenditure, eligibility and benefit levels would have to be 
restricted. 41  However, Labour did not have the political will to cut government 
expenditure, as this would mean “recanting the party’s historical commitment to the 
welfare state.”42 National were not restricted by the same political considerations as 
Labour. However, making severe cuts to government expenditure would likely be 
politically unpopular without a strong justification.  No such justification existed 
prior to the election.43 However, upon taking office, National was presented with an 
urgent fiscal crisis, as the Bank of New Zealand (which the state partially owned) 
required a bail-out.44 In response to this crisis, Treasury re-estimated the fiscal deficit 
the Government would face post-election. The new estimates showed an impending 
crisis; with anticipated deficits being nearly three times higher than expected.45 This 
sudden discovery of a fiscal crisis provided the justification Treasury and the National 
Party needed to go ahead with its radical reforms.46 
In December 1990, National released The Economic and Social Initiative (ESI), 
outlining its proposed changes to social and employment relations policy. The 
document was authored by Prime Minister Jim Bolger, Finance Minister Ruth 
Richardson, and Minister of Labour and Social Services Bill Birch. Bolger and 
Richardson emphasised the necessity of achieving fiscal surplus, particularly given 
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the newly discovered fiscal crisis.47 Bolger stated “short-term sacrifices and some 
major longer-term adjustments are both necessary if we are to succeed in the battle 
for economic growth and a return to full employment.”48  
Reforming the Labour Market: Employment Contracts Act 
Labour market regulation was one of the key structural adjustments which National 
argued needed to be reformed. According to neoclassical economics, which had now 
established itself as economic orthodoxy, the labour market is considered no different 
from other markets. Any form of government intervention or regulation is seen as 
creating inefficiency and inequity through the distortion of price signals, which leads 
to suboptimal market outcomes (i.e. unemployment). 49  Neoliberals advocate a 
“flexible” labour market, with little regulation, where individuals negotiate contracts 
based on their own needs. Historically, New Zealand’s maintained an extensively 
managed labour market, which formed part of the core of the wage earners’ welfare 
state.50 
Birch announced labour market reforms which represented “the most fundamental 
change to industrial relations in New Zealand since … 1894.” 51  This would be 
achieved with the passage of the Employment Contracts Act in 1991, which was based 
on neoliberal assumptions regarding the labour market. The Act consisted of two 
parts. The first provided for “freedom of association,” which ended compulsory 
unionism.52  As Roper points out, this “entrenched the ‘free-riding’ of non-union 
employees,” effectively discouraging individuals from registering with a union.53 This 
had a profound impact on union membership, as they experienced a 69% decrease 
                                                   
47 Jim Bolger al., Economic and Social Initiative, December 1990: Statements to the 
House of Representatives (Wellington: Government Printer, 1990), 7. 
48 Ibid, 8. 
49 Pat Walsh and Rose Ryan, “The Making of the Employment Contracts Act,” in 
Employment Contracts: New Zealand Experiences, ed. Raymond Harbridge 
(Wellington: Victoria University Press, 1993), 13. 
50 Frank Castles “Needs-Based Strategies of Social Protection in Australia and New 
Zealand,” in Welfare States in Transition, ed. Gosta Esping-Andersen (London: Sage, 
1996), 111. 
51 Jim Bolger et al., Economic and Social Initiative, 40. 
52  Raymond Harbridge, “Bargaining and the Employment Contracts Act,” in 
Employment Contracts: New Zealand Experiences, ed. Raymond Harbridge 
(Wellington: Victoria University Press, 1993), 42. 
53 Brian Roper, Prosperity for All?, 210. 




within 18 months.54 Part two of the act dealt with representation and bargaining 
arrangements, which further diluted the importance of unions, including restricting 
the right to strike. The ECA was designed to reduce collective agreements, increase 
individual contracts, thereby ensuring a “flexible” labour market.55  
Redesigning the Welfare State: 1990-93 
 
In the ESI, Bolger and Richardson announced a fundamental redesign of the welfare 
state. Bolger argued the welfare state was “unsustainable for one of the worst 
performing economies in the developed world,” and was responsible for a “drift from 
work to welfare.”59 The redesign of the welfare state would ensure “those in genuine 
need receive appropriate help, and those who can afford to fend for themselves do not 
have assistance they could do without.”60 Welfare reform would be guided by two 
objectives: to make an immediate impact on the economy; and to make changes that 
“will bring benefits over the longer haul.”61 The immediate impact would be to reduce 
Government debt by decreasing social spending. 62  Under the title of “bring[ing] 
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Table 1: Economic Data, 1990-93 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Real GDP Growth56 0.85% -0.59% -1.22% 1.17% 
Total Unemployment 
(%)57 
10.5%  11.7% 13.8% 14.6% 
Total Unemployment 
(Gross)58 
159,448 193,438 215,562 211,423 




benefits over the long haul,” National began to develop an argument for welfare 
reform that was not related to the economy. Richardson argued welfare had created a 
“pattern of permanent dependency on the State,” which was caused by the absence of 
work incentives.63 She stated “many beneficiaries receive an income close to or even 
higher than what they could receive in paid work.”64 This created an incentive for 
beneficiaries to remain on benefits, rather than entering employment. Overall, 
Richardson aimed to “remove the assumption that all the needs of members of 
society can be addressed by state action,” and aim welfare at “those in real need.”65 
The rest of the ESI outlined “what came to be seen as perhaps the most drastic 
example of welfare state retrenchment in … the OECD.”66 Payment rates were slashed 
across nearly all benefits. Table 2: April 1991 Benefit Cuts illustrates the extent of the 
cuts, which were unevenly spread across benefit type, age, and family structure. Peter 
Starke argues there seemed to be little systematic pattern driving the differences, and 
“cuts were not based on sound research on benefit adequacy or the likely 
consequences of the cutbacks.”67 The cuts were compounded by the cancelling of the 
annual benefit adjustment for inflation, which would have seen benefit rates 
increase. 68  The cuts would help solve the incentive problem by increasing the 
“rewards for moving from welfare to work by creating a greater margin between 
benefit rates and workforce earnings.”69 
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Table 2: April 1991 Benefit Cuts70 
Category  % Change Category  % Change 
Unemployment 
& Training 
 Single (1 child) -10.7 
Single 16-17 years 0.0 Single (2 children) -8.9 
Single 18-19 Years -5.8 Married couple (1 
child) 
-3.1 
Single 20 – 24 
years 
-24.7 Married couple (2 
child) 
-2.9 






-3.1 Domiciliary care  
Single (1 child) -10.7 Single 15-17 years 0.0 
Single (2 children) -8.9 Single adult (over 
17 years) 
0.0 
Married couple (1 
child) 
-8.5 Women Alone 
single adult 
-16.7 
Married couple (2 
child) 
-7.9 With Children -10.7 
Independent 
Youth 
 Single (1 child) -10.7 
Single 16-17 years -5.8 Single (2 children) -8.9 
Sickness  Invalids  
Single 15-17 years -17.6 Only cuts to:  
Single 18-24 years -20.0 Married Couple (1 
child) 
-5.2 





-9.1   
                                                   
70 Peter Starke, Radical Welfare State Retrenchment, 217. 




Eligibility for benefits was also restricted. This included lengthy stand-down periods 
for people applying for benefits. If an individual had voluntarily left their job, they 
would be denied a benefit for 26 weeks. The qualifying age for the DPB and other 
benefits was raised, restricting under 18s from receiving a benefit.71 Eligibility for 
youth rates for benefits was increased by 5 years to 25, effectively reducing benefit 
rates for young people.72 A work test was introduced, including “a new obligation that 
all adults capable of working actively seek employment.”73 Michael O’Brien pointed 
out this statement is disingenuous, as the unemployment benefit has included a work 
test since its introduction in 1936.74 A work test for lone parents whose youngest child 
was at least seven years old was proposed, though this was eventually dumped due to 
opposition from within the National Party.75 Finally, the universal Family Benefit 
payment, given to all individuals with children, was replaced by a means-tested 
benefit called the Family Support payment.76 However, the Family Support payment 
was not as large as the Family Benefit, and represented a benefit cut for low-income 
earners.77 
Six months later, Minister of Social Welfare Jenny Shipley further developed 
National’s ideological justification for welfare reform. She stated economic and social 
policy were fundamentally linked, reiterating that the current welfare system was 
restricting economic growth by increasing public debt.78 Shipley launched a stinging 
attack on the welfare system. New Zealand had been guided by the 1972 Royal 
Commission on Social Security, which stated: “The community is responsible for 
giving dependent people a standard of living consistent with human dignity and 
approaching that enjoyed by the majority, irrespective of the cause of dependency,” 
which would enable beneficiaries “to feel a sense of participation in and belonging to 
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the community.”79  According to Shipley, this approach to welfare had created a 
“culture of dependency,” and the lack of work incentives meant the “benefit system 
ha[d] become a poverty trap.”80 National’s reforms would create a welfare system 
that provided “a safety net – a modest standard below which people will not be 
allowed to fall provided they demonstrate they are prepared to help themselves.”81 
The new welfare system would “encourage … personal and family self-reliance.”82 
This represented a fundamental change in focus for the welfare state. Welfare was 
now conditional on the behaviour of beneficiaries (those who are prepared to help 
themselves), and would provide nothing more than a safety net, rather than enable 
participation in wider society. 
Over this period the Department of Social Welfare (DSW) was substantially 
restructured and broken down into separate business units in order to deal with the 
problems of “inefficiency, lack of accountability, customer dissatisfaction and poor 
public image.”83 This was part of a wider neoliberal public sector reform process. 
Although these reforms are of some relevance to the welfare reforms, they will not be 
discussed. The other policy changes which will be discussed are more significant, and 
given the space limitations of this chapter, it will be more advantageous to focus on 
them.84 National continued to reform the wider welfare state throughout its first term 
of office. These reforms occurred in areas beyond the scope of this thesis such as 
housing, accident compensation and superannuation. 
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Key Themes: 1990-93 
Having described National’s welfare reforms in its first term, the broad direction can 
now be analysed. The reforms were driven by neoclassical economic theories. Their 
primary goal was to cut public debt. This led the Government to reduce benefit rates 
and restrict eligibility in order to reduce welfare expenditure. The government based 
their welfare reforms on a neoclassical analysis of the labour market and work 
incentives. The analysis of the labour market refers to the belief that state 
intervention had created inefficiencies which caused unemployment. The concept of 
work incentives was founded on the neoclassical idea of price signals. Individuals 
rationally react to price signals, and because the difference between wages and 
welfare was so low, individuals were rationally choosing to stay on benefits.85 To solve 
the welfare problem, the labour market had to be reformed, and welfare payments 
needed to be reduced. Compared to future years, as will be shown, this is a 
remarkably shallow level of analysis. It simply extends economic concepts to 
beneficiaries without any reference to their actual lived experiences. 
Ideologically, there were three justifications used to support National’s reforms. The 
first was based on “fairness,” with National arguing those who were wealthy should 
not receive welfare, particularly in times of economic crisis. This justified the 
targeting of benefits and the restricting of eligibility, as these reforms would 
supposedly not hurt those in “genuine need.” The second justification was based 
around the negative effects of welfare “dependency.” Dependency would later become 
a pervasive concept in New Zealand’s welfare discourse. At this stage, however, the 
notion was only beginning to take shape. Dependency was never defined or 
thoroughly analysed. Presumably, it referred to the result of the welfare “poverty 
trap” which was created by poor work incentives. Whilst dependency had entered the 
public discourse, it was neither properly defined nor commonly used. The final 
ideological justification used during this term was behaviour. Previously, welfare had 
been provided “irrespective of the cause of dependency,” whereas now beneficiaries 
had to show “they are prepared to help themselves.” As with dependency, this 
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justification was only just taking shape. At this stage it was simply used to justify the 
implementation of work tests. 
Continued Reforms: 1993-96 
 
With the re-election of the National Party in 1993, the welfare debate began to take a 
new direction. This direction was heavily influenced by two documents: The DSW’s 
Brief to the Incoming Minister, published in 1993; and the 1994 Prime Ministerial 
Task Force on Employment. The Brief began to develop a new analysis of welfare 
which was separate from concerns over public debt and labour market regulation. 
Two key issues were highlighted. The first was the increase in the number of sole 
parents, with approximately 25% of children being in sole parent families. 89 The 
paper argued sole parents “stand out as the disadvantaged of the disadvantaged” in 
terms of employment, income, education and housing tenure.90 This had a significant 
impact on welfare, as the breakdown of the family reduced “the capacity of the family 
to deliver social services and economic support … and the responsibility is transferred 
to the state.”91 The second issue was the changing nature of the labour market after 
the passage of the ECA. There was an increase in long-term unemployment, with half 
of those on a benefit having been without a job for more than 27 weeks. In 1988, the 
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Table 3: Economic Data, 1993-96 
 1994 1995 1996 
Real GDP Growth86 6.31% 5.38% 3.78% 
Total Unemployment (%)87 13.4% 11.2% 9.5% 
Total Unemployment 
(Gross)88 
185,445 156,818 153,362 




number was only 22%.92 Youth (15-24) unemployment continued to be considerably 
higher than the average rate; standing at 18%.93 
The second important document was the Prime Ministerial Task Force on 
Employment. It proposed several reforms to welfare, including: that youth 
unemployment be a priority; income support should reinforce education and 
training; adults should continue upskilling; beneficiaries should receive 
individualised support; and welfare should encourage the take-up of full and part-
time work.94 
The Government’s response to these reports proceeded in two stages, which began in 
1994 with the release of From Welfare to Well-Being. The document identified nine 
major areas of concern, of which four are relevant: multi-problem families; benefit 
fraud; general income support; and transition to work for beneficiaries. 95  The 
Department implemented a range of policies to solve the multi-problem family’s 
issue, with few directly relating to income support, so they are not relevant here. 
However, it is important that families had become an area of concern. Reducing 
benefit fraud was the next major area of focus, with increased funding directed to 
preventing fraud.96 
Further initiatives were announced to encourage beneficiaries into work. As with the 
reforms of 1990/91, the concern over incentives was paramount. Reforms would help 
beneficiaries “transition to work” by increasing abatement rates for beneficiaries, so 
they could earn more money before having their benefit reduced.97 Importantly, the 
notion of incentives had grown to accommodate more than the difference between 
wages and benefit rates. Incentives now included “human resource development.”98 
New initiatives would thus help “the enhancement of skills, knowledge and personal 
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attributes” through offers of educational and training programmes.” 99  Here, the 
concept of reciprocal obligations begins to appear. In the 1993 Brief, the DSW 
committed to “continue to develop the notion of contract responsibilities for 
customers where they are made aware of their obligations in exchange for their 
income support.”100 Increased obligations would be placed on beneficiaries in order 
to “balance incentive [i.e. training programmes] with obligation.”101 
One of the most important initiatives to come from this period was the sole parent 
pilot scheme. The scheme would provide “special liaison officers … to help them find 
work, job training, or educational opportunities.” 102  The officers would assist in 
“achieving a closer integration between sole parent beneficiaries and the labour 
market,” and focus on removing barriers to full integration, such as child care, length 
away from the work force, a lack of confidence and a lack of access to information.103 
This represents a major step in the development of welfare policy. The DSW was 
acknowledging individuals on benefits face particular issues that were unrelated to 
the labour market or work incentives. To combat these issues the DSW was proposing 
a case manager take an active role in the beneficiary’s life in order to overcome these 
problems.  
By the beginning of 1996, New Zealand was facing a much brighter economic outlook. 
As Table 3: Economic Data, 1993-96 shows, real GDP was growing and 
unemployment was decreasing. During this period, the Government announced the 
second major step in response to the Employment Task Force. The Government 
announced it would “increase spending on education and health, and make a major 
new investment in the future of low- and middle-income families.”104 The first policy 
initiative was a tax cut for the lowest tax brackets. 105  Despite the rhetoric, the 
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majority of the tax cuts went to those on higher incomes. 106  Further initiatives 
targeted two groups: families and beneficiaries. Families were the target of two major 
changes. Firstly, two family benefits, which assisted low-income earners, were 
increased. Secondly, a new Independent Family Tax Credit was created, which 
provided a benefit for families on low incomes who were not receiving a benefit.107 
Beneficiaries were the second major target of the reforms. Sole parents, youth and the 
long-term unemployment were targeted, as the DSW had identified them as problem 
groups. A “dual abatement” system was set-up. Single-parents, widows, and those 
with disabilities had their abatement rates reduced. 108  This was designed to 
encourage part-time work, as these groups were often unable to work full-time, and 
there were more part-time jobs available due to the introduction of the ECA.109 Young 
people (16 to 20), and the long-term unemployed (unemployed for more than 2 
years), would also receive greater individualised assistance from employment 
advisors, similar to the sole parent pilot scheme.110 Finally, sole parents would receive 
more funding for early childhood care and a supplementary benefit for those entering 
some form of education.111 
The overall effect of these reforms was to increase the amount of after-tax income 
individuals and families received from working, and provided greater funding for 
beneficiaries. In exchange for these reforms, beneficiaries would have to accept “some 
increased responsibilities.”112 This meant the programmes for the youth and long-
term unemployed would be mandatory. Those on the DPB with children over 14 
would be required to look for part-time work or be in training. Those with a child 
between 7 and 14, and had been on the benefit for more than 12 months, would be 
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required to attend an annual interview with Income Support. This interview would 
“signal to beneficiaries that they should be taking steps towards independence and 
employment.”113  
Substantial changes were made to stand-down periods and the system of sanctions 
for beneficiaries. All stand-down periods were cut from two to one week, and the 
stand-down for voluntary unemployment was reduced from 26 to 13 weeks. 114 
Sanctions were now to be graduated; beginning with a loss of some benefit income, 
with the final punishment being loss of benefit. Previously, beneficiaries faced a 
complete loss of benefit for 26 weeks for a single infringement.115 Further, the work 
test was expanded to the partners of those on the unemployment benefit.116 Although 
work tests had been an important part of National’s rhetoric since 1990, there had 
been little practical change for beneficiaries. The changes in sanctions and greater 
focus on individualised assistance represented a fundamental change in the way 
beneficiaries were treated.117 
Key Themes: 1993-96 
Having described the reforms, the key themes of National’s second term can now be 
identified. This term was marked by the development of a specific form of welfare 
analysis, which formed the basis for new policy initiatives. Rather than simply 
focussing on the labour market and work incentives, the Government began to 
recognise the importance of the breakdown of families and the barriers facing 
beneficiaries in their return to work. 118  The breakdown of families was mainly 
addressed in other policy areas. However, the emphasis on sole parents, who were the 
“disadvantaged of the disadvantaged,” belies National’s concerns. The emphasis on 
the barriers to work led to the implementation of in-depth case management for 
particular at-risk groups. As well as increased opportunities, the Government 
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introduced more responsibilities for beneficiaries through an enhanced work testing 
scheme and greater use of financial sanctions. 
Ideologically, the focus shifted away from dependence and onto reciprocal 
obligations. This was a development on the “behaviour” justification that had been 
used in the previous term. Reciprocal obligations demand certain behaviours from 
beneficiaries in exchange for welfare. As previously stated, this meant greater 
opportunities were implemented in exchange for greater responsibilities. The shift 
towards identifying specific groups helped to reintroduce “familiar 
deserving/undeserving distinctions … around the spectre of beneficiaries,” which 
identified these groups as “the feckless and the work-shy,” which “had frequent 
racialised undertones.”119 There was further consistency with the previous term with 
the on-going emphasis on financial incentives. Rather than cutting benefits, National 
focussed on changing abatement rates, decreasing taxes and using financial sanctions 
in order to encourage employment.  
National’s Final Term: 1996-99 
 
National faced a substantially different political environment after the 1996 election, 
as New Zealand had voted to move to a proportional representation electoral system. 
This meant the 1996 election produced a coalition government, with National 
supported by the minor party New Zealand First.123 This new political environment 
                                                   
119 Neil Lunt, “From Welfare State to Social Development: Winning the War of Words 
in New Zealand,” Social Policy and Society 7 (4, October 2008): 412. 
120 Statistics New Zealand, INFOS 3.0.  
121 Paul Dalziel and Ralph Lattimore, The New Zealand Macroeconomy, 136. 
122 Statistics New Zealand, INFOS 3.0. 
123 Jonathan Boston and Elizabeth McLeay, “Forming the First MMP Government: 
Theory, Practice and Prospects,” in From Campaign to Coalition: The 1996 MMP 
Table 4: Economic Data, 1996-99  
 1997  1998 1999 
Real GDP Growth120 2.65% 1.93% 0.02% 
Total Unemployment (%)121 9.3% 10.1% n/a 
Total Unemployment 
(Gross)122 
159,448 193,438 n/a 




would have important consequences for welfare policy. It was, however, the Strategic 
Directions paper, authored by the DSW, which first signals a major change in welfare 
policy. The paper began with a dire warning: “New Zealand faces a number of critical 
social policy problems. These problems may become endemic …. Resolution of these 
problems will require re-examination of the issues and may necessitate the adoption 
of radical shifts of approach.”124 The broad problem facing New Zealand was termed 
“the welfare conundrum.”125 Three major problems were identified within the welfare 
conundrum: welfare dependency; crises in families; and an ageing population (this 
final issue will not be discussed, as it relates to superannuation).  
Welfare dependency was defined as “the negative effects which long-term reliance on 
benefits can have for working-age people and their families,” adding “the Department 
does not consider that there are harmful effects from short-term access to the benefit 
safety net.”126 The dependency problem had arisen as more individuals were reliant 
on the benefit. Overall, 21% of the working age population (400,000 people) were 
dependent on a benefit, compared to 8% in 1985. Worryingly, the recent economic 
growth was accompanied by an increase in the numbers receiving a benefit. This was 
said to be a new problem, as previously economic growth had reduced the amount of 
people on benefits to virtually zero. The DSW argued this meant “there was a wider 
issue of welfare dependency.”127 
The second major problem identified lay within families. Arrests of teenagers and 
school suspensions had approximate doubled; young people were committing suicide 
at a higher rate than anywhere in the OECD; teenage pregnancies was at a relatively 
high rate; and domestic violence was leading to a substantial number of deaths. This 
was evidence families were not “meeting their care, control and support 
responsibilities.”128 This problem was exacerbated by welfare dependency, as “Long-
term and multi-generational dependency adds stresses to people’s lives and 
exacerbates social problems such as child abuse, domestic violence, youth offending, 
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poor health and education attainment. The continued existence of high levels of 
dependency may result in the development of an “underclass.””129 
In response to these problems, the Department proposed a series of “strategic 
directions” for future welfare policy. To achieve this new direction the benefit system 
would be transformed from a passive to an active welfare system. A passive benefit 
system was defined as one that provides benefits for those who are eligible, and does 
little to ensure that beneficiaries are actively seeking work. Active assistance “is the 
processing of an application for a benefit in a way which establishes expectations … 
about their responsibilities and the assistance available to become more self-
reliant.”130 This assistance would be based on the notion of reciprocal obligations. 
This change was reflected in the youth and long-term unemployed programs 
established earlier in 1996. 131  This would ensure the reduction of “welfare 
dependence by ensuring that they are better placed to take up opportunities in 
employment when they arise.”132 Here, the connection to Lawrence Mead becomes 
apparent. The Department cites Mead in order to support the notion of “helping” and 
“hassling.” The Department would help beneficiaries by “invest[ing] in human 
capital.” 133  Hassling would be “largely verbal,” and consist of emphasising the 
beneficiary’s reciprocal obligations.134 
The major policy reform in the early years of National’s third term was the creation of 
the ‘Community Wage’. This policy was included as part of its coalition agreement 
with New Zealand First, which had championed the policy as part of their election 
campaign.135 The Community Wage was a work-for-the-dole program, and replaced 
the unemployment, sickness and training benefits.136 At its core was the concept of 
reciprocal obligations, symbolised by a contract. Beneficiaries were required to sign a 
Job Seeker Agreement, which committed beneficiaries to be being available for 
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community work, training or other activities for up to 20 hours per week.137 Those 
who were sick, injured or disabled were required to sign the agreement, though they 
could receive a deferral to void the work requirements.138 Beneficiaries would be 
treated as much like members of the work force as possible in order to maintain their 
“work skills and self esteem.”139 The community wage was designed “to reduce long-
term unemployment and benefit dependency by encouraging … [beneficiaries] to take 
opportunities to move into paid work.”140 
Welfare reform would take a turn in late 1997, when Jenny Shipley took over the 
Prime Ministership in a coup. With Shipley’s rise, welfare cuts returned to National’s 
agenda. 141  This occurred for two reasons. Firstly, Shipley had a firm ideological 
commitment to welfare cuts. 142  Secondly, New Zealand’s economic situation was 
worsening. This was largely caused by the East Asian Financial Crisis, which began in 
1997, and severely affected New Zealand due to the loss of trade.143 The impact of the 
East Asian Financial Crisis was clearly seen in the 1998 budget. Treasurer Winston 
Peters committed Government to “controlling spending, reducing debt and enabling 
continued operating surpluses,” and to reducing the cost of welfare. 144  It was 
announced savings would be found in the implementation of the Community Wage 
program. This was achieved by reducing sickness benefits to the same level as the 
unemployment benefit, with cuts ranging from 4 to 17%.145 
Further savings were found later in 1998, with reforms focussing on extending the 
obligations created in previous years. Those on the DPB were again targeted, with 
recipients with children between 6 and 13 required to look for part-time work. Full-
time work was expected for those with children over 14. Work tests were extended to 
the spouses of sickness and invalid beneficiaries. A benefit category was created for 
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18 and 19 year olds living with their parents, which effectively reduced their 
benefit.146 There was also an important restructuring of the way benefit services were 
delivered. In 1998, the Income Support Service and the Employment Services were 
merged to form Work and Income New Zealand (WINZ).147 This meant employment 
advice and eligibility for benefits were to be delivered simultaneously, rather than by 
separate departments. This ensured beneficiaries were aware of their work 
requirements, and reflected the “growing emphasis on welfare-to-work programs.”148 
The final policy worth noting was the 1998 release of a public discussion document 
called Towards a Code of Social Responsibility. Though some consider it to be “an 
abject failure as a policy initiative,” it remains relevant as a public statement of 
National’s conservative values. 149  It included a statement of expectations for 
parenting, health, money management and finding employment, and was sent to 
every household in the country.150 By circulating the document, the Government 
hoped parents would understand what was expected to “meet their 
responsibilities.” 151  It was hoped the responses to the document would form a 
consensus on appropriate responsibilities, and write them into law.152 Nominally the 
code applied to every citizen, but Deputy Prime Minister Winston Peters stated that 
the main target of the code was beneficiaries. 153 After receiving responses, the 
Government quietly abandoned the code.154 
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3.5. Welfare Reform and Paternalism  
There is a clear connection between New Zealand’s welfare reform and new 
paternalism. The influence of paternalism became prominent in the mid-1990s. 
During this time, the DSW had become interested in the “Wisconsin Model,” which 
was a real-world implementation of new paternalism. Ross Mackay, who worked for 
the DSW during the 1990s, states “if one were to construct a plot of all overseas visits 
made by officials from the New Zealand Department of Social Welfare, it would show 
a heavy line … between Wellington … and California and Wisconsin.”155 Mackay 
argues New Zealand’s reforms “bear the traces of a genetic link to their American 
progenitors,” and in particular Wisconsin.156 He believes New Zealand officials saw 
“[in Wisconsin] a reflection of their own values, and a realisation of their own vision. 
This reinforced the view that the reshaping of the New Zealand system was on the 
right track and gave additional impetus” to reforms157 Peter Starke wrote the impact 
of Wisconsin could “hardly be overstated,” and pointed to the regular contact as 
evidence.158 
The impact of the Wisconsin Model becomes clear in 1996. The Strategic Directions 
paper contained several references to Lawrence Mead and Wisconsin. 159  Most 
tellingly, the Department’s support of the “help and hassle” approach was based on 
Mead’s research, and was a term used by Mead himself. In 1997, the Journal 
published by the DSW would contain a paper by Mead, and others analysing 
Wisconsin. 160  Later in 1997, the Department hosted a conference titled Beyond 
Dependency, which aimed to encourage solutions to welfare dependency. 161  The 
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emphasis of the conference was on the Wisconsin Model.162 In a presentation from 
Jean Rogers, an official from the Wisconsin Government, she stated her Government 
“followed [New Zealand’s] reforms and feel you’re very much on target … In fact, 
we’ve referred to New Zealand as our mirror image in the Southern Hemisphere.”163 
Mead gave a talk at the conference, though was less complimentary about New 
Zealand’s reforms. He supported the broad direction, but argues that a “change [to] 
the economics of welfare is not enough to reform well … the reason is that you simply 
cannot motivate work effectively simply by changing the economics.”164 He went on 
to state “[c]utting benefits does surprisingly little actually to move people towards 
employment … you have to do something else … enforcement.”165 He went on to argue 
for greater paternalism in New Zealand’s welfare reforms. This would require greater 
supervision through case managers who “help and hassle.”166 Mead’s desire would be 
fulfilled in 1998 with the implementation of the Community wage and the reform of 
WINZ, which increased the demands on beneficiaries, and entrenched the role of the 
case manager, representing a more paternalistic approach to welfare. 
Mackay’s assessment of paternalism’s influence is supported by a closer analysis of 
the similarities between the paternalist case and the DSW’s own analysis of welfare. 
In chapter two, the three key elements of paternalism were outlined: beneficiaries are 
assumed to be incompetent, which is linked to a dysfunctional culture; extensive case 
management, utilising the “help and hassle” technique; and a statement of morality 
which relate to the deficits of the underclass. 
The first element is seen in New Zealand’s own analysis of the welfare problem. 
During the early 1990s, similarities began to develop with New Zealand’s emphasis 
on reciprocal obligations and the use of case management, though there is no 
evidence this was related to developments in the US. However, in 1996 the DSW’s 
analysis began to show significant similarities with paternalism, at the same time that 
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their attention turned to Wisconsin. Where paternalists spoke of a breakdown of 
society, the DSW discussed dependency and family breakdown. The family break-
down problem included a list of problems analogous to America’s societal 
breakdown: increased crime amongst youth, ill-discipline at school, family violence 
and so on. According to the DSW, these problems were threatening to create an 
“underclass.” This underclass was not affected by the economy, as benefit 
dependency remained high even after years of economic growth. This was because 
some families were stuck in a cycle of disadvantage. So, New Zealand had adopted the 
first element of paternalism; welfare dependency was creating an underclass, whose 
behavioural deficiencies prevented them from leaving welfare.  
Further similarities are seen in National’s policy initiatives. Throughout the early 
1990s, National experimented with increased case management based on reciprocal 
obligations. In 1996, emboldened by Mead’s research and the success of its pilot 
programs, the DSW advocated an extension of reciprocal obligations and case 
management. The result was the Community Wage, underpinned by a case 
management system based on help and hassle. This fulfils the second key element of 
paternalism.  
Finally, the requirement for a statement of morality was fulfilled by the dependency 
discourse. The final three years of the National Government saw the full development 
of the “predatory conceptual framework” of dependency. 167  Dependency 
“individualised, blamed and moralised” beneficiaries for their failings, and became 
“pseudo-explanatory … and served as shorthand for intergenerational cycles of 
reliance amongst promiscuous and work-shy populations.”168  In response, National 
attempted to destroy this culture through both policy and statements from 
politicians. Policies included the introduction of work tests, the extension of work 
tests to new groups, and sanctions. There were also multiple public campaigns, as 
National thought eliminating dependency required “a broader cultural project in 
shifting how welfare, responsibility and citizenship were conceptualised.”169 These 
campaigns reached their full development with the Code of Social Responsibility, 
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which outlined the moral expectations for society, and beneficiaries in particular. It 
assumed the main problem facing at-risk families was that they simply did not know 
how to parent, and having their expectations outlined would help solve the issue. The 
issue was not incentives; it was their basic level of competence. This reinforced the 
view that beneficiaries were incompetent. It was also a literal statement of public 
morality, with the government producing a document outlining expectations of how 
its citizens should live.  
New Zealand did not adopt paternalism in its entirety. For example, there was no 
implementation of time limits, and there was more of an emphasis on voluntary, 
rather than mandatory, programs.170 Further, the DSW noted that there were major 
differences between the welfare programs in the US, which mainly focussed on sole 
parents, and New Zealand, which covered the entire working age population. 171 
However, it is clear Paternalism was a significant influence on New Zealand, as the 
Government’s analysis of the welfare problem and proposed solutions bore 
significant similarities. Overall, the influence of paternalism was not to bring in a 
radically new direction to welfare policy. Instead, as Mackay argues, it confirmed to 
the DSW it “was on the right track,” and helped to sharpen the analysis of the welfare 
conundrum, which provided the Government “additional impetus” for its reforms.172 
From the Liberal to Conservative Tradition 
A clear pattern exists within National’s welfare reforms. Broadly, the reforms should 
be conceptualised as representing a shift within neoliberalism; from one influenced 
by the classical liberal tradition and its concomitant neoclassical economic concepts, 
to one influenced by conservatism. National’s first term was dominated by classical 
liberalism and economic concerns. Although Jenny Shipley argued economic and 
social policies should be connected, in practice this simply meant social policy 
became subservient to economic concerns. The analysis of welfare was dominated by 
neoclassical economic theories. The Government argued a mixture of labour market 
inefficiencies and incorrect price signals stemming from benefit rates was creating 
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unemployment. This meant welfare reform had two goals: to reduce public debt and 
to increase the difference between income from work and benefit rates. The focus on 
financial incentives would remain throughout National’s reign. Dependency, 
behaviour and fairness became important ideological justifications for these reforms. 
However, they were more influential in rhetoric than practice.  
By National’s second term, the public had turned against the hard-line neoliberal 
reforms, and National took a more moderate turn.173 The DSW also began to develop 
an analysis of welfare which emphasised the break-down of families and the barriers 
facing beneficiaries trying to enter the labour market. This analysis of beneficiaries is 
crucial, as it was pushing National away from its narrow economic focus. This led to 
pilot programmes which sought to increase work, educational and training 
opportunities through the use of case managers. Reciprocal obligations became an 
important justification for National. These trends moved away from the liberal 
approach, and laid the basis for a more conservative approach to welfare reform. 
However, financial incentives still remained the favoured policy tool, with tax cuts 
and abatement rates being adjusted to improve financial incentives. 
National’s third term saw the full realisation of the conservative elements of its 
second term. The DSW’s Strategic Directions emphasised that problem families were 
unable to respond to economic growth. These families had a unique set of problems 
which prevented them from maintaining a place in the labour market. These 
problems contributed to a rise of an underclass, who were contributing to problems 
of: family violence; crime; low educational achievement; teenage pregnancy and so 
on. Reciprocal obligations and case managers who “help” and “hassle” their clients 
were advocated as the most effective policy response to these problems. Dependency 
and work tests, unlike in National’s first term, became central to its reforms. 
Dependency was defined as the behavioural problems which could result from being 
on a benefit long term, and related to the increasing numbers of beneficiaries despite 
strong economic growth. The Community Wage program would help overcome these 
problems by ensuring beneficiaries contributed to their community, helping to 
maintain their work skills and self-esteem through community work. Over nine years, 
there was a reversal in importance; financial incentives were only part of the policy 
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response, whereas dependency and work tests were at the core of National’s reforms. 
This change was heavily influenced by the conservative ideas imported from the US. 
National’s reforms were now predominantly driven by conservatism, not, as was the 
case earlier in the 1990s, neoclassical economic theories. 
3.6. Conclusion 
From 1990 to 1999, National radically reformed the welfare state. National arrived in 
Government after nearly two decades of economic turbulence and six years of 
neoliberal economic reforms. National continued these reforms upon gaining office. 
Welfare in National’s first term was subservient to economic concerns. The main 
reform of this period was to slash benefit rates and restrict eligibility for benefits. The 
second term saw a softening of National’s approach; with greater emphasis placed on 
case managers and assisting beneficiaries. Financial incentives remained a central 
concern, though a better economic environment allowed National to increase wages 
through tax cuts and benefit increases. The third term saw a more conservative 
approach, as the Department of Social Welfare began to focus on the Wisconsin 
Model. The Community Wage was introduced and some minor cut backs were made 
to benefits. The influence of paternalism was clear and had a significant impact on 





THE FIFTH NATIONAL GOVERNMENT’S 
WELFARE REFORMS 
The 1999 election saw the end of the Fourth National Government. The National 
Party received 30% of the total vote, its worst election result in history up to that 
point.1 The Labour Party formed a coalition government, and would successfully 
navigate three terms in office.2 In 2008, the National Party returned to Government 
with the support of several minor parties. During the 2008 election campaign, 
National leader John Key promised welfare reforms which would have “an 
unrelenting focus on work,” a theme that would guide the following six years of the 
Fifth National Government.3 This chapter describes these reforms, and proceeds in 
five sections. Section 4.1 provides a brief description of the previous Labour 
Government’s welfare reforms, which provides context for how welfare changed 
under Labour. Section 4.2 outlines the economic conditions National faced upon 
entering Government, which impacted on the timing of National’s welfare reforms. 
Sections 4.3 and 4.4 describe the welfare reforms during National’s terms in office 
from 2008-11, and 2011-14. Two major events dominated its first term. Firstly, a local 
recession and the Global Financial Crisis combined to delay National’s proposed 
reforms. Secondly, it set up the Welfare Working Group, whose advice would guide 
the next term’s reforms. The second term was characterised by the extension of a 
wide array of obligations, and the restructuring of benefit categories. Finally, section 
4.5 identifies the key trends in welfare reform over National’s two terms in office. 
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4.1. Welfare Reform Under the Fifth Labour Government 
The run up to the 1999 election was poor for National, with a series of political 
blunders and poor economic results blighting its election campaign.4 Over a decade of 
neoliberal reforms had created “bitterness, hostility and resistance amongst the 
working-class,” which created a large voter base for anti-neoliberal political parties.5  
To secure these voters, Labour had to show it provided a legitimate alternative to 
neoliberalism, an ideology it pursued with such zealous enthusiasm in the 1980s.6 
Labour achieved this perception through the adoption of the “Third Way.”7 According 
to its most prominent advocate, Anthony Giddens, the Third Way is an intellectual 
project which seeks to reinvigorate social democracy in a globalised world. He argues 
globalisation means the traditional strategies of the left, such as greater state 
involvement in the economy, are no longer possible, and its traditional constituency, 
the working-class, has diminished in size and importance.8 As a policy agenda, the 
Third Way purports to be a middle ground between Keynesian and neoliberal 
approaches to policy making.9 Put concisely, it attempts to create “market economies 
with a heart” by “softening” the harsher elements of neoliberalism.10 The adoption of 
the Third Way proved to be a successful electoral strategy, with Labour entering a 
coalition with the Alliance party, with the support of the Green party.11 
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Reforming welfare was crucial for the “softening” of neoliberalism. The concept 
guiding reforms was “Social Development.”12 The goal of social development is to 
“assist people to gain the skills that lead to a sustainable job, provide effective 
support to keep them in work, and make sure that taking a job always leaves them 
and their families better off.” This approach accepts those on benefits “are not there 
because of adverse labour market conditions or traditional caring responsibilities, but 
because they have a raft of other social difficulties, ranging from health … to 
substance abuse, domestic violence, lack of self-esteem and absence of labour market 
skills.” 13  Given the nature of social disadvantage, social policy would be seen 
holistically, and target “individuals and families at the source of disadvantage,” which 
requires intervention across different policy areas.14  
Two policy developments are central to the social development approach. The first is 
the adoption of a work-first approach to welfare.15 This means the goal of welfare is 
for beneficiaries to gain paid employment. Labour argued welfare was insufficiently 
“active,” and though the previous National Government had aimed to create work-
first welfare, it had failed to do so.16 As seen in the previous chapter, this is an 
identical criticism to the one both the Department of Social Welfare and National 
made of welfare in the late 1990s. Key to this approach is case managers; who were 
able to identify individual barriers facing beneficiaries, and provide support and 
resources to help overcome these barriers.17 At the core of the relationship between 
the case manager and client was the Job Seekers Agreement. This contract set out the 
reciprocal obligations beneficiaries faced, and the assistance Work and Income New 
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Zealand (WINZ) could provide in return.18 Importantly, the Third Way’s approach to 
“active” welfare is strongly influenced by paternalist welfare reforms in the US.19 
The second policy development, which shows a clear change from the Fourth 
National Government, was an emphasis on “making work pay.”20 Labour argued 
beneficiaries often “find that going to work simply does not pay. This may be because 
they are in a low paid or unstable job.”21 This problem was exacerbated by poor 
financial incentives arising from benefits. 22  Labour argued the solution to this 
problem lay in increasing the gains received from working. Two policies were 
introduced to increase incomes. Firstly, the minimum wage was increased 
progressively from $7 per hour in 1999, to $11.25 in 2007.23 The Youth Wage was 
abolished, which was a separate minimum wage for young people.24 Secondly, Labour 
introduced Working for Families (WFF), which was designed to achieve Labour’s goal 
of eradicating child poverty.25 WFF included a raft of policy changes which increased 
financial assistance for working families.26 The specific details of WFF will not be 
discussed here, as this has been done elsewhere.27 However, one element must be 
described. WFF targeted families in paid work, thereby encouraging people off 
welfare by increasing wages. Thus there was little income change for beneficiaries 
(though families did receive a small amount), with benefit levels staying below 1990 
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levels.28 Official advice argued WFF would reduce child poverty by 30%, leaving 70% 
still in poverty, with the vast majority being on a benefit.29 This fell well short of 
eradicating child poverty. However, it is important given that it reduced poverty, and 
has been the only major policy change since 1984 which has decreased income 
inequality.30 
Though an extensive analysis of the similarities and differences between Labour and 
National’s welfare reforms is outside the scope of this thesis, it is worth noting three 
key differences. Firstly, Labour made reducing poverty an explicit policy goal. Labour 
introduced a variety of policies to combat poverty, and pioneered innovative ways of 
measuring it. This stands in stark contrast with National, who banned the word 
poverty from Government documents, and did not monitor its impact.31 However, by 
the end of Labour’s term 18% of the population was in poverty.32 Secondly, the 
language surrounding beneficiaries changed. Louise Humpage and David Craig noted 
that welfare debates in the 1990s were characterised by “an emotive language of 
morality and blame” which emphasised “the individual character of beneficiaries.”33 
After 1999, the language shifted to a focus on “social inclusion,” and how “social 
investment could lift individual capacity.” 34  Finally, Labour shunned the strong 
emphasis on sanctions which National had introduced. Mike O’Brien summarised the 
shift: “work remains the central focus, but the process for moving people from benefit 
to work shifts from a punitive, obligation-based, sanction-reinforced process to an 
emphasis on … a ‘work development and employment plan’ … rather than the 
emphasis being on sanctions, the focus here is on developing an individual plan.”35 
Thus under Labour the Community Wage was abolished,36 work testing for sole 
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parents was more flexible,37 and greater incentives for those on sickness and invalid 
beneficiaries to return to work were created.38 Though the emphasis on paid work 
remained, the use of obligations and sanctions was weakened. 
4.2. Economic Conditions and Policy Response of the National 
Government 
  
The economic context National faced upon entering Government in 2008 had a 
major impact on the timing of the welfare reforms. According to Treasury “the period 
from the early 1990s to the beginnings of the Global Financial Crisis in 2007 was a 
period of exceptional macroeconomic stability in the advanced world … Fiscal 
outcomes in New Zealand throughout the period were correspondingly favourable.”42 
Labour’s term in office was characterised by economic growth, consistent surpluses 
and the reduction of government debt.43 Real GDP growth averaged approximately 
3.5% and unemployment reached a low of 3.5%.44 However, this sustained period of 
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Table 5: Economic Data, 2008-11 
 2008 2009 2010 
Real GDP Growth39 1.1% -1.9% 1.3% 
Total Unemployment (%)40 4.1% 6.1% 6.5% 
Total Government Debt 
($million)41 
10,258 17,119 26,738 
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growth would come to an end in early 2008, as New Zealand entered a recession, 
driven by a variety of factors.45 Treasury predicted real GDP would fall to virtually 
0%, unemployment would increase, and state debt would increase from $19 million 
to $29 billion by 2013.46 Despite this gloomy outlook, Treasury forecast the economy 
would return to approximately 3% growth by 2010/11.47  
The onset of New Zealand’s recession was overshadowed by an emerging crisis 
originating from the United States. In August 2007, troubles in the US banking 
system led to the “near collapse of the global financial system in late 2008.”48 A 
summary of the global financial crisis (GFC) is not possible here, but it is important 
to note the severity of the crisis. It has been described as the “worst recession since 
the 1930s,” which had “affected all financial institutions and national economies … 
with a devastating effect on the real economy.” 49  In response, Treasury’s 2008 
forecasts put New Zealand in a “much weaker” position than it had anticipated, 
predicting a “smaller nominal economy than past forecasts … leading to an increase 
in the size of fiscal deficits and large increases in debt.”50 
National’s response to the economic crisis was to institute a short-term fiscal 
stimulus which was designed to “maintain economic activity, support jobs, and buffer 
the economy during the recession.”51 This approach is broadly in line with economic 
orthodoxy, which accepts that a stimulus can have positive effects in the short term.52 
Indeed, virtually all OECD countries implemented some form of stimulus.53 These 
stimuli were designed to rescue the financial sector and ensure economic growth (or 
mitigate the economic slowdown). The sheer size of these stimuli was immense. In 
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Britain, the Government invested $875 billion in the banking sector, and the US 
implemented a stimulus worth $831 billion. 54  These stimuli were funded by 
Government debt. The OECD warned the adoption of this debt “entails risks 
regarding the long-term sustainability of public finances,” meaning the debt created 
by the stimulus would become a burden in the future.55 According to British think 
tank, the payment of this debt would entail “A decade of pain,” as Governments must 
seek to reduce expenditure in order to decrease their debt levels.56 
This problem is applicable to New Zealand’s experience. National’s stimulus package 
was relatively large by global standards, ranking as the fourth highest in the OECD.57 
After the implementation of the stimulus, Treasury advocated a focus on cutting debt 
and restricting spending, advice which National readily accepted. 58  As Byron 
Richards points out, the focus on decreasing debt has led to “significant pressure to 
curtail and ultimately reduce government expenditure in key areas such as health, 
education, and social welfare.”59 Thus the fiscal incentive to reduce the cost of welfare 
had been increased by the GFC. As will be described in the following section, this 
situation was readily accepted by National, who had planned to reduce the size of the 
welfare state prior to the GFC. 
4.3. National’s Reforms of Welfare: 2008-11 
National’s plans for reforming welfare were signalled during the 2008 election 
campaign in National’s Benefits Policy Backgrounder. National began the document 
by reiterating its commitment to a welfare state which provides “a genuine safety net 
in times of need.”60 Welfare would have an “unrelenting focus on work,” which would 
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“provide support that reflects an individual’s needs and circumstances.”61 The focus 
on work was justified as “paid work is the route to independence and well-being for 
most people,” and “is the best way to reduce child poverty.”62 
National adopted the same language which the Department of Social Welfare, the 
Fourth National Government and the Fifth Labour Government used to criticise 
welfare. The current system was too “passive,” and did not emphasise the importance 
of work enough.63 Three main problems were identified. The first was the long-term 
unemployed. Labour had successfully reduced unemployment benefit (UEB) 
recipients from 169,203 in 1999, to 17,871 in 2008.64  The amount of long-term 
unemployed (defined as being on the UEB for longer than 1 year) had also decreased. 
Despite this, National argued the existence of the long term unemployed was a 
significant problem.65 The second problem was the growth in sickness and invalid 
beneficiaries. Despite consistent economic growth, total numbers on these benefits 
had risen from 83,195 in 1999, to 131,907 in 2008.66 The third issue identified was 
the debt owed by beneficiaries to the state, which stood at $780 million, up from 
$450 million in 1999.67  
National proposed a range of policies to address these issues. They can be sorted into 
four categories. The first relates to the income of beneficiaries. National would 
legislate to link benefit rates to the Consumer Price Index (a measure of inflation), 
which, although already done by convention, would increase “certainty” for 
beneficiaries.68 The abatement rate for beneficiaries would increase from $80 to 
$100.69 Secondly, there were a range of policies to tighten eligibility for benefits. 




64 Ministry of Social Development, The Statistical Report: For the Year Ending June 
2002 (Wellington: Ministry of Social Development, 2002), 39. 
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66 For 1999 figures, see Ministry of Social Development, The Statistical Report: For 
the Year Ending June 2002, 40 (Sickness numbers), 42 (Invalids). For 2009 figures, 
see Ministry of Social Development, The Statistical Report: For the Year Ending 
June 2008 (Wellington: Ministry of Social Development, 2008), 42 (sickness), 49 
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67 “National’s Benefits Policy Backgrounder,” 5.   
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National would ensure those on the UEB would have to re-apply every 12 months.70 
For sickness beneficiaries, more medical certificates would be required to continue 
receiving the benefit, and a compulsory second opinion would be sought after 12 
months.71 Thirdly, National would increase obligations on beneficiaries. The long-
term unemployed would be required to “do what it takes to secure employment. This 
may include practical training, attending a basic skills course, or attending drug and 
alcohol rehabilitation.” 72  DPB recipients would be subject to a “part-time work 
obligation of 15 hours per week of employment, training, or job-seeking activities … 
once their youngest dependent child turns six,” though WINZ case managers would 
have discretion over whether to apply this to their clients.73 For sickness and invalid 
recipients, there would be an obligation to work part-time for those assessed as being 
able to do so.74 The debt problem would be addressed by a requirement to attend 
budget advice programs for those who repeatedly seek emergency financial 
assistance.75 
Finally, National would reform the system of sanctions. Labour had removed the 
graduated levels of sanctions, which National had set up in the 1990s. Under Labour, 
beneficiaries faced a full suspension of their benefit after they failed to comply with 
their obligations on three or more occasions. The severity of the sanction made their 
usage a rare occurrence. Thus, National would introduce graduated sanctions. This 
would encourage their usage, as a smaller sanction would be less severe than a full 
loss of benefit.76 
Ministry of Social Development’s Advice to the Incoming National 
Government 
Upon entering government, the Ministry of Social Development’s (MSD, formerly 
known as the Department of Social Welfare) official briefing painted a different 
picture of welfare. MSD emphasised two major achievements. Firstly, outcomes for 
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children and youth had improved substantially over the previous nine years. 77 
Secondly, they heralded improvements for adults. Labour’s reforms had meant 
“incomes have risen, benefit numbers and poverty have fallen.”78 They argued WINZ 
had a “significant positive impact in driving additional reductions in job seeker 
benefit numbers during the economic upswing,” which they credited to the active 
nature of policy interventions.79 MSD advocated a work-first approach, arguing it 
helped the most vulnerable and provided a route out of poverty.80 Finally, MSD noted 
two problem groups: sole parents, due to the high rates of child poverty; and those on 
the sickness and invalid beneficiaries, who made up an increasing proportion of the 
total benefit population.81 
MSD argued for a variety of reforms to improve social outcomes. Broadly, MSD 
argued for a continuation of the work first approach, backed with higher levels of 
investment, particularly at the early stages of life.82 Importantly, MSD argued this 
approach had to be backed by adequate income assistance.83 Despite improvements 
made through WFF, there still existed substantial pockets of hardship. This hardship 
was not conducive to people who are “searching for work, or who are building their 
capacity to work.”84 MSD recommended reform and investment in the areas of tax 
credits, housing assistance and hardship assistance to reduce poverty.85  
National’s Policies After the Election: Response to the Recession 
Upon entering government, Prime Minister John Key appointed Paula Bennett to 
lead MSD, a role she would remain in until 2014.86 Due to the GFC, the Government 
had to modify its policies to cater for the new economic environment. This was 
particularly problematic for welfare as National had implemented a fiscal stimulus. 
Welfare spending is an important part of government spending, and any cut to 
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welfare would work against the stimulus package it had enacted.87 It was no surprise, 
therefore, to see National delay the introduction of the reforms promised during the 
election, which was designed to reduce welfare spending.88 
National’s new welfare policies sought to “lessen the impact of the recession on the 
labour market,” through the creation of temporary welfare programs.89  Policies can 
be split into those targeting the adult population and those targeting youth. Policies 
targeting the adult population were relative small. National improved WINZ’s 
assistance to jobseekers by increasing funding to the Job Search Service. 90  Two 
temporary benefits were created. The first was the ReStart programme, which 
provided assistance for those made redundant due to the recession.91 The second 
benefit was the Job Support Scheme Allowance, which subsidised employee wages in 
order to discourage redundancies. 92  A greater emphasis was placed on youth 
programmes.93 Three new programmes were created. Firstly, Youth Opportunities 
was established, which included wage subsidies for at-risk youths and military-style 
training;94 Community Max, which increased skills through community work;95 and 
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the Straight 2 Work programme, which included partnerships with industry to 
develop skills.96 
The final point worth noting is the justifications used for policy reforms. Paula 
Bennett argued “the Ministry’s [MSD] most important responsibility is to lessen the 
impact of the economic downturn on families and individuals.” To do so, it would 
have an “unrelenting focus on paid work, because we believe keeping people in some 
form of employment is critical,” as “paid work is the route to independence and well-
being for most people, and … is the best way to reduce child poverty.”97 There was a 
commitment to supporting beneficiaries by setting high expectations, as welfare 
could “condemn [beneficiaries] to low expectations of themselves - sparking the 
viciousness of a self-fulfilling prophecy.”98 This broadly sets out the argument made 
for welfare reforms: the economy was in poor shape; welfare could help cushion the 
effects of the recession; work brings positive results for beneficiaries; and 
beneficiaries need active help to become independent. 
Future Focus: A Return to National’s Pledged Reforms 
In 2010, National began to implement its welfare election promises, which were 
repackaged as the Future Focus reforms. The policies were virtually identical to those 
in the policy backgrounder. Benefits would be linked to the CPI: abatement levels 
would be increased; beneficiaries would have to reapply for the UEB after 12 months; 
sickness beneficiaries would be required to produce more medical certificates; there 
would be a graduated system of sanctions, with a single intermediate step; budget 
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advice would be required for repeated use of hardship grants; sole parents would 
have to look for part-time work when their youngest child was six; and sickness 
beneficiaries would be required to look for work if assessed as being able to do so. A 
new policy was created requiring young people on the benefit to be in education, 
work or training.99 
Two key developments occurred in this period. The first was the formation of the 
Welfare Working Group (WWG), whose purpose would be to “advise the Government 
on ways to reduce long-term welfare dependency.”100 This purpose is related to the 
second key development. The language used to justify welfare reforms changed. This 
shift was clearly seen in Paula Bennett’s speech to Parliament during the first reading 
of the bill to implement the Future Focus reforms. She argued the status quo of 
welfare was “quite frankly, dangerous,” which “failed to do anything about long-term 
welfare dependency.”101 National would address this by finding “the right balance of 
obligations and incentives to address an unreasonable sense of entitlement, and to 
introduce a set of expectations.”102 
Welfare reform, rather than being justified with reference to the recession, was now 
deemed a moral issue. Welfare was a statement of what values society deemed 
valuable: “Do we want a society that teaches its children by example that the path to a 
better, more prosperous, and fulfilling life is through work, not welfare? I believe that 
the answer is yes … there is a higher purpose to this. It comes back to the question of 
what kind of society we want to live in.”103 This moral argument also extended to the 
importance of work, with Bennett arguing reforms would see “a shift in aspiration 
that lifts people’s sights up beyond a simple existence on welfare to a meaningful, 
rewarding life as a working member of society.”104 Overall, the goal of the reforms 
was to “discourage[e] long-term dependency.”105 
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Welfare Working Group 
The Welfare Working Group was set up in April 2010, and was to become a 
“landmark document” in National’s welfare reforms.106 The Government narrowly 
prescribed its focus; restricting it to seeking to reduce welfare dependency, whilst 
excluding benefit adequacy, and the tax/benefit interface. This meant poverty could 
not be addressed by the group.107 It produced two key reports: the first outlining the 
issues in welfare reform; and the second proposing solutions to welfare dependency. 
The “Issues” report identified an increase in welfare dependency 
The overall extent of benefit use increased significantly in New Zealand over 
the last 50 years. In 1960, approximately 2 percent of the working age 
population were receiving a benefit. By 2008 … roughly 10 percent of the 
working age population were receiving a benefit. 
Of greater concern was the proportion of long-term recipients. In 2010, there were 
170,000 people who spent over half of the past decade on welfare, and 100,000 of 
those had spent nine or more years on a benefit. 108  The WWG identified three 
problem groups. Firstly, there were sickness and invalid beneficiaries, whose 
numbers continued to grow despite years of economic growth, with no evidence this 
was “caused by the population getting sicker or more disabled.”109 Secondly, there 
were those on the DPB, with the WWG noting New Zealand has the second lowest 
sole parent employment rate in the OECD.110 The WWG argued these groups are the 
most likely to benefit from paid employment.111 Finally, young people were a problem 
group, as those who went on the benefit as teenagers were more likely to become 
dependent.112  
The WWG argued welfare contributed to the growth of welfare recipients, as it was 
insufficiently active. The growth in DPB, sickness and invalid beneficiaries were 
significant as those benefits had a weaker work-focus and fewer obligations, with the 
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WWG concluding “a lack of consistent work focus makes it difficult for the most 
vulnerable groups to secure employment.”113 The WWG set out the broad solution to 
welfare dependency: “a mix of incentives, support, and expectations which reinforce 
personal responsibility.” They further emphasised the necessity of obligations and 
sanctions, which ensured the “the wrong sorts of behaviours are not encouraged by 
the benefit system.”114 
The second report provided 43 recommendations designed to reduce dependency. 
Over-arching these recommendations were two reforms. The first was the creation of 
a “single work-focused welfare payment to replace all existing categories of benefit, to 
be called Jobseeker Support.”115 This reform has been proposed by every Government 
dating back to 1989, but was never implemented due to the complexity of the 
scheme.116 The reform would see every beneficiary receive the Jobseeker Support 
benefit. Beneficiaries would then be sorted into one of three streams. The first was 
the ‘jobseeker’ stream, which would include those who are capable of work. The 
second was a ‘transition to work’ stream, which would encompass those who face 
significant barriers to work, such as young children or health problems. Finally, there 
would be the ‘long-term support’ stream, similar to the invalid’s benefit. 117  The 
second reform would be the “establishment of a delivery agency, Employment and 
Support New Zealand (ESNZ)” which would replace WINZ.118  
The creation of the Jobseeker Support would be accompanied by a range of changes 
to the way welfare was administered. The proposed reforms included three aspects: a 
strong work focus; increased reciprocal obligations; and overcoming barriers to 
employment. To ensure a strong work focus, all beneficiaries would be presumed to 
be in the ‘jobseeker’ stream, unless otherwise determined. The first ‘stream’ of 
jobseeker support functioned like the UEB, and included those with a work obligation 
(including the old unemployment, DPB with older children, and sickness 
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beneficiaries deemed able to work).  There would be three key obligations for this 
group. Firstly, they would be required to actively seek work and accept any 
reasonable job offer.119 Secondly, they would not be allowed to move to areas with low 
employment rates. 120  Finally, beneficiaries would be required to apply for jobs 
requiring drug tests, meaning they would have to abstain from drugs whilst on a 
benefit. Failure to comply with these obligations would be punished with a heavily 
graduated system of sanctions. 121  Beneficiaries would also receive extra support, 
including: greater access to alcohol and drug treatment programs; a more generous 
abatement rate; case management; and increased funding to move to high 
employment areas.122 
The second stream would be called ‘transition to work’, and would likely include sole 
parents with young children and some sickness beneficiaries. Case managers would 
tailor expectations and obligations to the individual’s problems, with the goal of 
either increasing capacity to work, or entering part-time work.123 A range of services 
would be provided to assist these goals.124 Finally, though the base benefit rate would 
be identical to those in other streams, disabled people could be eligible for income 
supplements.125  
Sole parents would face a range of new obligations, and would be placed in different 
streams depending on the age of their children. They would be required to seek work 
involving at least 20 hours of work per week once their youngest child was 3, 
increasing to 30 hours once their child had reached six.126 Those with children under 
three would have to participate in activities designed to prepare them for a return to 
work. If a sole parent had another child whilst receiving a benefit, the work 
expectations would begin when the child is 14 weeks old.127 Parenting obligations 
would be created. Sole parents on a benefit would be required to ensure their child 
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attends school, attends early childhood at the age of three, and is participating in 
health programs.128 16 and 17 year old parents would be required to attend parenting 
and budgeting programs, and their welfare payments would be managed by a third 
party until these have been completed.129 Finally, parents who have “shown they have 
a clear need for budgeting support” would have their income managed by a third 
party.130 Additional support for this group would be provided by increasing early 
childhood and out-of-school care funding and services, the provision of long-term 
contraception as well as increasing incentives to undertake tertiary study.131 As with 
individuals with health issues, sole parents would be eligible for income 
supplements.132 
The final set of targets for reforms was children, youth and families. Only a few of the 
recommendations relate to welfare. 16 or 17 year olds receiving a benefit would be 
required to be in education or paid work: would have to live with an adult; have their 
benefits managed by a third party; and would be ineligible for Jobseeker Support.133 
Finally, the WWG recommended that youth should be a “major focus of the 
Government-wide plan to reduce long-term welfare dependence.”134  
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4.4. National’s Continued Neoliberal Reforms: 2011-14 
 
National was re-elected in 2011, increasing their proportion of the vote from 45 to 
47.4%.139 National again entered government with the support of ACT, United Future 
and the Maori Party. The coalition agreement with ACT stipulated that “Both parties 
… agree with the broad thrust of the recommendations of the Welfare Working Group 
(WWG), and support their implementation.”140 The agreement stated that National 
must implement the recommendations regarding parenting obligations (attending 
school and health checks), support for at-risk families, and income and budgeting 
support.141 Though it appears ACT was having an influence over welfare reforms, 
there is little evidence this is the case. ACT won a single seat in parliament, which 
they won due to an electoral deal with the National Party.142 As such, they had little 
negotiating power. Further, National had already stated their support for the broad 
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Table 6: Economic Data, 2011-14 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Real GDP Growth135 1.5% 2.6% 2.5% 3.4%136 
Total Unemployment137 6.5% 6.9% 6.2% 5.8% 
Total Government Debt 
($million)138 
40,128 50,671 55,835 59,931 
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thrust of the WWG prior to the election.143 Whilst the coalition agreement did commit 
National to some specific measures, there is little evidence this was due to the 
influence of ACT. 
Prior to the election, National announced it would enact two phases of welfare 
reforms. 144  The key principle underlying the reforms was the adoption of an 
“approach that invests in people who have the highest risk of remaining on … benefit 
for the long term,” an approach which had been recommended by the WWG.145 This 
approach was formalised through the commissioning of the Actuarial Valuation of 
the Benefit System for Working-Age Adults report. It attempts to measure the 
“future liability” of welfare by estimating “all future lifetime costs of benefit payments 
and associated expenses for working-age clients who received a benefit” in the 
previous 12 months.146 The authors state there were three main groups contributing 
to future liability: young people; sole parents; and sickness and invalid beneficiaries. 
Thus they argue welfare reform should target these groups to get the greatest value 
for money.147 
The first phase of welfare reforms in National’s second term targeted youth and 
parents. 148  There were four key reforms related to youth. Firstly, young people 
(including parents) receiving benefits are required to be in education and training. 
This is incentivised by an extra $20 per week for participation in such programmes. 
Secondly, a third party would now manage their incomes. Their rent and utility bills 
are paid directly, and most of the remainder of their income is placed on a “payment 
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146 Taylor Fry, Actuarial Valuation of the Benefit System for Working-age Adults as 
at 30 June 2011 (Sydney: Taylor Fry, 2011), 3. 
147  “Baseline Valuation: Key Findings and Background Facts,” Ministry of Social 
Development, (last modified 12 September, 2012), 
https://www.msd.govt.nz/documents/about-msd-and-our-work/newsroom/media-
releases/news/2012/key-findings-and-background-facts-120912.pdf. 
148 Office of the Minister of Finance and Office of the Minister for Social Development 
and Employment, Paper 1: Reforming the Benefit System – An Investment 
Approach (Wellington: Government Printer), 1. 
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card,” which restricts purchases to “essential” goods. 149  Thirdly, young parents 
receive additional childcare funding.150 Finally, the Job Ops and Straight 2 Work 
programs were merged into “Job Streams,” which provided more targeted job 
training for at-risk individuals.151  
Reforms aimed at sole parents extended work obligations. Sole parents would now be 
required to look for part-time work when their youngest child was age five, and full-
time work at age 14. If a sole parent has a further child whilst on a benefit the work 
obligations begin at age one. 152  Work obligations were extended to the smaller 
Widows’ and Women Alone benefits.153 Sole parents with children below the age 
thresholds now face “stronger and broader pre-employment preparation and 
activation expectations,” which may require “work preparation, training, parenting, 
budgeting, or other activities,” with the threat of sanctions for non-compliance.154 
These obligations were targeted at the most at-risk parents, and would not be 
required for all sole parents.155 
Phase two of the welfare reforms involved restructuring benefit categories. The 
government accepted the WWG’s advice that benefit categories had to be changed. 
Rather than creating a unitary benefit, the government merged the existing categories 
into four.  
  
                                                   
149 “Youth Service Payment Card,” Work and Income New Zealand, accessed 2nd 
November, 2014, http://www.workandincome.govt.nz/individuals/payment-
card/youth-service-payment-card.html. 
150 “Guaranteed Childcare Assistance Payment,” Work and Income New Zealand, 
accessed 2nd November, 2014, http://www.workandincome.govt.nz/individuals/a-z-
benefits/guaranteed-childcare-assistance-payment.html 
151 Paula Bennett, “Government Announces Job Streams,” (last modified 14th June, 
2012), http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/government-announces-job-streams. 
152 Paula Bennett, “Welfare Reform Legislation to be Introduced (last modified 27th 
February, 2012), http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/welfare-reform-legislation-be-
introduced. 
153 Ibid, 3.   
154 Ibid, 4.  
155 Ibid, 11. 




Each new category is accompanied by a set of work obligations and support. 
Jobseeker Support is a work focused benefit, which includes part and full-time work 
expectations, and includes sole parents and those with health problems. Sole Parent 
Support is accompanied by a part-time work or planning obligation. The Supported 
                                                   
156  Paula Bennett, “Welfare Reform Factsheet and Q & A,” (last modified 1st 
November, 2011), 
http://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/all/files/27_Feb_Welfare_Reform_QandA.pdf, 1. 
Table 7: New Benefit Structures156 
Current Benefit Recipients New Benefit Recipients 
Unemployment Benefit 
Sickness Benefit 
DPB Parents, children 
over 14 
Widows, children over 14 






Job Seeker Support 
 
135,100 
DPB parents, children 5-
13 
Widows, children 5-13 
DPB parents, children 
under 5 





Sole Parent Support 93,250 
Invalid’s Benefit 


















Youth Payment  
Young Parent Payment 
1,700 
1,065 
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Living Payment has no work obligations. The Youth Payment includes the obligations 
created in the first phase of welfare reforms.157  
The second phase also included new non-work obligations. Beneficiaries would now 
be required to apply for jobs which require a drug test. If the beneficiary fails the test, 
they face a benefit reduction through the use of sanctions. 158  The National 
Government also accepted the WWG’s recommendation of social obligations for 
parents. These included: attending early childhood education from age three; attend 
primary school; enrol with a GP; and complete free health checks.159 The final reform 
of phase two was to increase funding to reduce welfare fraud.160 
4.5. Key Themes of National’s Welfare Reforms: 2008-14 
The two terms of National’s reign will be analysed together. The similarities and 
differences between the two Governments will not be addressed here, as they form 
part of the following chapter. The Fifth National Government’s welfare reforms have 
been based on an approach which emphasises the importance of obligations and 
sanctions. This was signalled prior to their election, with National promising to 
increase obligations and restrict eligibility for welfare. National further expanded 
obligations after the recommendations of the WWG, which argued for an increased 
focus on work, more reciprocal obligations, and greater support for beneficiaries. By 
2015, the unemployed, sole parents, people with health issues, and youth are subject 
to a wider array of obligations, backed by the threat of sanctions. These obligations 
now extend beyond ensuring beneficiaries look for work. Now, the state demands a 
certain set of behaviours in order to ensure good parenting and a drug-free lifestyle. 
The reforms saw National entrenching the punitive nature of welfare.  
Ideologically, there were three dominant themes. Firstly, ‘work-first’ is constantly 
reaffirmed as the prime driver of reforms. It is argued work benefits the individual 
                                                   
157 Ibid, 2.   
158 Paula Bennett, “Pre-employment Drug Testing for Jobseekers,” (last modified 
28th August, 2012), http://beehive.govt.nz/release/pre-employment-drug-testing-
jobseekers. 
159 Paula Bennett, “Social Obligations Mean Better Outcomes for Children,” (last 
modified 11th September, 2012), http://beehive.govt.nz/release/social-obligations-
mean-better-outcomes-children. 
160  Chester Burrows, “New Tools to Combat Welfare Fraud Announced,” (last 
modified 20th February, 2013), http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/new-tools-
combat-welfare-fraud-announced. 
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through increased finances, well-being, and a reliable path out of poverty. It has a 
positive impact on the economy, as increased employment helps economic growth. It 
is considered the morally correct action, and contributes to a just society. Secondly, 
dependency is identified as the key problem to combat. This was best seen in the 
terms of reference of the WWG, whose primary goal was to “examine ways to reduce 
long-term benefit dependency.” 161  The third key justification was the investment 
approach. Though this was not utilised in the first term, it became the key driver in 
the second term of National’s reforms, along with the work-first emphasis.  
Alongside these three concepts is a particular form of rhetoric justifying welfare 
reforms. The work of academic Louise Humpage is useful in explaining this rhetoric. 
She argues National is driven by a “desire to avoid the kind of public resistance 
provoked by radical, previously unannounced reforms in the early 1990s.”162 Though 
there has been a shift back to emphasising obligations and dependency, beneficiaries 
have not been “pilloried in public discourse” to the extent they were in the 1990s.163 
The emphasis on work is a continuation from the previous Labour government, who 
had placed significant focus on their work-first policies, which was itself a 
development on the earlier National Government’s reforms. 164  The Labour 
Government had found “adopting both incentives and obligations helped avoid a 
significant negative public reaction.”165 National has learnt this lesson, with policy 
announcements always including both the obligations and support beneficiaries are 
subject to.166  
                                                   
161  Welfare Working Group, Reducing Long-Term Benefit Dependency: 
Recommendations, 1. 
162 Louise Humpage, “Do New Zealanders Really Support Welfare Reform?,” in The 
New Electoral Politics in New Zealand: The Significance of the 2011 Election, ed. 
Jack Vowles (Wellington: Institute for Governance and Policy Studies, 2014), 77-8. 
163 Neil Lunt, “Panacea, Problem or Perish: Social Policy Language in New Zealand,” 
in Analysing social policy concepts and language, ed. Daniel Beland and Klaus 
Petersen (Bristol: Policy Press, 2014), 258. 
164 Ibid, 77, and Neil Lunt, From Welfare State to Social Development: Winning the 
War of Words in New Zealand, Social Policy and Society 7 (4, October 2008): 414. 
165 Ibid, 78. 
166 A few examples help illustrate this trend. National’s policy backgrounder, despite 
predominantly advocating for additional obligations, began by stating its plan to 
ensure increases in benefits by linking them to inflation, and increase abatement 
rates. The document announcing Future Focus was split into new obligations and 
new support, and the factsheet announcing the two phases of welfare first 
acknowledged that beneficiaries could receive “intensive support” before outlining 




From 2008 to 2014, National implemented a series of significant reforms to welfare. 
Upon entering office, it sought to create a more active welfare system, with the aim of 
reducing welfare dependency. Its plans were put on hold, as a local recession 
combined with the Global Financial Crisis to change the economic conditions facing 
the Government. By 2010, National were able to proceed with the Future Focus 
reforms, which increased obligations and restricted eligibility for welfare. The 
Welfare Work Group was established, and the report it produced would prove to be 
immensely influential. In its second term, National restructured benefit categories, 
extended work obligations even further, and non-work related obligations were 
established. Overall, National moved towards a welfare system based on obligations 
and sanctions, with obligations extending further into the lives of beneficiaries. 
                                                                                                                                                               
the new obligations. See “National’s Benefits Policy Backgrounder,” 3, John Key and 
Paula Bennett, “Future Focus,” and “Welfare Reform,” Ministry of Social 




 CHAPTER FIVE 
ANALYSING AND EVALUATING THE 
WELFARE REFORMS 
The overarching goal of this thesis is to describe, critically analyse and evaluate the 
welfare reforms of the two National Governments. This chapter proceeds in three 
sections. The first section analyses the similarities and differences between the two 
National Governments, and identifies the theoretical underpinning of welfare 
reforms. I show that the welfare reforms of the two National Governments should be 
characterised as paternalistic. The section begins by recapping the new paternalist 
ideology identified in chapter two; and then comparing the reforms of the two 
National Governments against the key features of new paternalism. The next two 
sections evaluate the impact these reforms have had on how New Zealand delivers 
social security. Section 5.2 shows the reforms have entrenched New Zealand in 
Esping-Andersen’s ‘liberal’ category, as decommodification has decreased and 
stigmatisation has increased. In section 5.3 I describe the reforms made to the 
institutions which constituted the Wage Earners’ Welfare State (WEWS). Here, I 
argue National’s reforms have turned the WEWS into a Trojan horse for 
beneficiaries; it maintains the valorisation of work, without any means of ensuring 
full employment, leading to an in an increase in poverty, inequality and the 
impoverishment and exclusion of beneficiaries. Finally, I utilise the insights from 
Neo-Marxism to argue that underlying the welfare reforms is the development of a 
fundamentally different relationship between the state and the reserve army of 
labour, and that welfare reform has assisted the growth of low quality and low wage 
work. 
5.1. New Paternalism 
The first task of this chapter is to critically analyse the major similarities and 
differences between the two National Government’s approaches to welfare. This 
requires describing the key welfare reforms of the governments, and identifying the 
theoretical underpinnings of the reforms. As previously stated, the Fourth National 
Government’s reforms are characterised by a move towards a neoliberalism 
influenced by conservatism, and in particular by the new paternalism. The Fifth 
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National Government has continued to implement this conservative approach to 
welfare. To show this, the key elements of new paternalism will be restated, which 
provides criteria to analyse National’s reforms. In the second chapter three key 
elements of new paternalism were identified. Firstly, Conservatives argue the USA 
was experiencing a breakdown of basic morality. The then current generation got 
divorced more, had more children out of wedlock, did worse at school, committed 
more crime, and were voluntarily choosing to be unemployed. This led to the rise of 
an underclass, which was united by their behavioural deficiencies. This underclass 
created a challenge for the way governments should assist the poor. Welfare reform 
up until the 1980s had assumed beneficiaries would behave in a way conducive to 
bettering their own lives. However, conservatives argue the rise of the underclass 
demonstrated this to be untrue. Lawrence Mead argues this is because the poor are 
not competent. Instead, they suffer from behavioural deficiencies which make it 
unlikely they will escape poverty. The problem lay not with the structure of society, 
but with the individual. The assumption of incompetence, which is linked to a 
dysfunctional culture (i.e. the underclass) is the first key element of paternalism. 
The key goal of paternalism is therefore to make beneficiaries competent, which is 
achieved by basing welfare on paternalism. This approach demands welfare is 
delivered through case managers, who provide a mix of help and hassle for their 
clients. Help includes providing support to overcome barriers to employment, for 
example through the creation of employment plans or organising child care. Hassle is 
predominantly achieved by creating compulsory obligations. It also demands a 
certain tone be adopted by case managers; they must be able to “get in the face” of 
their clients.1 The help and hassle technique mimics the relationship between parent 
and child, with the case manager acting as a parent, and the beneficiary the child. 
This is the second key element of paternalism; it relies on case management based on 
help and hassle. The role of the case manager must be backed by public statements of 
morality which reinforce the societal view that work is mandatory, the value of family, 
and that being dependent on welfare is undesirable. These statements should be 
reflected in welfare policy. This is the final element of new paternalism; it must 
involve public statements of morality which relate to the deficits of the underclass. 
                                                   
1 Lawrence Mead, Government Matters: Welfare Reform in Wisconsin (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004), 165. 
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The Fourth National Government: Emerging New Paternalism 
The third chapter established that the Fourth National Government was strongly 
influenced by new paternalism. The key points of this chapter will be summarised. 
Overall, New paternalism provided the Government “a reflection of their own values, 
and a realisation of their own vision.” 2  Paternalism did not, however, have a 
consistent influence over the Government. Its first term was dominated by an 
emphasis on economic concerns. The overall goal of the reforms was to cut public 
debt. The secondary goal was to improve work incentives for beneficiaries. These 
goals were based on an analysis drawn from supply-side economics. Advocates from 
this branch of neoliberalism argue that individuals rationally react to price signals, 
and because the difference between wages and welfare were so low, individuals were 
rationally choosing to stay on benefits.3 
National’s second term was marked by the development of a specific form of welfare 
analysis. Rather than simply focussing on work incentives, the Government began to 
recognise the importance of the breakdown of families, and the barriers facing 
beneficiaries on their return to work. The emphasis on the barriers to work led to the 
implementation of case management for particular at-risk groups. The Government 
began to emphasise reciprocal obligations, which required both additional support 
and obligations for beneficiaries. Despite these developments, the dominant 
emphasis was on financial incentives. Rather than cutting benefits, National focussed 
on changing abatement rates, decreasing taxes and using financial sanctions in order 
to encourage employment. 
National’s welfare policies in its third term were clearly influenced by new 
paternalism. This can be seen in the light of the three key elements of new 
paternalism. The assumption of incompetence, which is linked to a dysfunctional 
culture, and the public statements of morality worked closely together through the 
adoption of the dependency discourse. The argument for a dysfunctional culture was 
not as wide-ranging as in the USA. However, a cultural problem was identified; the 
                                                   
2  Ross Mackay, “Work-Orientated Reforms: New Directions in New Zealand,” in 
Activating the Unemployed: A Comparative Appraisal of Work-Orientated Policies, 
ed. Neil Gilbert and Rebecca Van Voorhis (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 
2001), 84. 
3 Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon, “A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword 
of the U.S. Welfare  State,” Signs 19 (No. 2,Winter, 1994): 328. 
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“culture of dependency,” which Jenny Shipley railed against in 1991.4 The political 
emphasis on dependency grew throughout National’s nine years in office. Initially it 
was undefined, and presumably referred to the poverty trap created by inefficient 
monetary incentives. By the third term, dependency “individualised, blamed and 
moralised” beneficiaries for their failings, and became “pseudo-explanatory … and 
served as shorthand for intergenerational cycles of reliance amongst promiscuous 
and work-shy populations.” 5   National attempted to destroy this culture in part 
through the introduction of work tests and sanctions. Increasingly, National relied on 
public statements to prevent dependency through public campaigns. This trend 
reached its full development with the Code of Social Responsibility, which outlined 
the moral expectations for society, and beneficiaries in particular. 
This discourse revolved around the assumption of incompetence. Following the 1991 
cuts, dependency presumably (as it was undefined) relied on neoclassical economics, 
and implied that beneficiaries were simply “work shy.”6 Beneficiaries were not, per 
se, incompetent; they just needed appropriate monetary incentives. Beginning in 
1993, it increasingly came to include human resource development and the problem 
of families. The problems of young people were placed at the feet of parents, who 
were not meeting the basic expectations for parenting. This trend again reached its 
peak with the release of the Code. It assumed the main problem facing at-risk 
families was that they simply did not know how to parent, and having their 
expectations outlined would help solve the issue. The issue was not incentives; it was 
their basic level of competence. The final element of paternalism was the role of case 
management using help and hassle. New Zealand began introducing case 
management from 1993, as the Department of Social Welfare implemented a pilot 
program for sole parents. In 1996, the DSW used Lawrence Mead’s work to justify the 
use of the help and hassle technique, and proceeded to extend the use of case 
managers.7  
                                                   
4 Jenny Shipley, Social Assistance: Welfare that Works (Wellington: Government 
Printer, 1991), 12. 
5 Neil Lunt, “From Welfare State to Social Development: Winning the War of Words 
in New Zealand,” Social Policy and Society 7 (4, October 2008): 412. 
6 Ibid  
7  Lawrence Mead, “Welfare Reform: The Need for Obligation,” in Beyond 
Dependency Conference: Conference Proceedings, ed. Department of Social Welfare 
(Wellington, Government Printer, 1997), 251. 
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The Fifth National Government: Entrenching New Paternalism 
The Fifth National Government’s welfare reforms show clear continuities with the 
paternalist reforms of the late 1990s. In 1997, Mead presented a talk at the Beyond 
Dependency conference. Mead was supportive of New Zealand’s direction, but argued 
“[c]utting benefits does surprisingly little actually to move people towards 
employment … you have to do something else … enforcement.”8 This is exactly the 
trend the Fifth National Government took up. Over the six years in office, relatively 
little emphasis was placed on financial incentives, with increased enforceable 
obligations taking prominence. This included rehashing several policies from the 
1990s. Extensive work testing for sole parents was introduced, which had been 
undone by the Labour Government. The work focus of the Jobseeker Support is 
broadly comparable to the Community Wage. Under both schemes beneficiaries are 
assumed to be eligible for obligations, and those who cannot participate have to opt 
out. However the Jobseeker support does not include a community work obligation. 
Sanctions were reformed, with graduated sanctions introduced to encourage greater 
usage. There were also new policies. Prominent among them is the extension of work 
obligations to those with health problems. Restricting eligibility became a focus, with 
beneficiaries now facing yearly reapplications for their benefit, those with health 
issues now require more medical certificates, and young people are expected to rely 
on their parents, not the state, except under extreme circumstances. 
These policies, however, fit broadly within the global trend to increase work 
obligations on beneficiaries, and though they are consistent with paternalist policy, 
they are not necessarily paternalist.9 To see how they are uniquely paternalist, the 
reforms will be placed in the context of the three elements of new paternalism. 
Firstly, case management has become a fundamental and unquestioned part of social 
security, with the increase in support and sanctions helping fulfil the “help and 
hassle” requirement. Secondly, the assumption of incompetence is clearly seen in the 
parenting obligations that were introduced to ensure participation in education and 
health, as well as the mandatory parenting and budgeting programs. Until these 
programs have been completed, a third party controls how the beneficiary’s income is 
                                                   
8 Ibid.   
9 Mike O’Brien does a good job of summarising the move to an “active” welfare state, 
see Mike O’Brien, Poverty, Policy and the State: The Changing Face of Social 
Security (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2008). 
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spent. Further, the state can intervene and manage the incomes of any beneficiary 
parent deemed at-risk. These policies reflect the influence of concerns over the 
breakdown of families, as the state is now directly intervening in the family to ensure 
good parenting. Finally, obligations were extended to prevent beneficiaries from 
using recreational drugs. These policies should be seen in light of the Code of Social 
Responsibility, which attempted to improve the behaviour of society (particularly 
beneficiaries and parents) through a public statement of morality. The Fourth 
National Government had intended to write these responsibilities into legislation for 
beneficiaries, but did not do so. The Fifth National Government succeeded in this 
task. Beneficiaries are no longer seen as having the competence to manage their own 
drug usage, or fulfil their parenting duties. This incompetence on the part of 
beneficiaries means the state has to intervene through help (parenting courses, drug 
treatment) and hassle (making them mandatory obligations). 
This trend is linked to statements of public morality. Paula Bennett stated welfare 
reforms have a “higher purpose … It comes back to the question of what kind of 
society we want to live in.”10 Bennett wants to see a wider cultural shift that “lifts 
people’s sights up beyond a simple existence on welfare to a meaningful, rewarding 
life as a working member of society.”11 The core of this new society is the “unrelenting 
focus on work,” which provides a path to a better life, and a better society.12 The 
dependency discourse has returned, though beneficiaries are not “pilloried in public 
discourse” to the extent they were in the 1990s.13 There is not, however, a strong 
emphasis placed on linking welfare reforms with a wider dysfunctional culture, as 
there was in the new paternalism discourse and the 1990s reforms. Overall, viewing 
the Fifth National Government in the light of paternalism shows important 
                                                   
10 New Zealand, Social Assistance (Future Focus) Bill — First Reading, House of 
Representatives.  
11 Ibid.  
12 This argument is seen a wide variety of documents, see “National’s Benefits Policy 
Backgrounder,” National Party, accessed 15th October, 2014, 
www.nzdoctor.co.nz/media/137374/benefits_backgrounder.pdf, and Welfare 
Working Group, Long-Term Benefit Dependency: The Issues, Detailed Paper 
(Wellington: Institute of Policy Studies, 2010), and Welfare Working Group, 
Reducing Long-Term Benefit Dependency: Recommendations (Wellington: Institute 
of Policy Studies, 2011). 
13 Neil Lunt, “Panacea, Problem or Perish: Social Policy Language in New Zealand,” in 
Analysing social policy concepts and language, ed. Daniel Beland and Klaus 
Petersen (Bristol: Policy Press, 2014), 258. 
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continuities with the reforms in the 1990s. There has been a clear development in 
increasing obligations, with the non-work obligations firmly based on the assumption 
of incompetence for beneficiaries. 
5.2. The Regimes Debate: Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare 
The second task of this chapter is to evaluate whether National’s reforms have 
changed how New Zealand delivers its social security. In chapter one, the theories of 
Gosta Esping-Andersen and Frank Castles were identified as useful in achieving this 
goal. In this section, National’s welfare reforms will be reconceptualised according to 
Esping-Andersen’s concepts of decommodification and stratification. I argue 
National’s reforms have entrenched New Zealand in the liberal category of Esping-
Andersen’s typology of welfare regimes. As with paternalism, this trend emerged in 
the 1990s, and has been entrenched from 2008. Section 5.3 will carry out a similar 
analysis utilising Castles’ concepts. This task is important, as Shaun Wilson et al. 
pointed out, as there has been little academic work on the political economy of 
welfare focussing on New Zealand since the 1990s. Consequently, the evolution of 
New Zealand’s social security is poorly understood.14  
The Fourth National Government: Decommodification 
Esping-Andersen’s work is situated in the social democratic tradition of political 
economy. He founds his analysis on the concept of social citizenship, and evaluates 
welfare regimes according to two concepts: decommodification and stratification. 
Underlying National’s reforms is a fundamental shift in the content of social 
citizenship. As noted in chapter three, New Zealand’s welfare state had been guided 
by the 1972 Royal Commission on Social Security, which states: “The community is 
responsible for giving dependent people a standard of living consistent with human 
dignity and approaching that enjoyed by the majority, irrespective of the cause of 
dependency,” which would enable beneficiaries “to feel a sense of participation in 
and belonging to the community.”15  The Royal Commission represents the social 
democratic view of social security; it ensures people a sense of belonging in their 
                                                   
14 Shaun Wilson et al., “Wage-Earners’ Welfare after Economic Reform: Refurbishing, 
Retrenching or Hollowing Out Social Protection in Australia and New Zealand?,” 
Social Policy and Administration 47 (no. 6, December 2013): 625.  
15 Royal Commission on Social Security, Social Security in New Zealand: Report of 
the Royal Commission of Inquiry (Wellington: Government Printer, 1972), 65-6. 
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society based on their citizenship, not on their status in the market. The Fourth 
National Government rejected this view. Instead, they stated welfare should provide 
“a safety net – a modest standard below which people will not be allowed to fall 
provided they demonstrate they are prepared to help themselves.”16 This view rejects 
the concept of unconditional citizenship rights; welfare would only be provided for 
those who “are prepared to help themselves.” The change in the content of social 
citizenship would have substantial impacts on decommodification and stratification. 
Decommodification “refers to the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold 
a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation.”17 In 
order to measure decommodification, Esping-Andersen identifies three empirical 
features. Firstly, he includes access to benefits. This takes into account: the eligibility 
rules and restrictions on entitlements; whether it guarantees a standard of living 
regardless of previous employment or financial contribution; whether the benefit is 
time-limited; and if it includes a needs-test. Secondly, he includes the level of income 
replacement, which measures the level of benefit income as a percentage of previous 
market income. Finally, he measures how extensive the range of benefits is. A limited 
range would only apply to the elderly, sick and unemployed, and a wide range would 
include a social wage for all citizens.18 
The Fourth National Government decreased decommodification throughout its nine 
years in office. This was most prominently seen in two areas: the goal of reducing 
benefit dependency; and the increase in poverty rates. National sought to reduce 
benefit dependency from the beginning of its reign, with the reforms aiming to 
“encourage … personal and family self-reliance.”19 Virtually all welfare reforms aimed 
to decrease welfare dependency: the 1991 benefit cuts sought to improve work 
incentives; the introduction of work tests and sanctions would stop people remaining 
on welfare; the 1996 tax cuts would make work more desirable; and the Community 
Wage would help maintain people’s work ethic. More broadly, the dependency 
discourse publicly affirmed the moral worth of paid employment, and demonised 
beneficiaries, thereby encouraging participation in paid employment. Other reforms 
                                                   
16 Jenny Shipley, Social Assistance, 13.   
17  Gosta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1990), 35. 
18 Ibid, 47. 
19 Jenny Shipley, Social Assistance: Welfare that Works, 17. 
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sought to ensure that if individuals did require welfare, they would first have to look 
to their family for support: increased stand-down periods meant individuals could 
not rely on welfare; teenagers were excluded from eligibility for the main benefits; 
and work and income tests were extended to spouses. Overall, the thrust of the 
welfare reforms was to ensure people were reliant on the market or their family for 
well-being; a clear move away from decommodification. 
What remained of welfare would be targeted to ensure only those in “genuine need” 
received assistance.20 The first major step to achieving the “limited safety net” was 
the 1991 reduction in benefit rates. These cuts led to a substantial reduction in the 
level of decommodification. The immediate consequence of these cuts was a 
substantial rise in poverty. According to data gathered by the New Zealand Poverty 
Measurement Project, poverty increased from 4.3% in 1984, to 10.8% in 1993. For 
sole parents, poverty increased from 11.8 to 46.2%. In a study which attempted to 
more closely monitor the effects of the cuts, Brian Easton found poverty increased by 
40% between 1989/90 and 1991/92.21 The increase in poverty rates represents a 
direct reduction in the decommodifying nature of social security, as benefits did not 
ensure “a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market 
participation,” which is the key goal of decommodification.22 Instead, benefits only 
provide enough income for basic sustenance. The effects of this are described in more 
detail later in the chapter. 
Decommodification also decreased across Esping-Andersen’s other empirical 
measures. Access to benefits was restricted. Lengthy stand-down periods were 
introduced, eligibility was restricted, and various work tests extended to sole parents 
and the partners of beneficiaries.23  Further reforms introduced a wide range of 
obligations, and sanctions were reformed to ensure compliance. Overall, eligibility 
was made conditional on certain behaviours, representing a restriction of access to 
benefits. However, no attempts were made to create a time-limit for beneficiaries or 
to link benefit rates to previous employment record. 
                                                   
20 Jim Bolger et al., Economic and Social Initiative, December 1990: Statements to 
the House of Representatives (Wellington: Government Printer, 1990), 11. 
21 Brian Easton, “Poverty and Families: Priority or Piety?,” (Paper to “Issues for 
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The level of income replacement, the next measurement of decommodification, was 
also reduced. This was achieved through the substantial cuts to benefits rates in 1991. 
These cuts fulfilled what Esping-Andersen calls the principle of less eligibility, a 
hallmark of liberal welfare states. This principle dictates that benefits should be set at 
a level below what is provided by the market, ensuring no overlap between welfare 
and the market.24 This is precisely what the reforms achieved, as benefit levels were 
set at a level which ensured beneficiaries received a higher income from work than 
from the benefit.25 Reforms in the mid-1990s increased wages through tax cuts and 
the introduction of the Independent Family Tax Credit. This decreased the level of 
income replacement by increasing the gap between wage earners and beneficiaries.26  
The final measure used by Esping-Andersen was a measure of how extensive benefits 
were. The coverage of benefits was restricted by excluding young people from welfare. 
This occurred in 1991, when those under 18 were restricted from receiving a benefit. 
However, the independent Family Tax Credit increased coverage to those in full-time 
work who were not receiving any other benefits. This violates the principle of less 
eligibility as it extends welfare into the market. However, the goal of this reform was 
to ensure work incentives through increasing the income gained from work. So, 
whilst it appears to be a move towards increasing decommodification, it is driven by a 
desire to decrease decommodification. 
Social Stratification 
Social stratification relates to whether welfare provision fosters a sense of solidarity 
amongst society, or stigmatises and alienates welfare recipients. Esping-Andersen 
measures the level of means-testing, the degree of market provision of welfare, and 
the extent of universalism. He also states the impact welfare has on inequality is 
important, but less so than its impact on solidarity.27 As Castles places a greater 
emphasis on inequality, it will be discussed in the following section which analyses 
the WEWS. Given New Zealand’s history of high levels of means-testing and low 
universalism in welfare, only minor changes have occurred in this area. This contrasts 
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to areas where universalism was the norm, including: health;28 education;29 accident 
compensation;30 and superannuation,31 where substantial moves were made towards 
reducing universality. However, universalism in welfare was reduced, as the universal 
Family Benefit was replaced by the means tested Family Support, and later the 
targeted Independent Family Tax Credit was introduced. 
There was also an increase in the privatisation of welfare. This was achieved through 
the failure of the state to respond to the needs of those in poverty, representing 
“privatisation by default.”32 This was seen in the sudden explosion of food bank usage 
after the 1991 cuts.33 The New Zealand Council of Christian Social Services (NZCCSS) 
succinctly states the role of foodbanks: “Foodbanks are an indicator of intense 
hardship, because many people experiencing food poverty do not go to a foodbank 
unless they have exhausted other forms of help (such as loans or benefit assistance) 
and are desperate or courageous enough to ask for assistance.”34 Thus an increase in 
the usage of foodbanks represents an increase in intense hardship which the state has 
not addressed. The increase in food bank usage was illustrated by the Salvation Army, 
one of the major providers of food parcels. In the first quarter of 1990, they provided 
1,226 food parcels; in 1994, the equivalent number was 14,906.35 It was estimated 
                                                   
28 Toni Aston, “The Health Reforms: To Market and Back?,” in Redesigning the 
Welfare State in New Zealand: Problems, Policies, Prospects, ed. Jonathan Boston, 
Paul Dalziel and Susan St. John (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1999), 134-153. 
29 Susan St John, “Accident Compensation in New Zealand: A Fairer Scheme?,” in 
Redesigning the Welfare State in New Zealand: Problems, Policies, Prospects, ed. 
Jonathan Boston, Paul Dalziel and Susan St. John (Auckland: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), 154- 176. 
30  Jonathan Boston, “The Funding of Tertiary Education: Enduring Issues and 
Dilemmas,” in Redesigning the Welfare State in New Zealand: Problems, Policies, 
Prospects, ed. Jonathan Boston, Paul Dalziel and Susan St. John (Auckland: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 197-217. 
31 Susan St John, “Superannuation in the 1990s: Where Angels Fear to Tread?,” in 
Redesigning the Welfare State in New Zealand: Problems, Policies, Prospects, ed. 
Jonathan Boston, Paul Dalziel and Susan St. John (Auckland: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), 278-298. 
32 Glenda Laws, “Privatisation and the Local Welfare State: The Case of Toronto's 
Social Services,” Transactions 13 (1988): 442. 
33 Chris Rudd, “The Welfare State,” in The Political Economy of New Zealand, ed. 
Brian Roper and Chris Rudd (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1997), 252. 
34  New Zealand Council of Christian Social Services, A Snapshot Comparative 
Analysis of Foodbank Usage: December Quarter 2004 and December Quarter 2007 
(Wellington: New Zealand Council of Christian Social Services, 2008), 5. 
35  Ross MacKay, Foodbanks in New Zealand: Patterns of Growth and Usage 
(Wellington: Social Policy Agency, 1994), 2. 
Analysing and Evaluating the Welfare Reforms 
123 
 
that two thirds of the foodbanks that existed in late 1991 had been established in the 
previous two years.36By 1994, there were 365 foodbanks providing over 40,000 food 
parcels each month.37  
In response to the explosion of foodbanks, the government increased eligibility for 
the Special Needs Grants. In the five months after this decision, grants increased by 
75%, and food grants by 142%. This led to an increase in expenditure of 
approximately $6 million, accompanied by a reduction in the usage of foodbanks. 
Because of the rapid increase in expenditure, National retightened eligibility, leading 
to a rise in foodbank usage.38 The Income Support Service (the precursor to WINZ), 
began directing beneficiaries to foodbanks when they could not provide assistance.39 
Foodbanks represent a form of privatisation of welfare, as the state allows (and 
encourages) individuals to ensure their welfare outside of state welfare through 
foodbanks.40 
The changes to welfare, and the dependency rhetoric that accompanied it, had a 
substantial impact on social stratification. The key insight of Esping-Andersen, 
shared by many others, is that highly targeted systems can produce feelings of 
exclusion and stigmatisation for beneficiaries. A substantial amount of research on 
the living standards of people living below the poverty line amply showed this.41 This 
research was excellently summarised by Mike O’Brien in Poverty, Policy and the 
State. Due to space constraints, this research can only be briefly summarised. 
Broadly, the research shows food inadequacy (either not having enough, or 
insufficiently nutritious) became a significant problem; many beneficiaries had 
inadequate clothing; many had to go without key household items such as washing 
machines or fridges; housing was often inadequate, which was exacerbated by the 
need to reduce heating costs; visits to medical services, and the purchase of 
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prescriptions, was often avoided due to cost; and families felt embarrassed as they 
could not afford school fees.42 
As a consequence of these problems, some families “were feeling so hopeless that 
they could see no end to their struggle and hence were not looking after themselves, 
leading to mental, physical and emotional neglect.”43 List et al. argue “restrictions in 
every day areas can be seen to have caused stress in relationships and a decline in 
emotional and personal well-being … Many families have therefore become more 
isolated and less able to participate in society in a way they would like to.”44 This 
isolation was caused in part by an inability to “reciprocate hospitality … because the 
costs of social and recreational participation could not be met.”45 In one focus group, 
a participant put the consequences of isolation poignantly: “You are limited so much 
that when someone does show you a bit of human kindness you lap it up like cream – 
I reckon it is quite sad … I think [to] myself that life is just a thing you have got to put 
up with. If you’ve not got the guts to commit suicide just keep going.”46 Overall, the 
poverty created by welfare reforms excluded beneficiaries from participating in 
society.47 
The Fifth National Government: Decommodification 
The Fifth National Government has entrenched the liberal welfare regime which 
emerged in the 1990s. National subscribes to the same notion of social citizenship it 
proposed in the 1990s; stating it supports a “genuine safety net in times of need” 
which provides “temporary support.”48 Thus, National has not raised benefit rates 
above a “modest safety net,” and continued to make welfare conditional on 
behaviour.  
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The move towards decreasing decommodification is seen in National’s overall goal of 
reducing the amount of welfare recipients. The rhetoric used by National sums up 
this goal; with reforms having “an unrelenting focus on work.”49 Paid employment is 
valorised as an individual and societal virtue in policy documents and public 
statements. Its opposite, benefit dependency, is identified as the major problem 
facing welfare. These goals are seen in the terms of reference for the Welfare Working 
Group, which would research how to reduce “long-term benefit dependence” and 
improve work outcomes.50 The most prominent reform designed to achieve these 
goals is the restructuring of benefit categories, which ensures a strong work focus for 
beneficiaries. Decommodification was further decreased by reducing access to 
benefits. This was achieved through the creation of an array of obligations for 
beneficiaries, with sanctions being reformed to encourage greater usage. As with the 
previous National Government, this represented a move to make benefits dependent 
on behaviour, not on citizenship. 
There has been little change in the level of income replacement. National have made 
no attempts to reduce benefit rates. Indeed, National linked benefits to the CPI, 
ensuring benefit rates increase in line with inflation. This is not a major change, as it 
had been adjusted by convention. This means, unlike the previous National 
Government, poverty rates have not increased. As Table 8: New Zealand Poverty 
Rates, 1982-2013 shows, poverty rates suddenly spiked after the 1991 benefit cuts, 
and continued to rise until the economy began to grow in the mid-1990s.51 Under the 
Fifth Labour Government, poverty decreased, driven by a mixture of economic 
growth and new policy initiatives, particularly the introduction of Working For 
Families (WFF).52 Since 2007, poverty rates have only changed by a few percentage 
points. However Bryan Perry, the author of poverty research outlined in Table 8: New 
Zealand Poverty Rates, 1982-2013, states “nothing should be read into small changes 
from one survey to the next, as sampling and non-sampling errors mean that such 
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differences are unlikely to have any significance.” 53  National’s decision to leave 
benefit rates largely untouched has ensured the “safety net” protects the poor to a 
similar degree as it had under Labour.  
Table 8: New Zealand Poverty Rates, 1982-201354 
 Percentage of whole 
population below selected 
thresholds (BHC) – 
Constant Value 
Percentage of whole 
population below selected 
thresholds (AHC) 
HES year 60%  1998 median  60%  1998 median  
1982 12 8 
1984 13 9 
1986 14 8 
1988 12 9 
1990 14 11 
1992 24 21 
1994 26 23 
1996 20 21 
1998 16 18 
2001 16 19 
2004 13 17 
2007 11 13 
2009 7 12 
2010 9 12 
2011 10 14 
2012 7 13 
2013 9 13 
  
Measuring current poverty levels compared to pre-1990 levels is a more difficult task. 
The two measures in Table 8: New Zealand Poverty Rates, 1982-2013 provide 
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different answers. The before housing costs measure shows a decrease in poverty, 
reflecting a rise in real incomes for those in low income households. However, 
poverty increases once housing costs are taken into account, as housing costs have 
increased faster than incomes for those on low-incomes. Thus, poverty has increased 
on this measure, as low-income households have less income to spend after housing 
costs are considered.55 Bryan Perry also includes other measures of poverty. Seven of 
the eight measures used by Perry show an increase in poverty levels since the 1980s. 
Thus, there appears to have been a slight increase in poverty since the 1980s.56 It is 
worth noting, as described in chapter three, that the welfare state was in crisis in the 
early 1980s, with high levels of unemployment emerging for the first time in decades, 
and economic growth slowing substantially. As Castles points out, social security was 
guaranteed through work, not welfare. Thus, the increase in unemployment would 
have likely seen an increase in poverty compared to the 1960s and 70s. 
There has been no attempt to make welfare reliant on previous employment, or to 
introduce time limits on benefits. Finally, there has been no attempt to reduce the 
coverage of welfare benefits. Though welfare categories were reduced, grouping 
together beneficiaries with different needs (e.g. those suffering from sickness and sole 
parents with older children with the unemployed), it did not reduce the range of 
people eligible for welfare. 
Social Stratification 
According to Esping-Andersen’s three measures of stratification: means-testing; the 
extent of universalism; and the privatisation of welfare, social stratification has 
slightly increased. However, there is a lack of research in this area, so the conclusion 
is a tentative one. As previously mentioned, means-testing and low levels of 
universalism has always been a prominent feature of New Zealand’s welfare. The 
Fifth National Government has built on this tradition by seeking to improve the 
efficiency of targeting. National consistently argues it is targeting welfare spending on 
those who will cost the state the most money (or, more kindly, on the most 
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vulnerable).57  This is seen in two areas. Firstly, the adoption of the investment 
approach, which is most obviously seen in the commissioning of the Actuarial 
Valuation of the Benefit System report, which analyses what groups of beneficiaries 
will likely cost the state the most. Secondly, it is seen in Treasury’s support of 
National’s welfare reforms, with Treasury arguing National is reprioritising welfare 
expenditure to “effectively … improve outcomes for the most disadvantaged New 
Zealanders.”58 The targeting is seen in a variety of policies. The Job Ops and Straight 
2 Work programs were merged into Job Streams, which provided greater funding for 
beneficiaries deemed “at-risk” of long term unemployment. Paula Bennett announced 
the parenting obligations would not be applied equally to all beneficiaries; and would 
instead only be applied to the “most vulnerable.”59 The increased targeting of welfare 
to “the most vulnerable” now means beneficiaries are not treated equally; those 
defined as “at-risk” or “vulnerable” face stricter obligations, and can access more 
funding. Welfare may now be producing levels of stratification within beneficiaries by 
targeting some more heavily than others. 
Despite the decrease in poverty during the 2000s, foodbanks continue to be a crucial 
part of New Zealand’s social security. The NZCCSS attempted to monitor the usage of 
foodbanks from 2001 to 2004. However, due to a variety of reasons, the project 
proved unsuccessful.60 Thus, there is no official data which measures the exact usage 
of foodbanks. However, a variety of research clearly demonstrates there were high 
levels of demand for foodbanks through the 2000s. 61  Under the Fifth National 
Government, foodbanks continue to play an important role.62 The 2015 Vulnerability 
Report, produced by the NZCCSS, state their members saw an increase in demand for 
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foodbanks since the Global Financial Crisis.63 Another report by the Child Poverty 
Action Group details the experiences of foodbanks in Whangarei, concluding there is 
substantial demand in the area, with foodbanks establishing eligibility criteria to 
reduce demand.64 Frustratingly, there is no data available to accurately compare 
foodbank usage over the past twenty five years. However, the evidence does show 
foodbanks remain an integral part of social security.  
The large rise in poverty in the 1990s provided the impetus for research into the lived 
experiences of those in poverty. Unfortunately, the recent reforms have not received 
similar levels of attention. Thus, there is relatively little research available describing 
the lived experiences of beneficiaries. However, two pieces of research point to the 
on-going impact of welfare reforms on stratification. As part of wider research funded 
by the Auckland City Mission, Hodgetts et al. produced qualitative research regarding 
beneficiary’s experiences with WINZ.65 WINZ has become an increasingly important 
institution, as the usage of case management means WINZ is at the forefront of 
beneficiary’s experiences of welfare. The Fifth National Government has increased 
obligations, but allow case managers the discretion over whether to enforce them. 
Further, case managers can approve extra funds for beneficiaries, providing they can 
prove their neediness.66 Thus, how beneficiaries are treated by case managers is 
fundamental to their lived experiences. 
Hodgetts et al. use spousal abuse as a criterion to judge the experience of 
beneficiaries against; and finds numerous similarities.67 The authors argue “having to 
beg for food and charity is a demeaning experience.” Three issues contribute to this 
problem. Firstly, there is the underlying inequality between case manager and 
beneficiary. The case manager holds access to the basic necessities of life, particularly 
in times of crisis. Several participants note they felt they had to “shut up and suffer 
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through” their negative experiences with case managers.68 Secondly, the process of 
seeking help leads to the revictimisation of beneficiaries. Beneficiaries applying for 
additional assistance have their budgets thoroughly analysed to ensure they are 
spending their incomes in a “morally sanctioned manner.”69 This requires WINZ staff 
to be critical of the spending choices of beneficiaries, and “impose their ideas” on how 
beneficiaries should spend their money.70 Several participants report going through 
this process, successfully displaying an urgent need for money, but were provided 
with insufficient money.71 The process of extensive budget analysis and rejection 
leads to the growth of resentment.72  
The unequal relationship and revictimisation is exacerbated by the behaviour of 
WINZ staff. Beneficiaries experience personal ridicule, criticisms of their behaviour, 
ignoring of their needs, cynicism, and a lack of sympathy from staff.73 They also feel a 
sense of distrust and betrayal after being rejected for help. 74  Hodgetts, a social 
psychologist, states “the WINZ office comes to be associated with strong emotional 
feelings of exclusion, fear, foreboding, dislike, disrespect and anxiety.” 75  These 
feelings lead to avoidance of WINZ, and an increase in anxiety and depression. 
Overall, Hodgetts et al. conclude “the psychological impact of recent efforts to 
manage the poor promotes low self-esteem, fear, shame and guilt.”76 These findings 
are supported by two other pieces of research. The first is from the Child Poverty 
Action Group, who set up the Alternative Welfare Working Group (AWWG), which 
sought to counter the dependency narrative produced by the WWG. Though there 
were some positive experiences with WINZ, the AWWG report “a marked change in 
the institution’s culture to be less respectful, more judgemental and more suspicious 
towards people.”77 For beneficiaries, this means WINZ had become a more “menacing 
and punitive environment.”78 A recent report by Community Law Canterbury notes 
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beneficiaries are left with feelings of dehumanisation, intimidation, public 
humiliation and stigmatisation due to their dealings with WINZ.79 
Table 9: Polling Data on Welfare80 
Statement Agreed Disagreed Weren’t Sure 
Welfare benefits 
make people lazy 
and dependent 
62% 24% 12% 
Most people on the 
dole are fiddling in 
one way or another 
51% -81 - 
Around here, most 
unemployed people 
could find a job if 
they really wanted 
one 
57% 28% 15% 
With lower 
benefits, people 
would learn to 
stand on their own 
two feet’ 
56% - - 
Many people who 
get welfare benefits 
don’t really deserve 
any help’ 
38% 38% 24% 
 
The second key piece of research comes from polling data analysed by Louise 
Humpage. Several questions from the poll are relevant. The survey asked individuals 
                                                   
79 Kim Morton, Claire Gray, Anne Heins and Sue Carswell, Access to Justice For 
Beneficiaries: A Community Law Response (Christchurch: Community Law 
Canterbury, 2014), 29-55. 
80 Louise Humpage, “Do New Zealanders Really Support Welfare Reform?,” in The 
New Electoral Politics in New Zealand: The Significance of the 2011 Election, ed. 
Jack Vowles (Wellington: Institute for Governance and Policy Studies, 2014), 53-71. 
81 Humpage did not provide data on how many disagreed or weren’t sure for these 
questions. 
Analysing and Evaluating the Welfare Reforms 
132 
 
to state whether they agreed, disagreed, or weren’t sure about the truth of a variety of 
statements. Unfortunately, the poll only asked about unemployed people, and 
respondents may not have considered DPB, sickness or invalid’s benefit recipients in 
their response. For the unemployed, a clear majority of New Zealanders believe they 
are lazy, dependent, fraudsters, could get a job if they really tried, and could “stand 
on their own two feet” if their benefits were less generous.  Clearly, New Zealand’s 
welfare does not foster a sense of social solidarity. Instead, the poor are being blamed 
for their situations. This represents a substantial level of stratification, which is 
associated with liberal welfare regimes. 
Towards Esping-Andersen’s Liberal Welfare Regime 
The Fourth and Fifth National Governments’ welfare reforms entrenched New 
Zealand as a liberal welfare state according to Esping-Andersen’s measures. The 
major reforms were enacted in the 1990s. These reforms were justified as part of a 
push to make welfare a “modest safety net.” This represents the abandonment of the 
social democratic concept of social citizenship, leading to a decrease in 
decommodification and an increase in the level of stratification. The Fifth National 
Government are committed to a “modest safety net” for welfare. Consequently, 
National has decreased decommodification, and the effects on stratification are 
unclear due to a lack of available research, though the evidence suggests there remain 
significant levels of stratification. So, the Fifth National Government’s reforms have 
had less of an effect than the reforms of the 1990s, but have continued to entrench 
New Zealand in the liberal category. Overall, the reforms of the two Governments a 
move towards a more comprehensively liberal regime, driven in part by the adoption 
of a neoliberal ideology which rejected the social democratic conception of 
citizenship.  
5.3. The Wage Earners’ Welfare State 
The evaluation of National’s welfare reforms which utilises Esping-Andersen’s 
concepts shows New Zealand entrenching its classification as a liberal welfare state. 
However, as was shown in chapter one, Castles’ critique shows several deficiencies in 
Esping-Andersen’s characterisation of Australia and New Zealand’s welfare regimes. 
So, then, what has happened to the WEWS? There is a general consensus that the 
Fourth National Government dismantled it. There is some disagreement, however, 
over whether post-1999 reforms have fundamentally changed social security. Here, I 
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put forward a modified thesis, originally made by Shaun Wilson et al., that the 
WEWS has been “hollowed out” into a Trojan horse. The reforms maintain the 
valorisation of work and protection for working families, but bring with it the 
abandonment by the state of its commitment to full employment, and the 
impoverishment and exclusion of beneficiaries.82 
There is a general consensus the Fourth National Government effectively destroyed 
the WEWS.83 The core of the WEWS lay in employment; the state guaranteed social 
security through full employment and a managed labour market which ensured a 
family wage. This system was dismantled by the Employment Contracts Act (ECA). 
Arbitration was removed, and union membership was made voluntary, which 
substantially reduced their influence, and “effectively ended New Zealand’s wage-
earner compact.”84 Contracts are now set in the context of supply and demand, not by 
what is considered an appropriate family wage. 85  Unemployment remained high 
throughout the era, only falling to a low of 6.3% in 1996.86 Thus, the core of the 
WEWS had been destroyed; the state no longer guaranteed social security via the 
labour market. 
Table 10: New Zealand Gini Coefficient, 1984-199887 
 1984 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 
BHC-1 (OECD) 27.0 26.2 30.0 31.1 31.8 32.5 32.7 
AHC 28.5 28.5 32.1 34.9 35.6 37.2 37.5 
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The second defining feature of the WEWS was its distributional outcomes. Castles 
argues the WEWS was different from liberal regimes because it maintained low levels 
of poverty and inequality; a trait more commonly associated with social democratic 
regimes.88 The impact on poverty rates has already been described; with poverty rates 
substantially rising over National’s nine years in office. Inequality also increased 
substantially. Numerous measures have been utilised by different authors to show the 
increase in inequality over the 1990s.89 Due to space constraints, only the changes in 
the Gini coefficient will be described, as it is the most popular measure of income 
inequality internationally.90 The Gini coefficient measures income inequality out of 
100; with a score of zero meaning all individuals have the same level of income.91 
Amongst OECD countries, the Gini coefficient rose by an average of 1.4 points 
between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s. New Zealand increased by 6.1 points.92 By 
2001, New Zealand had the eighth highest rate of inequality in the 27 countries 
measured by the OECD. 93  National dismantled the system of labour market 
protections which characterised the WEWS, and oversaw a substantial increase in 
poverty and inequality.  
The Fifth Labour and National Governments 
Few academics have sought to analyse the evolution of New Zealand’s welfare state 
since 1999. The little work which has been done has come to differing conclusions. 
The debate focuses on three key reforms: the introduction of WFF; the increases in 
the minimum wage; and the repeal of the ECA. The first two reforms were described 
in chapter four. WFF includes an array of benefits for families with low incomes who 
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are in full time work. The policy decreased both poverty and inequality.94 It fails, 
however, to address poverty in families who are reliant on benefits, as they are not 
eligible for assistance.95 The minimum wage was increased by over 50%, from $7 per 
hour in 1999, to $11.25 in 2007.96  In 2000, Labour repealed the ECA, replacing it 
with the Employment Relations Act (ERA). The ERA gave a more prominent role to 
unions. By 2002, union membership had increased by 10.7% since the 
implementation of the ERA. 97  However, mandatory union membership was not 
reintroduced, and several key elements of the ECA were retained.98 
Peter Starke, writing during the final years of Labour’s rule (1999-2008), argues the 
WEWS had been destroyed despite Labour’s reforms. He argues “New Zealand is now 
a full member of the liberal club.”99 In terms of economic policy, the ERA fails to 
return New Zealand to a system of wage setting based on the family wage, trade 
protections had not been reintroduced, and despite favourable economic conditions 
unemployment only reached a low of 3.7%.100 Full employment, as was seen in the 
1950s and 60s, has never been achieved. In terms of welfare, Starke argues welfare 
has become more liberal, as family policy now relies on means-testing, as the 
universal Family Benefit was abolished in 1991.101 WFF utilises extensive means-
testing, thus Starke views its implementation as entrenching the liberal welfare 
regime. Further, demographic changes had undermined the (male) WEWS; women 
are now an important part of the workforce, dual-earner families are more prevalent 
and sole parenthood has increased. Overall, he concludes 
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although not all of the elements that once characterized the wage earners’ 
welfare state are completely gone, they no longer form a coherent 
arrangement. Instead of regulating the market directly, the emphasis today is 
on market conformity of social policies. Stripped of its protective belt in form 
of a wage earners’ welfare state, the contemporary system of social protection 
could now better be described as purely residual.102 
 
In 2013, Shaun Wilson et al. put forward a different thesis. They argue the WEWS 
had been “hollowed out,” a concept which “sits between earlier characterizations of 
‘refurbishment’ and ‘abandonment’.”103 They argue contemporary reforms reflect the 
enduring influence of the WEWS, which is seen in three areas: minimum protections; 
levels of employment; and WFF. Crucial to this thesis are the three reforms 
implemented by Labour. They argue that though the ERA did not return New Zealand 
to a system of centralised wage setting, it represents a compromise for workers. 
Employers maintain the freedom to set wages, whilst the state ensures “minimum 
protections” for workers by increasing the minimum wage. Over its nine years in 
office, Labour increased the minimum wage to 59% of median full-time earnings, one 
of the highest levels in the OECD.104 The second argument relates to unemployment; 
though New Zealand’s unemployment rate is high historically, unemployment 
remains relatively low compared to other countries.105 Finally, they argue the WFF 
represents “a mechanism to shift from a narrower wage-earner focus to a broader 
one, involving more welfare instruments.”106 WFF is now a key mechanism for the 
provision of a family wage; it ensures the social security of those in full-time work 
through welfare payments. In principle, this fulfils the WEWS’ goal; it provides social 
security for those who participate in the labour market. Only the mechanism has 
changed. Social security is provided through direct income payments to families in 
paid employment, not via a managed market.107 Overall, Wilson et al. argue the 
reforms of the 1990s “have fallen short of full retrenchment or abandonment, with 
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later Labour governments … legislating new protections that suggest ongoing to 
commitment to wage-earner norms.”108  
Wilson et al. note that the Fifth National Government have made four reforms which 
“hollow out” what remains of the WEWS. Firstly, the ERA has been maintained, but 
several reforms have been implemented. According to Nigel Haworth, these reforms 
have been based on “orthodox neo-liberal policy settings … [representing] views 
about [employment relations] more akin to those found in the ECA.” 109  The 
minimum wage continues to be increased, though the increases have been below the 
rise in average weekly earnings, representing a relative decrease in the value of the 
minimum wage.110 Secondly, National has restricted eligibility for WFF. Between 
2008 and 2018, the abatement threshold will fall in nominal terms from $36,875 to 
$35,000, and the abatement rate will be increased.111 Thirdly, National introduced 
regressive tax reforms through the reduction of income taxes (particularly for high 
earners), and increasing GST from 12.5 to 15%.112 Finally, the authors note National’s 
welfare reforms create an “increasingly stratified welfare, which marginalizes and 
stigmatizes many outside the workforce.”113 Thus, on each of the measures of the 
hollowed out WEWS, National has implemented reforms which represent a move 
away from Labour’s reforms.  
Wilson et al. do not comment on the effectiveness of the hollowed out WEWS. By 
doing so, a clearer picture of what is meant by “hollowing out” can be gained. In 
assessing its effectiveness, three issues will be addressed. The first issue is the 
changes in distribution outcomes. Current levels of poverty remain at higher levels 
than in the early 1980s. Thus, the hollowed out WEWS is slightly worse than its 
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predecessor at preventing poverty; and it is likely the statistical difference would be 
larger if poverty statistics were available from prior to the 1980s. Changes in the level 
of inequality are, as yet, unknown. Since 2008, the Gini Coefficient has been volatile, 
as the impact of the global financial crisis makes it too difficult to discern a trend 
from National’s time in Government. However, since the mid-1990s, inequality has 
remained relatively stable.114  
Table 11: Gini Coefficient, 2007-2013115 
 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
BHC-1 (OECD) 32.5 33.1 32.5 35.0 32.4 33.4 
AHC 36.8 37.5 37.0 39.9 37.7 38.3 
 
The second key trend is the level of unemployment. As Table 13: Unemployment, 
1999-2013 shows, unemployment has never fallen below 3.7%, which is markedly 
higher than in the 1950s and 60s. The most striking difference is the difference in the 
number of people relying on benefits. The Welfare Working Group estimated the total 
numbers receiving a benefit as a proportion of the total working age population. In 
1970, just over 2% were receiving a benefit; in 1993 the proportion peaked at 15%; 
and decreased to 12% in 2010. In total numbers, 31,277 people received a benefit in 
1970, compared to 352,918 in 2010. Each of the main benefits (unemployment, 
sickness, invalid’s, and the DPB) saw an increase in total recipients, reflecting a range 
of different causes for each.116 
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Table 13: Unemployment, 1999-2013118 
Year  Unemployment Rate 
(%) 
Year  Unemployment 
Rate (%) 
1999 7 2007 3.7 
2000 6.1 2008 4.2 
2001 5.4 2009 6.1 
2002 5.3 2010 6.5 
2003 4.8 2011 6.5 
2004 4 2012 6.9 
2005 3.8 2013 6.2 
2006 3.8   
 
So, compared to the WEWS which existed prior to the neoliberal reforms, the 
hollowed out version has higher levels of poverty, inequality and welfare recipients. 
However, when compared to the outcomes of the late 1990s, it has lower levels of 
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poverty and welfare recipients, and similar levels of inequality. The core of the 
WEWS was the linking of social security to work through an extensively managed 
labour market, backed by economic regulations to ensure full employment. Now, the 
state still links social security to work; escaping poverty can only be achieved through 
entry into the labour market, as benefits are set below the poverty line.119 However, 
the state no longer guarantees full employment. The state maintains the valorisation 
of work which characterised the WEWS, without ensuring people can get the work 
which ensures their social security.120 Its consequences are seen in the higher levels of 
poverty, unemployment, and welfare recipients. Further, as was shown in the 
previous section, reforms have created a more stratified welfare regime. At the same 
time as the state abandoned its commitment to full employment, it ensured those 
who could not find employment would be systematically excluded from society. 
Overall, New Zealand’s WEWS has been hollowed out into a Trojan horse; it 
maintains the valorisation of work and protection for working families, but brings 
with it the abandonment by the state of its commitment to ensure everyone can get a 
job which ensures their social security, and the impoverishment and exclusion of 
beneficiaries. 
5.4. The Wage Earners’ Welfare State, the Labour Market and Neo-
Marxism 
The final part of this chapter draws upon the neo-Marxist literature described in 
chapter one to analyse National’s welfare reforms. The key insights of neo-Marxism 
are that unemployment and the welfare state assist the process of accumulation, and 
help to mitigate and legitimate the negative outcomes of capitalism. As stated in 
section 1.6 of the first chapter, a neo-Marxist analysis requires a depth of analysis of 
the process of accumulation which is not possible in this thesis. However, important 
insights can still be gained by viewing welfare reforms in the context of increasing 
unemployment, and the state of the labour market.  
The first point regarding unemployment has already been noted; levels of 
unemployment since the neoliberal reforms remain substantially higher than during 
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the golden era of Keynesianism during the 1950s and 60s. It is widely accepted by 
both Keynesian and Marxist economists that central banks operating a monetarist 
monetary policy framework, which New Zealand continues to operate, rely on 
historically high levels of unemployment to place downward pressure on inflation.121 
Thus, these economists argue there is a causative link between neoliberal economic 
policy and high unemployment. The need for brevity means this cannot be discussed 
more fully, as I am not closely analysing the process of accumulation. It is sufficient 
to note that the onset of neoliberalism is associated with mass unemployment.  
The second point is the changing nature of jobs available in the labour market. These 
changes are well described by Paul Spoonley and Carl Davidson. They argue Western 
economies, including New Zealand, have undergone a transformation from “mass 
production to flexible specialisation.” 122  During the mid-twentieth century, the 
“dominant political-economic framework” of Western economies was characterised 
by the “Fordist” form of production. 123  Economically, Fordism relied on mass 
production and consumption of goods. This required high levels of demand, and was 
supported by the implementation of Keynesian economic management, which sought 
to maintain aggregate demand. The relevant point here is the nature of work which 
underpinned Fordism; it required “standardised work,” which is defined as the 
“employment of individuals for wages and salaries by a single firm, where individuals 
work full-time … and expect (and are expected) to be employed for an indefinite 
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period.”124 Further, New Zealand was characterised by low levels of unemployment, 
and the WEWS ensured relatively high wages. 125  Thus, work during the mid-
twentieth century was predominantly full-time, had high levels of job security, a clear 
career path, and had high enough wages to support a family. This form of 
employment underpinned the economic system by ensuring high levels of demand for 
products, allowing for the mass consumption of goods Fordism required. 
The onset of economic crisis in the 1970s and 80s and the subsequent neoliberal 
reforms heralded the end of the Fordist form of production.126 Newly industrialising 
countries, predominantly located in Asia, began to adopt the mass production 
techniques which characterised Fordism. The costs of production, particularly labour 
costs, are substantially lower in these countries. Thus, mass production began to 
move away from advanced capitalist countries to countries with lower cost structures. 
Further, consumption patterns in advanced capitalist countries were changing. 
Consumer demand moved away from mass produced goods towards “niche” goods 
which expressed the values of consumers. Thus, a post-Fordist regime began to 
emerge which is characterised by “new patterns of production and consumption 
which were more noticeably global and niche-based.”127 To remain competitive, firms 
had to reduce their own cost structures, and become “flexible in product development 
and cost, especially the cost of labour.”128 According to Spoonley and Davidson, this 
flexibility is incompatible with the old system of standardised work. Standardised 
work is inflexible; it guarantees full-time hours, with high levels of job security, and 
historically had provided wages designed to support a family, rather than being set by 
market forces. Thus, a new and more flexible form of work emerged, called “non-
standard work.”129 Non-standard work is defined as the opposite of standard work, 
which includes work that is: part-time; temporary or casual; having multiple jobs; or 
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being self-employed without any employees.130 Crucially, the neoliberal reforms of 
the 1980s and 90s opened New Zealand firms to competition from countries with 
substantially lower cost structures. Thus, New Zealand faced the pressures which 
were undermining the Fordist form of production in other advanced capitalist 
countries. 131  
Table 14: Percentage of workers in Standard and Non-Standard Work, 1981-2006132 
 1981 1991 2001 2006 
Standard 
Work133 
77.2 50.2 41.6 45.4 
Non-Standard 
Work 
22.8 49.8 58.4 54.6 
Part-time 6.3 17.7 22.9 22.4 
 
Table 14: Percentage of workers in Standard and Non-Standard Work, 1981-2006 
outlines the growth of non-standard employment in New Zealand over the past thirty 
years. Standard work is defined as those on wages or salaries, working 30-50 hours 
per week, and working only one job. Between 1981 and 2006, the total amount of 
standard work dropped from 77.2 to 45.4%, with non-standard work now forming the 
majority of jobs in New Zealand. The amount of part-time work has almost 
quadrupled, with a quarter of all jobs being part-time. This shift reflects global 
trends, with non-standard employment commanding “a quantitatively larger share of 
total employment” than it had during the Fordist era.134 
In the economics literature, the causes of this trend are sorted into supply and 
demand side factors. The supply side relates to the decisions of those seeking 
employment in the labour market. The major changes on the supply side relate to 
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changing demographic pressures and social expectations. The most prominent of 
these changes is the breakdown of the “traditional breadwinner couple where the 
man was in full-time work and the woman was not in the labour force at all.”135 This 
resulted in two trends. Firstly, women entered the workforce in large numbers from 
the mid-twentieth century. In 1981, approximately 47% of women were employed in 
the labour force, compared to 79% of males. By 2001, 59% of women were employed, 
compared to 71% of men.136 Secondly, there has been a substantial rise in the number 
of sole parents. In 1975, just over 10% of all families were headed by a sole parent. By 
2009, the number had risen to 28%.137 These trends have contributed to the rise of 
non-standard work, as women are more likely to participate in this form of work 
(particularly part-time work), as it “appear[s] to suit their need to be flexible around 
domestic commitments.”138  
The second demographic change relates to age. Young people are engaged in 
education for longer periods of time, and often shift between full-time work and 
education during their adult lives.139 Young people engaged in education tend to seek 
part-time, temporary or casual work, as they are unable to participate in standard 
work.140 Those nearing or beyond retirement age are also more likely to seek non-
standard work, as they seek to manage their exit from the labour force by reducing 
the amount of hours they work, or working on an irregular basis through contractual 
or temporary work.141 Such options are likely to become increasingly popular, as 
those in the “baby boomer” generation reach retirement age.  There are also a range 
of other supply-side factors not related to demographic changes. These include: an 
increase in higher income professionals holding multiple jobs; high marginal rates of 
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taxation; and a growing interest in work-life balance issues.142 Overall, the effect of 
supply-side factors is to make non-standard work a more desirable option for work 
than standard employment for many workers. 
Demand side factors have also played an important role in changing the nature of 
work. In line with the move to post-Fordism, research conducted by the Centre for 
Research on Work, Education and Research (WEB) argues the growth in non-
standard work represents an increase in demand from business for “flexible” labour. 
The research concludes “supply-side characteristics are not unimportant, [however] 
demand side factors appear to provide more likely explanations.” 143  The most 
important point to note from this research is how demand side factors are supported 
by the employment law framework. WEB argues “the context within which supply 
and demand side factors operate shifted to strengthen the demand side under the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991.”144 So, whilst there was increased demand from 
business, they were only able to achieve a flexible labour force through the support of 
the ECA. Indeed, business groups lobbied the government heavily to implement the 
ECA, with the explicit goal of creating a more flexible labour force.145 Despite the 
introduction of the ERA four years prior to the research, it appears to have little 
effect. WEB cite Department of Labour research which concludes “the large majority 
of workplaces have been largely unaffected by the ERA and there is little in the ERA 
to compel them to make changes.” 146  Importantly, the WEB study found non-
standard work is most common in occupations with low levels of union membership; 
which rapidly declined after the introduction of the ECA. Overall, the effect of 
demand-side factors is to increase the amount of non-standard work available.  
Given the increase in non-standard work is predominantly due to the demands of 
employers, a key question must be whether the increase in non-standard employment 
represents a positive trend for employees. The local research on this topic is well 
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summarised by Spoonley and Davidson, with Spoonley updating the research in 
2010. They point to research by Karl Klare, who argues the New Zealand labour 
market is being split into two separate groups: the first a “highly attached core 
workforce,” characterised by excellent conditions in their employment; and a group 
of “peripheral, low-attachment employees,” who have poor conditions of employment 
and few alternative employment options.147 Work in the peripheral labour force is 
often “precarious,” which is defined as 
Employment [that] can be terminated with little or no notice by an employer, 
that the hours and functions of employment can be changed at short notice, 
that earnings are uncertain and low, that there is no (or little) protection 
against unacceptable working practices and there is limited opportunity to 
gain skills or access to education.148 
There are multiple problems which arise for workers in precarious work: health and 
safety provisions are worse;149 they are likely to be paid less than those in standard 
work;150  be required to work “asocial and extensive hours;”151 and such jobs are 
associated with lower levels of job satisfaction. 152  The temporary nature of the 
employment means “without continuity of employment, a number of benefits, 
including those from employers and the state, as well as the satisfaction and security 
of employees, are foregone.”153 Research from the WEB found “many employees 
employed in casual work … would prefer permanent employment or reported that 
they were unhappy with the quality of their employment.”154 Overall, Spoonley and 
Davidson conclude “the combined effect of these conditions is that precarious casual 
employment limits the options for those in the secondary labour market and restricts 
the opportunities to obtain a living wage, to qualify for mortgages or personal loans 
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and to invest in the education and training of themselves or their dependents.”155 It is 
worth noting, however, many workers have positive experiences in non-standard 
employment, particularly those demographic groups who contributed to the supply-
side factors, and high-skilled and higher income employees.156 However, Spoonley 
concludes “the increase in non-standard work, driven as it has been by the goal of 
increasing labour flexibility, has produced significantly more “bad” jobs.”157  
It is in the context of mass unemployment and an increase in “bad” jobs that the 
theories of Marxism and neo-Marxism become important. In particular, the concept 
of the reserve army of labour is useful. The reserve army is the pool of unemployed 
and underemployed workers in society. They play two key roles in ensuring the 
extraction of surplus value. Firstly, they ensure workers cannot claim all of the 
surplus value, as employers can simply replace them with lower paid workers.158 
Secondly, they ensure greater productivity, as employers can pressure employees to 
work harder out of fear of losing their job, or to accept the introduction of new 
technology.159 One of the roles of the welfare state is to ensure the unemployed are 
prepared to work by ensuring they are suitable for employment.160 
Throughout the 1950s and 60s, New Zealand was characterised by exceptionally low 
unemployment, underpinned by the prevalence of standard work. During this period, 
the vast majority of working-age males were employed, and were therefore not part of 
the reserve army of labour. Women, particularly married women, constituted the 
reserve army of labour, as they could be brought into the labour force in times of 
economic boom, and pushed out during recessions.161 In New Zealand, wages for 
women were set at a lower rate than males, and were therefore a cheap source of 
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labour. The expectation that the male would be the main income-earner meant they 
were a disposable source of labour.162 This had an important impact on the welfare 
state; the reserve army of labour did not have to rely on welfare to avoid poverty, as 
they could rely on the family income. The onset of mass unemployment from the 
1970s, combined with the breakdown of the traditional breadwinner couple, 
fundamentally changed the relationship between the reserve army and the state. The 
reserve army now had to rely on the state, not the family, for their income. This 
substantially increased the cost of the welfare state which, as described in chapter 
three, occurred under the Muldoon Government. The reserve army served as a 
valuable economic asset during the 1950s and 60s by providing a source of cheap and 
disposable labour. By the 1970s and 80s, it became a burden on the state through 
increased social spending. 
The Fourth National’s Government’s welfare reforms should be seen in this light. As I 
previously argued, the three terms are characterised by a shift from a neoliberalism 
dominated by classical liberalism, to one more heavily influenced by conservatism. 
The liberal period was dominated by the 1991 benefit cuts, which reduced social 
spending. This performed the important economic goal of reducing social spending 
by lowering the burden of the reserve army on state finances. By the mid-1990s, 
National was more influenced by conservatism. This shift should be conceptualised 
using James O’Connor’s concepts of social capital and social expenses. Social capital 
refers to social spending which seeks to increase the rate of profit, e.g. through 
investing in education or healthcare. Social expenses are projects which maintain 
social harmony, without increasing the rate of profit.163  
Underlying the increase in obligations and sanctions during the mid-1990s was a 
change in welfare spending from social expenses to social capital. Prior to the 1990s, 
benefits were set at a level, at least nominally, to ensure participation in society and 
prevent poverty amongst beneficiaries. They were predominantly a social expense, 
designed to maintain social harmony. With the introduction of reciprocal obligations, 
work tests and sanctions, welfare was now explicitly designed to ensure beneficiaries 
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were ready to work, were actively seeking work, and would accept offers of 
employment. Case managers provided individualised assistance to ensure 
beneficiaries were improving their job opportunities. The increased intervention of 
welfare into the lives of beneficiaries was designed to ensure the reserve army of 
labour would function more effectively. The ECA moved the power away from 
employees towards employers, allowing employers to substantially increase the levels 
of non-standard work. The welfare reforms supported this goal by providing a source 
of “cheap, non-unionized, compliant wage labour” for employers, who were obliged to 
accept offers of employment.164 Forcing welfare beneficiaries into work helps reduce 
wages and labour costs for businesses, which Marx identified as a key role of the 
reserve army.165 Thus, the welfare reforms assisted the ECA in the growth of non-
standard, low quality work.166 Overall, National was moving welfare spending from a 
social expense to a social capital, which helps boost the profitability of capitalism. 
The welfare reforms also helps shift the incentive to work towards the supply-side of 
the economy. Rather than building an economy with “sufficient long-term jobs at 
decent wages,” which would target the demand side of the labour market, the state 
introduced the threat of relative and absolute poverty to ensure the reserve army 
would seek employment. The 1991 benefit cuts substantially increased relative 
poverty by setting benefit rates below the relative poverty line. The introduction and 
usage of sanctions represents the threat of absolute poverty; if beneficiaries do not 
submit to the requirements imposed by the state, their main (or only) source of 
income will be reduced or removed. The welfare reforms of the Fifth National 
Government have followed the same path. They have deepened the level of 
intervention with the introduction of obligations for parents, drug testing and the 
increased use of sanctions. Overall, National’s welfare reforms should be 
conceptualised as an attempt to ensure the economic effectiveness of the reserve 
army of labour in an environment of high unemployment and an increase in non-
standard, low quality, work. The focus of welfare reforms have not been to create 
suitable employment for beneficiaries, but to ensure they are incentivised to work 
through the threat of relative and absolute poverty.  
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5.5. Conclusion: The Emergence and Entrenchment of a Neoliberal 
Welfare State 
This chapter has applied the theoretical framework outlined in the first two chapters 
to the case studies outlined in chapters three and four. The first section outlined the 
new paternalist ideology which originated in the United States. It was demonstrated 
that new paternalism was an important influence on the Fourth National 
Government, particularly in its later years in government. The influence of new 
paternalism is seen the Fifth National Government’s reforms. Reforms assume 
beneficiaries are incompetent, public statements of morality are utilised, and welfare 
is delivered through case management. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 addressed whether the 
reforms impacted on how New Zealand delivers its social security, drawing on the 
theories outlined in chapter one. Esping-Andersen’s theories show the Fourth 
National Government decreased decommodification and increased the stratification 
of welfare. The Fifth National Government continued to reform welfare according to 
this belief, most notably through decreasing the decommodification of welfare. 
Underlying these changes is the adoption of a neoliberal conception of social 
citizenship. 
Section 5.3 utilised Castles’ concept of the WEWS. Whilst the Fourth National 
Government effectively dismantled it, Labour was able to rebuild a “hollowed out” 
version. National have made some moves towards retrenching these reforms. 
However, I argued this hollowed out version represents a Trojan horse for 
beneficiaries; it maintains the valorisation of work, without any means of ensuring 
full employment, leading to the impoverishment and exclusion of beneficiaries. 
Finally, I drew on the neo-Marxist theories outlined in chapter one to develop two 
further arguments. Firstly, underlying the welfare reforms is a changing relationship 
between the state and the reserve army of labour. In the 1970s and 80s, the reserve 
army began to rely on the state for their welfare, which substantially increased social 
spending. The reforms of the 1990s reacted to this by reducing social spending 
through benefit cuts, and then by making welfare spending a social capital, rather 
than an expense. Secondly, I argued the reforms represent a changing of incentives 
from the demand to the supply side of the economy. Rather than incentivise work 
through the creation of full-time, high wage and sustainable work, welfare reforms 
have incentivised the supply side (potential employees). The main incentive was 
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plunging beneficiaries into relative poverty, with the threat of absolute poverty being 
used to ensure the compliance with increasingly invasive obligations. 
Table 15: Conclusions   
 Fourth National Government Fifth National 
Government 
Paternalism   
Assumption of incompetence Introduced Continued 
Linked to a dysfunctional 
culture 
Introduced Discontinued 
Case Management based on 
“help and hassle” 
Introduced Continued 
Public statements of morality Introduced Continued 
Esping-Andersen   
Neoliberal conception of 
social citizenship 
Introduced Continued 
Decommodification Decreased Decreased 
Stratification Increased Research unclear 
Wage Earners’ Welfare 
State 
  
Managed labour market Dismantled Some retrenchment 
of Labour’s ERA 
Poverty  Substantial Increase Maintained 
Inequality Substantial Increase Maintained 
Minimum protections Not yet implemented Some retrenchment 
WFF Not yet implemented Some retrenchment 
Neo-Marxism   
Reserve Army of Labour Reduced cost and move from 
social expense to social 
capital 
Continued to turn 
welfare expenditure 
into social capital 
 
The final task is to bring these four key findings together. Table 15: Conclusions 
shows the arguments across the four sections. It is clear the Fourth National 
Government radically reformed the welfare state. It entrenched New Zealand in the 
category of a liberal welfare regime, introduced paternalism, and dismantled the 
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WEWS. The Fifth National Government’s record is not so clear. On one hand, it has 
continued the paternalist reforms and decreased decommodification. Indeed, in the 
area of obligations, it has moved further than the previous National Government. On 
the other, it has maintained poverty and inequality levels in spite of a recession, and 
has not dismantled the reforms of the previous Labour Government. However, it has 
retrenched some of Labour’s reforms. Thus, in each of the three areas, the Fifth 
National Government has continued to reform welfare in the same direction, though 
to varying degrees of similarity, as had been done in the 1990s. This is most obvious 
in the analysis of paternalism and Esping-Andersen’s concepts, which more closely 
focus on welfare provision. It is weakest in the WEWS, which focusses on the labour 
market and distributional outcomes. Overall, National has clearly moved New 
Zealand to the political right over the six years analysed in this thesis. In terms of 
welfare, the reforms are driven by a neoliberal conception of citizenship and new 
paternalism; a school of thought located in the neoliberal tradition. National’s move 
to the right has been guided by neoliberalism. 
It is worth considering these reforms in the context of Louise Humpage’s work 
referred to earlier in this chapter. Over the past 25 years, there has been a substantial 
change in the public’s views regarding welfare. Broadly, there has been a significant 
hardening of views against the unemployed. 167  For example, in 1993, 69% of 
respondents agreed with the statement “Government should be responsible to ensure 
a decent standard of living for the unemployed,” with only 22% disagreeing. By 2011, 
45% agreed, and 45% disagreed.168 This is supplemented by the earlier conclusions 
that the majority of New Zealanders believe beneficiaries are lazy, dependent, 
fraudsters, could get a job if they really tried, and could “stand on their own two feet” 
if their benefits were less generous. Further, National is viewed as a better party than 
Labour to reform and manage the welfare state. Overall, Humpage argues there has 
“been a hardening of New Zealand attitudes towards the unemployed over the past 
two decades, particularly between 2008 and 2011,” suggesting “the public largely 
endorses the direction of National’s incremental welfare reform, representing a 
definite shift to the political right on this issue.”169 This is in stark contrast with the 
Fourth National Government, which faced a major public backlash over the 
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“previously unannounced [welfare] reforms in the early 1990s.”170  The depth of the 
unpopularity of the wider reforms was seen in opinion polls, with National’s support 
dropping from around 50% in 1990, to 22% by late 1991.171 Whereas National went 
against public opinion in the 1990s, the Fifth National Government appears to be 
broadly in line with it. 
Given the popularity of National’s recent reforms, these reforms should be considered 
an entrenchment of neoliberal welfare reforms. They are not as extreme or as 
extensive as the 1990s; however, in some areas they are extending the reforms, and in 
others slowly moving towards the right. A key difference between the governments is 
in the support for the reforms; National’s recent welfare reforms are popular, making 
them less likely to be reversed, at least in the short term. Not only is the neoliberal 
welfare state more popular than it has ever been, it is more popular in New Zealand 
than in the UK, Canada or Australia.172 Thus, given the recent reforms are more 
popular than the neoliberal reforms during the 1990s and less likely to be reversed, 
the recent reforms represent an entrenching of the neoliberal features of welfare. 
Overall, a neoliberal form of welfare emerged in the 1990s, and has been entrenched 
from the late 2010s. This conclusion should be put in the context of the high 
unemployment and an increase in bad jobs. At the same time the economic system is 
producing mass unemployment and poor quality jobs, the view that beneficiaries are 
to blame for relying on welfare is increasingly popular. The increase in welfare 
“dependency” does not appear to be seen as a failure of neoliberalism. Indeed, it is 
the opposite; neoliberal welfare reform now forms part of the popularity of both 
neoliberalism and the National Party.  
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The first two chapters of this thesis outlined a theoretical framework to analyse the 
evolution of the welfare state. The first chapter provided a literature review of the 
political economy of welfare, and began with a description of the welfare regimes 
debate. It outlined Gosta Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare regimes. He uses 
three concepts to guide his categorisation: social citizenship; decommodification; and 
stratification. He concludes that New Zealand is a liberal welfare state, with a high 
degree of commodification and stratification. Frank Castles’ work showed several 
deficiencies with the categorisation of Australia and New Zealand as liberal regimes. 
These countries were better categorised as wage earners’ welfare states (WEWS), 
which guaranteed people social security through work. Once this was taken into 
account, Castles’ argues it was clear these countries were closer to social democratic 
regimes in both intent and outcomes than other liberal regimes. Then, the three 
dominant traditions in political economy were described: neoliberalism; social 
democracy; and neo-Marxism. Each tradition provides a different characterisation of 
the relationship between the welfare state and capitalism. Neoliberals view the 
welfare state as a costly burden on the economy; social democrats view welfare as 
ameliorating inequality and extending social citizenship; and neo-Marxists view it as 
a crucial institution in ensuring the profitability and legitimacy of capitalism. Finally, 
I outlined my own position in relation to these traditions. I predominantly drew from 
the social democratic theories of Esping-Andersen and Castles. I supplemented their 
theories with the more critical insights derived from neo-Marxism, particularly 
regarding the role of the reserve army of labour and how welfare assists the 
profitability of capitalism. 
The second chapter completed the theoretical framework by providing a basis to 
compare the two National Governments. This basis was found in the new paternalism 
school of thought, which originated from Conservative thinkers from the US in the 
1970s and 80s. Three key elements of new paternalism were identified. The first 
element is the assumption of incompetence amongst beneficiaries, which is linked to 
a dysfunctional culture. The second is a reliance on case management to provide 
welfare, which was based on a “help and hassle” approach. The final element is that 




The third and fourth chapters outlined the two case studies. Chapter three described 
the welfare reforms of the Fourth National Government, and identified the key trends 
of this period. I demonstrated the reforms of the early 1990s were driven by 
neoclassical economic theories. Policies were designed to reduce public debt, and 
improve work incentives through cutting benefit rates and taxes for low income 
earners. By the end of the 1990s, National were strongly influenced by the new 
paternalist school of thought. The influence of new paternalism was demonstrated 
through the similarities in the analysis of welfare, and by the extensive levels of direct 
contact between New Zealand, Wisconsin and Lawrence Mead. I characterise this 
shift as a change from a neoliberalism dominated by classical liberalism, to one more 
heavily influenced by conservatism.  
The fourth chapter described and analysed the Fifth National Government’s welfare 
reforms. Overall, National’s goal was to reduce “welfare dependency” by encouraging 
people into work. This encouragement took the form of a “punitive, obligation-based, 
sanction-reinforced process.”1 Sole parents, people with health issues, and youth were 
targeted by reforms, with each group facing an array of new obligations. National also 
utilised a particular form of rhetoric to justify their reforms, which sought to avoid 
the controversy created by its 1990s reforms.  
The final chapter brought together the previous four chapters, and sought to critically 
analyse and evaluate the reforms of the National Governments. The two National 
Governments were characterised by the evolution of a neoliberal outlook on welfare, 
one which was initially dominated by classical liberalism, to one more heavily 
influenced by conservatism. There are significant similarities in the welfare reforms 
of the two National Governments. Reforms increased the level of paternalism in 
welfare, with beneficiaries now facing an array of behavioural obligations backed by 
the threat of sanctions. The method New Zealand uses to deliver social security has 
been fundamentally altered. The Fourth National Government saw the emergence of 
a neoliberal approach to welfare; and the Fifth National Government has entrenched 
it. This thesis was supported through using Esping-Andersen’s welfare typology and 
Castles’ conception of the WEWS. The concepts created by Esping-Andersen showed 
a clear move towards a liberal welfare regime, driven by a change in the content of 
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social citizenship, and an increase in commodification and stratification. The WEWS 
was a major area of change, with the Fourth National Government effectively 
dismantling it. The Fifth National Government made only minor changes in this area 
after the reforms of the previous Labour Government. However, the cumulative 
results of these reforms have been to turn the WEWS into a Trojan horse, which 
valorises work, but brings with it increased poverty, inequality, and the 
impoverishment and exclusion of beneficiaries. Finally, I utilised the insights of neo-
Marxism to develop two further arguments. Firstly, underlying the welfare reforms 
was a fundamentally changed relationship between the state and the reserve army of 
labour. The breakdown of the Fordist era meant the reserve army became a 
significant expense on the state. The welfare reforms of the 1990s sought to reduce 
this expense, and then turn welfare spending from a social expense to a social capital. 
Secondly, the welfare reforms have sought to strengthen the incentive to work on the 
supply side of the economy. The Keynesian era was defined high levels of 
employment and full-time work. The neoliberal era, conversely, is defined by mass 
unemployment and an increase in low-quality work. The welfare reforms now serve 
to strengthen the incentive to work through increasing poverty in order to encourage 
participation in low quality work. 
Wider Importance 
In the introduction to this thesis, I outlined three areas where this thesis would 
contribute to the wider academic and public debate on welfare. The first pointed to 
the lack of an analysis of the broad shape of welfare provision reform under the Fifth 
National Government, and that nearly no comparisons have been made between the 
Fourth and Fifth National Governments. This thesis has contributed in both of these 
areas. The second was the lack of analysis of the evolution of social security, 
particularly from a political economy perspective. In chapter five, I built on recent 
work by Peter Starke and Shaun Wilson et al. to conclude the “hollowed out” WEWS 
represents a Trojan horse for beneficiaries. This is a modified thesis of Wilson et al., 
and hopefully represents a worthy contribution to the field. 
Finally, I noted the academic and public debate over whether neoliberalism is still a 
relevant concept in analysing the Fifth National Government. A range of authors 
argue the Fifth National Government cannot be classified as neoliberal; Grant 




increasingly of historical interest only.”2 These writers who rejected neoliberalism did 
not address welfare reforms in their analyses. Thus, this thesis does not provide a 
direct refutation of the examples used to support their arguments. However, it has 
shown significant similarities between the welfare reforms of the two National 
Governments. There is no question the previous National Government can be 
classified as neoliberal. The similarities between the two Governments provides clear 
evidence that neoliberalism is still relevant in analysing welfare. Further, these 
similarities can be traced to the new paternalism school of thought, which was a 
major part of neoliberal reforms in New Zealand and the US. Thus, in the field of 
welfare, neoliberalism is still a valuable and relevant theoretical lens to use in the 
analysis of reforms. Indeed, the central argument of this thesis is that the Fifth 
National Government is entrenching neoliberal reforms. 
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New Zealand Real GDP Growth 
Source: David Briggs, Looking at the Numbers: a View of New Zealand's Economic 
History (Wellington, NZIER, 2003), 37.  
Year GDP Growth Average Growth  
   5 years 10 Years 
1945 5,497    
1946 5,659 2.95   
1947 5,683 0.42   
1948 5,863 3.17   
1949 5,570 -5.00   
1950 5,847 4.97 1.30  
1951 6,759 15.60   
1952 6,387 -5.50   
1953 6,380 -0.11   
1954 6,572 3.01   
1955 7,017 6.77 3.95  
Source: David Thorns and Charles Sedgwick, Understanding Aotearoa/New Zealand:  
Historical Statistics (Palmerston North, The Dunmore Press, 1997), 81.  
1955 13,252    
1956 13,744 3.71   
1957 14,009 1.93   
1958 14,737 5.20   
1959 15,148 2.79   
1960 15,744 3.93 3.51  
1961 16,711 6.14   
1962 17,270 3.35   
1963 17,799 3.06   
1964 18,884 6.10   
1965 20,038 6.11 4.95 4.23 




1967 22,065 3.79   
1968 21,875 -0.86   
1969 22,341 2.13   
1970 23,469 5.05 3.24  
1971 24,338 3.70   
1972 24,957 2.54   
1973 26,063 4.43   
1974 27,933 7.17   
1975 29,059 4.03 4.38 4.02 
1976 29,548 1.68   
1977 29,591 0.15   
1978 28,775 -2.76   
1979 28,835 0.21   
1980 29,571 2.55 0.37  
1981 29,888 1.07   
1982 31,357 4.92   
1983 31,561 0.65   
1984 32,422 2.73   
1985 34,022 4.93 2.86 1.52 
1986 34,284 0.77   
1987 33,005 -3.73   
1988 35,471 7.47   
1989 35,212 -0.73   
1990 35,800 1.67 1.09  
Source: Statistics New Zealand (2002) INFOS 3.0. (Wellington: Statistics New 
Zealand). 
INFOS series SNBA.S2AZAT        
1989 72,989    
1990 73,607 0.85   
1991 73,174 -0.59   
1992 72,278 -1.22   
1993 73,124 1.17   
1994 77,740 6.31   




1996 85,015 3.78   
1997 87,268 2.65   
1998 88,953 1.93   
1999 88,970 0.02 2.75  
     
Public Debt   
Source: David Thorns and Charles Sedgwick, Understanding Aotearoa/New Zealand, 
104 
Public Debt Total debt % increase   
1975 4200.0 12.4   
1976 5557.0 32.3   
1977 6289.2 13.2   
1978 7483.8 19   
1979 8819.5 17.8   
1980 10346.4 17.3   
1981 11617.0 12.3   
1982 14382.0 23.6   
1983 18733.0 30.3   
1984 21879.0 16.8   
  Overall 20.725%  
 
